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BEDROOM: REVITALIZING APPLICATION OF 
THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ACT TO PRIVATE 
RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 
Tim Iglesias 
 
What is crowded to some is exactly what is comfortable to others; 
what is comfortable to some is exactly what is lonely to others.1 
 
New empirical evidence demonstrates that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard (a common residential occupancy policy) 
substantially limits the housing choices of many thousands of 
families, especially Latinos, Asians, and extended families 
nationwide. The federal Fair Housing Act makes overly restrictive 
policies illegal, but promotion of the standard by housing providers, 
confusion in the courts and the enforcement practices of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have 
enabled the two-person-per-bedroom standard to become dominant 
with a false veneer of legality. This article urges HUD to use its 
regulatory authority to remedy the situation and offers several 
solutions. And, if HUD fails to act, it encourages private plaintiffs to 
challenge the two-person-per-bedroom standard and provides 
guidance to courts in deciding these cases. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. The following people provided helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article for which I am very grateful: Michael Allen, Chris Brancart, 
Anne Houghtaling, Richard Marcantonio, Rigel C. Oliveri, Mike Rawson, Robert Schwemm, Jodi Short 
and members of the USF School of Law faculty, especially Tristin Green and Josh Davis. Also special 
thanks to Rick Sander, Rich Hertz, Don Dixon, Sara Pratt and numerous practitioners including Mike 
Hanley and Matthew Dietz. I owe a great debt to the following USF law students who provided 
excellent research and other assistance for this article: Brandy Hillman-Azevedo, Kate Chatfield, 
Gwendolyn Harre, Christie Moore, and Peter O’Hare. Of course, any errors in this article are solely the 
responsibility of the author. 
 1. Ellen Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards: Inscribing Ethnicity and Family Relations on the 
Land, 19 J. ARCHITECTURAL PLAN. RES. 300, 305 (2002). 
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INTRODUCTION 
A family living in a home will often contract and expand over 
time, depending on a variety of life circumstances. Children are born 
or added to the family by adoption or foster care. Or parents may 
divorce and establish separate households between which their 
children split time.2 Sometimes children sleep three to a room, or an 
uncle sleeps in the basement. A variety of financial and other 
considerations inform decisions about who is and how many people 
are considered members of the family’s household and who sleeps in 
what room. At a time when families struggle to make ends meet, 
allowing them to choose their living arrangements seems particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Other possibilities include the following: Children move away, but may want to return home 
after college. A divorced person with children may move back home. Someone with children from a 
prior marriage may remarry and establish a “blended household.” Elderly people may want to live with 
their children or extended relatives, either to care for others or to receive care themselves. 
3
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important.3 Even apart from economic concerns, many extended and 
intergenerational families desire to live together in one household.4 
Families living in single family owner-occupied housing often 
“double up,” but are rarely subject to enforcement of city housing 
codes. In contrast, renters are regularly subject to occupancy policies 
created and enforced by landlords and property management 
agencies. Many (perhaps most) landlords in the United States impose 
a maximum two-person-per-bedroom occupancy rule,5 which often 
prevents families who want to live together from doing so. Owners of 
nicer housing in higher-end neighborhoods and property management 
agencies managing large numbers of units regularly impose this 
limitation.6 Progressive housing advocates have argued for years that 
the bright line two-person-per-bedroom standard harms families of 
all kinds, particularly families of color.7 However, landlords and 
landlord advocates have dug in, defending the two-person-per-
                                                                                                                 
 3. Landlords sometimes refer to these practices as “doubling up.” “Census Bureau data released in 
September showed that the number of multifamily households jumped 11.7 percent from 2008 to 2010, 
reaching 15.5 million, or 13.2 percent of all households. It is the highest proportion since at least 1968, 
accounting for 54 million people.” Michael Lou, ‘Doubling Up’ in Recession-Strained Quarters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, at A1. “[T]he number of people in multigenerational households grew by 2.6 
million between 2007 and 2008.” Jennifer Ludden, Boomerang Kids Drive Rise of Extended Family 
Living, NPR.ORG, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124787436 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
 4. Dozens of posts on blogs and community forums requesting information and advice on this issue 
attest to its importance in the daily lives of renters. See, e.g., How Many People Can Live in a 3 
Bedroom House in Columbus[,] Ohio?, GOFTP ANSWERS, 
http://www.goftp.com/qna/How_many_people_can_live_in_a_3_bedroom_house_in_columbus_ohio-
qna324803.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). Interestingly, the city of Ames, Iowa attempts to make it 
easy for families who want to live under one roof to determine the city’s regulations. See Occupancy 
Laws for Rental Housing, CITY OF AMES, IOWA, http://www.cityofames.org/index.aspx?page=188 (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 5. See infra Part II.A. This article is a companion article to Tim Iglesias, Clarifying the Federal 
Fair Housing Act’s Exemption for Reasonable Occupancy Restrictions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1211 
(2004) (clarifying the relationship between the FHAA and governmental residential occupancy 
standards and proposing solutions to the problem created by the ambiguous exemption from FHAA for 
“reasonable” governmental occupancy standards). 
 6. See, e.g., Uludag v. Draper & Kramer, Inc., HUDALJ No. 06-047-FH, 2006 WL 2848628 (HUD 
Sept. 21, 2006) (where the company managed 574 units); Complaint at 2, Leather v. Florence Tollgate 
Condo. Ass’n, FHEO No. 02-06-0101-8 (HUD filed Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14495.pdf (where the company managed 
320 units). 
 7. See infra Part I.B. In addition, Catholics and Mormons, who traditionally have larger families 
and who are also protected by the FHAA on the basis of religion, may also be strongly affected. 
However, statistics linking religion and housing are not available. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 623 
 
bedroom standard, citing their need for a clear rule and concerns 
about “overcrowding.”8 
Upon close examination, justifications for the two-person-per-
bedroom occupancy standard are weak.9 Moreover, new empirical 
studies demonstrate that application of a two-person-per-bedroom 
standard predictably results in prima facie discrimination against 
families in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act 
(FHAA)10 in many housing markets.11 In the case of studio 
apartments, this standard discriminates in 44 states, and it 
discriminates as applied to one-bedroom apartments in every state 
except North Dakota.12 Studio and one-bedroom apartments account 
for approximately 32% of all rental apartment units, and almost 50% 
of rental apartment units in larger buildings.13 Latino and Asian 
families in every state suffer the greatest discriminatory effects of 
this standard because they tend to live in larger family groups.14 
Despite its widespread discriminatory effects, however, the two-
person-per-bedroom standard is widely perceived as the legally-
compliant standard in most of the country.15 Landlords and property 
management companies strongly prefer this traditional occupancy 
standard. And, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD)—the agency charged with enforcing the Fair 
Housing Act—inadvertently aids and abets this perception of legality 
through the use of the two-person-per-bedroom standard as part of its 
occupancy enforcement policy contained in the “Keating Memo.”16 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text for a discussion of landlords’ justifications for 
residential occupancy standards. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3608 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
 12. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Author’s Calculations Analyzing U.S. Census Bureau Data, 2008–2010 American 
Community Survey, 3-Year Estimates—Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(data available at http://dataferrett.census.gov/) (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (on file with author); 
Characteristics of Rental Apartment Units, 2009, Quick Facts: Apartment Stock NAT’L MULTI HOUSING 
COUNCIL, http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfm?ContentItemID=141 (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011) (reporting statistics from apartment units in structures with five or more units using U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2009 American Housing Survey). 
 14. Ludden, supra note 3. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. Memorandum from Frank Keating, General Counsel, HUD to all Regional Counsel regarding 
5
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The Keating Memo provides that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard is presumptively reasonable and articulates a multi-factor 
analysis to determine if any residential occupancy standard may 
violate the FHAA.17 Under that policy, HUD usually refrains from 
investigating when landlords impose a two-person-per-bedroom 
limit. This practice lends an unjustified quasi-legal veneer to the two-
person-per-bedroom standard. In the end, the under-enforcement of 
the FHAA in this area hurts many thousands of families nationwide 
that Congress intended to protect. 
The application of the Fair Housing Act to private residential 
occupancy standards is an area ripe for examination.18 Not only has 
the dominant status of the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
remained largely under cover, but until now no one has demonstrated 
its frequent discriminatory effects on families. This Article makes 
these two contributions. It exposes the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard as the dominant standard with a false aura of legal 
legitimacy, and it challenges the standard as an unfair and often 
illegal restriction on the housing choices of families protected by the 
FHAA. These findings pose an important and difficult problem for 
                                                                                                                 
“Fair Housing Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Cases” (Mar. 20, 1991), reprinted in Fair Housing 
Enforcement—Occupancy Standards Notice of Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,256, 70,256–57 
(filed Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Keating Memo]. The Keating Memo is extensively discussed infra 
Part II.B and Part III.B.2. 
 17. See id. 
 18. One commentator characterized the issue as one of “the most unsettled areas” in the FHAA and 
one that has created “significant controversy.” Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act: Discrimination Against Families with Children, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 
297, 300, 310 (1995). Despite the importance and complexity of regulation of residential occupancy 
standards, there has been very little coverage of familial discrimination caused by restrictive residential 
occupancy standards in law reviews. See Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America’s Families: 
Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1266 (2005); Allen, supra; Daniel Barkley, 
Beyond the Beltway: Familial Status Under the Fair Housing Act, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 93, 96 (1997); Harry J. Kelly, III, Discrimination and Occupancy Limits: Finding 
a Middle Ground, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 51 (1994–95); James Morales, 
Creating New Housing Opportunities for Families with Children: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 744, 750–51 (1988); Jim Morales, The Emergence of Fair Housing 
Protections Against Arbitrary Occupancy Standards, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 103 (1996). In addition, many 
secondary sources are incomplete, confused, wrong, or unhelpful in their statement of the law and 
advice. See, e.g., Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, Regulating Occupancy Under the Fair Housing Act, in ALI-
ABA, DRAFTING AND (RE-DRAFTING) DOCUMENTS FOR CONDOMINIUMS AND PLANNED COMMUNITIES 
IN TROUBLED TIMES: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES (2009) (discussing the Keating Memorandum but 
omitting the case law applying disparate impact analysis). 
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HUD as the nation’s primary enforcer of the FHAA. HUD Secretary 
Shaun Donovan has recently emphasized that “HUD has renewed its 
focus on research, data, and evidence-based policymaking.”19 Based 
upon this commitment and the combination of this Article’s 
empirical evidence and argument, the Article encourages HUD to use 
its regulatory authority to move the country to a less restrictive 
standard and articulates several reasonable alternatives for HUD to 
consider.20 This Article also seeks to enable private fair housing 
litigants to challenge the two-person-per-bedroom policy in 
appropriate cases, and it offers courts guidance for deciding these 
cases.21 
This issue is particularly important now because the current 
mortgage and foreclosure housing crises have worsened our chronic 
affordable housing crisis. Plus, the expected increase in Latino and 
Asian households—whose larger families tend to be 
disproportionately excluded by the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard—makes proper enforcement of the FHAA an even more 
important issue for the future. 
This Article is organized in three parts.22 Part I introduces the 
FHAA and the problem of restrictive residential occupancy 
standards. It then critiques justifications proffered for the two-person-
per-bedroom standard and presents substantial original empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Shaun Donovan, Message From the Secretary, EVIDENCE MATTERS, Winter 2011, at 2. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. Note that Kelly, supra note 18, at 61–62 proposes a three part test described 
as “a modified version of the pragmatic test used in Mountain Side I”: (1) Is the occupancy standard 
based on neutral standards?; (2) Is there actual evidence of familial discrimination or discrimination 
against other protected classes?; and (3) How has the owner actually applied the standard? In the 
author’s view, Mr. Kelly’s analysis and solution are inadequate because he construes the FHAA to only 
prohibit discrimination against “families as families,” in effect limiting the scope of familial status 
coverage to intentional discrimination. Id. at 53, 54, 62. 
 21. See infra Part III.C–D. 
 22. This Article focuses on neutral residential occupancy standards that discriminate on the basis of 
familial status. They also can discriminate against people based upon their race, national origin, religion 
or disability. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 984 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
plaintiff established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact under the Fair Housing Act with 
evidence that conversion to an all-adult rental policy in defendant’s building had a substantially greater 
adverse impact on minority tenants). These dimensions of the problem are left for future scholarship. 
This Article also does not consider the application of the two-person-per-bedroom standard as applied in 
HUD-assisted properties, as challenged in Head v. Cornerstone Residential Management, Inc., No. 05-
80280, 2010 WL 326035, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2010), because that standard rests on a distinct legal 
basis. 
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evidence demonstrating that the two-person-per-bedroom standard is 
discriminatory as applied in a wide range of housing contexts and 
jurisdictions nationwide. It argues that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard should not be considered presumptively compliant with the 
FHAA but rather should more properly be considered presumptively 
discriminatory. Landlords want and need a residential occupancy 
standard that can be easily applied and that provides assurance that 
the landlord is acting within the bounds of the law. However, the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard is not the appropriate standard. 
This conclusion sets the stage for a deeper investigation of how we 
got where we are and proposals for a new solution. 
Part II takes a step back and explains how the two-person-per-
bedroom rule became a dominant residential occupancy standard. It 
argues that the two-person-per-bedroom standard has become 
dominant not because it is a good standard or the right standard, but 
because of a lack of a clear liability standard, landlord advocacy, and 
dysfunctions in FHAA enforcement. 
Drawing upon previous cases and the insights incorporated into 
HUD’s existing enforcement guideline, Part III proposes innovative 
ways for HUD to better enforce the antidiscrimination goal of the 
FHAA by moving private housing providers to a less restrictive 
residential occupancy standard that also treats landlords fairly and 
reasonably. Moreover, it makes clear that HUD has the power to 
effect important social change without overstepping its bounds. In 
addition, Part III urges private fair housing enforcement and offers 
guidance to assist courts in case HUD fails to act. 
I.   STUCK IN THE WRONG PLACE: WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE TWO-
PERSON-PER-BEDROOM STANDARD? 
Part II argues that the two-person-per-bedroom standard has 
become the dominant standard unchallenged in many jurisdictions. 
However, is the status quo really a problem? In other words, is the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard a good stasis or a bad stalemate? 
From the standpoint of the housing industry, especially residential 
8
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management companies that operate in several states, the status quo 
(a predictable and clear two-person-per-bedroom standard) represents 
an achievement—a stable equilibrium in a complex issue that could 
have been rife with litigation. 
Some regulators may agree with the housing industry on this point. 
They may argue that the two-person-per-bedroom standard reformed 
the housing market from some more restrictive standards that were 
common prior to the FHAA, and that therefore some reasonable 
progress has been made. Some might argue that even if it is a 
Gordian knot, then it is a valuable knot that ties plaintiffs, defendants, 
and courts together with the benefits of stability.23 
But the mere fact that law is settled does not make it ideal. Nor 
should stability alone shield a law from examination. History is 
littered with stable but unjust laws; stability alone is not a compelling 
reason to continue using a legal rule. In particular, in the context of 
civil rights, widespread (and traditional) practice by the regulated 
community together with perceived “reasonableness” by that 
community is not a compelling basis for under-enforcement of a 
statute intended to rectify past injustices. 
This part first presents background on the FHAA and explains the 
residential occupancy standard problem. It then demonstrates that 
under-enforcement of the FHAA in this area allows many 
discriminatory practices to go unaddressed, (i.e., rental refusals and 
evictions of larger families and especially families of people of 
color). 
A.  Background on the Federal Fair Housing Act and the Residential 
Occupancy Standard Problem 
In 1968, on the heels of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Congress enacted the Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).24 
The FHA was adopted to expand housing opportunities and to 
                                                                                                                 
 23. The author thanks Chris Brancart for this insight. Telephone interview with Chris Brancart, 
Partner, Brancart & Brancart (July 25, 2010). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
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promote integrated living patterns.25 It prohibits discrimination 
against members of specified protected classes in a wide range of 
housing activities and transactions, including renting, selling, and 
finance.26 The classes protected under the original FHA in 1968 were 
race, color, and religion.27 In 1988, the FHA was amended to add 
familial status and disability as protected classes.28 (The law is now 
typically referred to as the “FHAA” for “Fair Housing Amendments 
Act.”) The term “familial status” is not used as in common parlance 
but is defined as a household which includes at least one minor 
child.29 This new protected class was added based upon two HUD-
sponsored studies that found widespread housing discrimination 
against the highly-valued social institution of the family and the use 
of “no children” policies as pretexts to discriminate based upon 
race.30 “Congress expanded the Fair Housing Act to protect against 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. § 3604. 
 27. Id. Sex was added as a protected class in 1973. 
 28. Id. § 3602(h). 
 29. “Familial status” refers to a household including a child under the age of eighteen and his or her 
legal guardian, regardless of age or number of children. Familial status also includes pregnant women, 
families that are planning to adopt, and families that have or are planning to have foster children (or to 
become guardians of children). See id. § 3602(k); see also Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section I Holding 
Corp., 746 F. Supp. 301, 309–10 (S.D. NY 1990) (FHAA protects single parents). Some people find the 
FHAA’s use of the term “familial status” confusing or misleading. It does not include every household 
composition that might be called a “family” in everyday conversation. At the time of writing, HUD has 
issued a proposed regulation to expand the definition of “family” under the FHAA to include lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender families and couples. See Press Release, Brian Sullivan, HUD, HUD 
Proposes New Rule to Ensure Equal Access Housing Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender 
Identity (Jan. 20, 2011), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2011/HUDNo.11-
006. 
 30. See JANE G. GREENE & GLENDA P. BLAKE, A STUDY OF HOW RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES 
AFFECT FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 3, 34 (1980) (research conducted for the Office of Policy 
Development and Research, HUD); ROBERT W. MARANS ET AL., MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL 
PRACTICES AFFECTING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1980) (prepared for the 
Office of Policy Development and Research, HUD); see also Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 326 
(3d Cir. 1989) (Roth, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184); United States v. Branella, 972 F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.J. 1997) (citing reasons 
why Congress added “familial status” with citations to cases and legislative history: “Congress 
expanded the Fair Housing Act to protect against familial status discrimination in light of an express 
concern for the plight of single-parent families, young families with children, and poor families”); 
United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (quoting 134 CONG. REC. H4611 
(daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Miller)). Congress intended to prohibit the exclusion of 
families with children from housing opportunities based on invidious discrimination and stereotypes. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2180; Sierra v. City of 
10
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familial status discrimination in light of an express concern for the 
plight of single-parent families, young families with children, and 
poor families.”31 Restrictive residential occupancy standards were 
one of the housing problems that Congress specifically targeted in the 
enactment of the 1988 amendments to the FHA.32 In addition, 
“Congress noted racial segregation was exacerbated by the exclusion 
of families with children in the sale or rental of a dwelling.”33 “The 
Amendments were ‘carefully crafted to protect American families, 
without placing an undue burden on owners and landlords.’”34 
This Article focuses on cases in which plaintiffs challenge private 
neutral residential occupancy standards (such as a two-person-per-
bedroom limitation) as discriminating based upon familial status.35 
Courts have recognized both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims under the FHAA in restrictive residential occupancy cases. In 
disparate treatment cases challenging neutral restrictive residential 
occupancy standards,36 a plaintiff presents evidence that the standard 
is caused by intentional discrimination against families. If the 
plaintiff carries her burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
present a nondiscriminatory reason for its policy. If the defendant 
succeeds, a plaintiff can try to demonstrate that the proffered reason 
                                                                                                                 
New York, 579 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 31. Branella, 972 F. Supp. at 297; see also City of Butler, 892 F.2d at 326. 
 32. United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991), was one of the first published cases 
applying the FHAA to a claim of familial status discrimination based upon a neutral restrictive 
occupancy standard. In its analysis of the legislative history, the court states: “Congress indicated that 
these amendments are intended to alleviate the squeeze on affordable housing stock for families with 
children and to protect such families from eviction or inability to find reasonably priced places to live.” 
Id. at 1017. This statement is followed by a citation to Rep. Miller, 134 CONG. REC. H4611 (daily ed. 
June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Miller). 
 33. Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. 1427, 1429 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2180, 2182.). 
 34. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. at 1429 (citing 134 CONG. REC. H4687 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (remarks by 
Rep. Pelosi)). 
 35. While this Article focuses on familial discrimination, sometimes landlords use a neutral 
residential occupancy standard to refuse to rent or evict a family because of its race or national origin. 
See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (alleging familial status and racial 
discrimination). These cases may be brought as race/national origin claims. 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992) (disparate treatment); Reeves, 
108 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (same); Complaint at 4, Interfaith Hous. Ctr. of the N. Suburbs v. Giarelli, FHEO 
No. 05-07-0669-8 (HUD filed Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14471.pdf (charging that one person per 
bedroom residential occupancy standard was used to exclude families). 
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is only pretextual. Under a disparate impact theory,37 a plaintiff can 
challenge a neutral residential occupancy standard as a violation of 
the FHAA by demonstrating through statistics that the application of 
this limitation has the effect of excluding a substantial proportion of 
families from housing units compared to non-family households in 
the relevant geographical area.38 If a plaintiff has sufficiently made 
out a prima facie case of discrimination, most courts require 
defendants to rebut the claim and defend their policy by producing 
some kind of a “legitimate business reason” or “business 
necessity.”39 Some courts require defendants to rebut the prima facie 
case by demonstrating that their policy is “the least restrictive means 
to achieve a compelling business purpose.”40 
The federal FHAA protects housing choice.41 Housing is an 
important social need because having a decent, affordable, stable 
home is a fundamental building block of life.42 Housing choice is 
important because each family or household has particular needs and 
preferences as well as a limited budget. While many factors affect the 
breadth of housing opportunities available, a restrictive residential 
occupancy standard is an important but frequently overlooked one. 
These standards represent an important area where fair housing law 
and concerns about housing affordability overlap. 
A residential occupancy standard limits the number of persons 
who can legally occupy a particular residential space (e.g., two 
persons per bedroom).43 Generally, a residential occupancy standard 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(disparate impact); United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc. 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995) (same). Even 
when a defendant rents to some families a court might still find a disparate impact violation because of 
refusal to rent to a larger family. E.g., United States v. Hover, No. C 93-20061 JW, 1995 WL 55379 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (two parents and four children). 
 38. See generally Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347. 
 39. See, e.g., id. 
 40. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayers, 855 F. Supp. 315, 319 (C.D. Cal. 
1994). 
 41. See, e.g., Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1179 (“[T]he issue is not whether any housing was made available 
to Mayeaux, but whether she was denied the housing she desired on impermissible grounds.”). 
 42. See generally Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2007). 
 43. Most people are familiar with other types of non-residential occupancy restrictions, such as rules 
stating maximum allowable occupancy in elevators, pools, and meeting rooms, which are based solely 
on health and safety concerns. See Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (rare 
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may be set and enforced by governments or by private landlords. 
Usually governments set residential occupancy standards to protect 
public health and safety (fire safety, for example); these standards are 
generous, allowing more persons to occupy a given amount of space 
than occupancy standards set by private landlords.44 Private landlords 
and property managers may have many different purposes for 
selecting and enforcing residential occupancy standards; their 
standards are typically more restrictive than those set by 
governments. 
In the landlord–tenant context, restrictive residential occupancy 
standards commonly deny families housing choice through refusal to 
rent, refusal to renew a lease, or eviction.45 These situations often 
arise when a child is added—or children are added—to the household 
by birth, foster care, adoption, or marriage to someone who already 
has children, and the added family member would put the household 
out of compliance with the residential occupancy standard.46 Under a 
two-person-per-bedroom standard, a couple with one child would not 
be able to live in a studio apartment or a one-bedroom unit. A 
household of five would similarly be rejected from two-bedroom 
apartments and houses. The two-person-per-bedroom standard 
excludes many families from a large portion of available rental 
housing: 28% of families in the United States who are renters are 
                                                                                                                 
litigation involving alleged disparate application of occupancy standards for commercial 
establishments). 
 44. Governmental occupancy limitations are intended to protect health and safety by ensuring 
adequate corridors and windows for fire escape, proper ventilation, etc. See, e.g., Sierra v. City of New 
York, 579 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that a city housing maintenance code rule explicitly 
excluding children from single room occupancy units (SROs) did not violate FHAA on familial status 
grounds because of health and safety justifications). Note also that governmental occupancy standards 
are controversial because of their paternalistic origins and doubtful basis in science. See, e.g., Iglesias, 
supra note 5, at 1214–16. 
 45. “There are numerous management policies and restrictions limiting the ability of families with 
children to find suitable rental housing. . . . [T]here are restrictions or limitations on . . . the maximum 
number of children or family members . . . .” MARANS ET AL., supra note 30, at 21. “[A]bout 40 percent 
of all [surveyed] properties . . . rejected applicants because the unit was too small for the number of 
people applying to live there.” HOWARD SAVAGE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, NO. 
H121/98-1, PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS SURVEY 5 (1998), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/h121-9801.pdf. 
 46. See, e.g., Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2010 WL 
2977143 (D. Conn. July 20, 2010) (married couple forced to move upon birth of first child); United 
States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995) (same). 
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comprised of three to five members,47 and 71% of the rental 
apartments in the United States are comprised of studios, one-
bedroom, and two-bedroom units.48 Of course, the situation is even 
worse for larger families. 
The households of some racial groups, especially Latinos and 
Asians, tend to be larger than typical Caucasian households because 
they include more children, multigenerational and extended families, 
or a combination thereof.49 These households and others would often 
prefer to live three to a bedroom or would like to use a room not 
designated by the landlord as a “bedroom” (such as a den/playroom, 
basement, office, living room or dining room) for sleeping.50 Such 
preferences are not merely economically driven; some prefer living 
closely even when financial considerations would allow a less dense 
arrangement.51 However, the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
prevents these households from living together as they desire. 
While renters are the group most affected by restrictive occupancy 
standards, they are not the only ones subject to their limitations. 
Owners of condominiums and owners of units in the fast-growing 
sector of “common interest communities” are also subject to the 
residential occupancy standards adopted by their governing 
homeowners’ associations.52 Further, owners of mobile homes or 
                                                                                                                 
 47. According to the 3-Year Estimates, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2008–2010 
American Community Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, 28% of rental households 
comprise three to five persons. According to the same data, there are 10,175,965 family households who 
rent that contain three to five members. See Author’s Calculations Using 2008-2010 American 
Community Survey, supra note 13. 
 48. See id. These units are concentrated in larger buildings. Characteristics of Rental Apartment 
Units, supra note 13 (92% of apartments in structures with five or more units are studios, one-bedrooms, 
or two-bedroom units). 
 49. The average household size when the householder is Hispanic is 3.54 people, the average 
household size when the householder is Asian is 2.95 people. And the average household size when the 
householder is white is only 2.56. See Table AVG1. Family Status and Household Relationship of 
People 15 Years and Over, by Marital Status, Age, and Sex: 2010, America’s Families and Living 
Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-
fam/cps2010.html (follow “Excel” hyperlink or “CSV” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 50. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1211–13. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2010 WL 
2977143 (D. Conn. July 20, 2010) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff unit owner 
claimed a two-person–per-bedroom association rule had a disproportionate impact on families with 
children). Covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) and/or homeowner association rules 
14
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manufactured housing located in mobile home parks are subject to 
the residential occupancy standard enforced by the park owner.53 
Homeowner associations and mobile home park owners also 
frequently adopt a two-person-per-bedroom occupancy standard, or 
sometimes even more restrictive ones. 
The harms caused by an overly restrictive residential occupancy 
standard are numerous.54 In the face of such restrictions on its 
housing choice, a household is left with few options. It can 
reconfigure its household composition—split up and deprive its 
members of their desired living situation. Splitting up the family can 
conflict with deeply held cultural preferences/norms to live closely as 
a way of life and to keep together the intergenerational family, the 
extended family, or both. Household reconfiguration also causes 
conflicts and stress because the “family” is not together. If the 
household does split up, this causes additional costs, in particular the 
need to rent two housing units instead of one. 
If the household is not willing to reconfigure its composition, then 
it must do either one or some combination of the following: 
(1) Buy or rent more housing than desired: If the household wants 
to stay together, it is forced to buy more housing than it wants (e.g., a 
family of three must rent a two-bedroom unit instead of one-
bedroom; or a family of five must rent a relatively scarce three-
bedroom unit instead of a two-bedroom).55 
                                                                                                                 
establish residential occupancy standards which are enforced by the homeowners’ association. See, e.g., 
Complaint at 2, Leather v. Florence Tollgate Condo. Ass’n, FHEO No. 02-06-0101-8 (HUD filed Feb. 
11, 2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14495.pdf (where the plaintiff 
owned five condo units as a small business and sued the condominium association). Common interest 
communities are a significant and growing percentage of home ownership stock. See David L. Callies, 
Common Interest Communities: An Introduction, 37 URB. LAW. 325, 327 (2005) (noting 36,000 such 
communities in California alone in 2004). 
 53. See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995); see 
also State, Civil Rights Comm’n v. Cnty. Line Park, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. 2000). 
 54. This is the primary subject of the HUD report on how restrictive practices affect families. 
GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30. 
 55. See, e.g., Snyder v. Barry Realty, Inc. 953 F. Supp 217, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Barry’s policy 
forces couples with more than one child to rent housing with a separate bedroom for each child. Many 
(if not most) families cannot afford to provide separate bedrooms for each of their children. The Snyders 
could afford to rent the unit in controversy, except that Barry’s rigid occupancy policy prevents them 
from doing so. The discriminatory effect of Barry’s policy along with its inflexible application raise a 
question about whether Barry intends to exclude families.”); Complaint, United States v. Candlelight 
15
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(2) Accept inferior quality housing: Sometimes, households have 
to live in substandard or poorly maintained housing with its attendant 
health risks and difficulties because landlords of these housing units 
impose less restrictive residential occupancy standards, if any.56 
(3) Accept an inferior location: Often the household must live in a 
less desirable neighborhood or in a nearby city, typically in an area 
with worse schools, more crime, and less access to jobs, 
transportation, shopping, and other amenities.57 Cumulatively, 
movement to these inferior locations increases economic and racial 
segregation.58 
In any of these cases, the household is certain to incur additional 
search time and costs for its housing. This time and these costs can be 
substantial because the family must either find and compete for a 
limited amount of available larger units or try to find landlords who 
do not impose the two-person-per-bedroom standard. Information 
about what residential occupancy standard a landlord imposes is not 
generally available in rental advertisements and may be difficult and 
costly to obtain. If the household is also low-income, these extra 
expenses (due to forced purchase and search costs) can be significant 
in terms of reducing money available for other needs, such as food, 
                                                                                                                 
Manor Condo. Ass’n, No. 1:03:-CV-248 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/candlecomp.php (son of original tenant and his wife 
purchased two-bedroom mobile home because of three person per unit occupancy restriction applied to 
previous home with mother; told by the condominium board that if they had another child, they would 
have to move again); see also GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30, at 12 (“In some instances, respondents 
said they were told they would have to rent a larger, more expensive apartment than they either needed 
or desired . . . .”). 
 56. See GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30, at 2 (“Respondents complain that rental housing which 
accepts children is either too expensive or substandard, sometimes both.”). 
 57. Id. at 3. 
When families cannot live in neighborhoods or housing of their choice, they may 
experience a variety of associated problems. Some have job related problems. They travel 
long distances to work or are unable to take a job in another city. Others are upset 
because their children cannot go to the schools of their choice. 
Id. at 73. Further, “the incidence of exclusionary policies and restrictive practices was found to be 
greatest in high quality residential areas characterized by newly built units with high monthly rents and 
having a predominately white population.” Id. 
 58.  Id. at 13 (“Local studies done in Atlanta and Dallas found that minority areas of those cities 
were far less exclusionary toward families with children than the majority white areas.”). 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 635 
 
medical care, and transportation.59 Of course, in any of these 
situations, there is increased family disruption and stress. 
Finally, the denial of housing choice by the application of a 
restrictive residential occupancy standard may also constitute illegal 
discrimination. It is settled law that it is illegal for landlords to 
discriminate against tenants even through the imposition of neutral 
residential occupancy standards.60 Therefore, restrictive occupancy 
standards also force tenants to suffer the harms of illegal 
discrimination.61 
While the idea behind a residential occupancy standard is old62 and 
conceptually simple, residential occupancy standards have 
surprisingly extensive and important public policy implications. For 
this reason, regulation of residential occupancy standards has been 
controversial and complex.63 Governments regulate occupancy to 
prevent “overcrowding” as a health and safety regulation for housing 
residents and for their neighbors.64 
Landlords sometimes frame regulation of occupancy standards as a 
property rights issue. On this view, the landlord, as the fee owner, has 
the rights to use, control, and exclude, while leaseholders only have 
the property rights defined contractually in the lease.65 Landlords’ 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1179–80 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The district court 
placed significant emphasis on the fact that Brittain did not refuse to rent Mayeaux a two-bedroom 
apartment. There are three problems with this reliance . . . . Second, there is a significant increase in cost 
between a one-bedroom and a two-bedroom apartment.”). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995) (facially neutral 
residential occupancy standard violated FHAA familial status provision); Fair Hous. Council of Orange 
Cnty., Inc. v. Ayers, 855 F. Supp. 315, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (same). 
 61. See, e.g., Sams v. HUD, 1996 WL 13810 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1996); United States v. Hover, No. C 
93-20061 JW, 1995 WL 55379, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (reciting facts of denial); United States v. 
Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1013–14 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (reciting facts of effects of threatened eviction); 
Complaint at 5–6, Link v. Trucksess, FHEO Nos. 03-10-0065-8, 03-10-0068-8 (HUD filed Apr. 9, 
2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7530.pdf (alleging injuries from the 
discrimination, including loss of connections to siblings living in same/nearby apartment house). 
 62. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1222 n.39; see generally Frank I. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to 
Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207 (1970) (describing housing-related 
rights and freedoms derived from constitutional and statutory law). 
 63. See infra Part II. 
 64. See Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 733 (1995). 
 65. Of course, the 1968 passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act and numerous common tenants’ 
rights laws (e.g. implied warranty of habitability) directly conflict with this view of landlords’ property 
rights. For a statement of landlords’ general frustration with fair housing law, see Steven J. Edelstein, 
Civil Rights and Wrongs: Fair Housing Isn’t Always Fair, APARTMENT PROFESSIONAL, Mar./Apr. 2004, 
17
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traditional arguments for imposing a residential occupancy standard 
include the following66: (1) to prevent a variety of economic costs67 
caused by “overcrowding,” including concerns about future property 
value and profits,68 increases in “wear and tear” costs (which are not 
reimbursable from security deposits),69 extra expenses for utilities 
and garbage, increased (risk of) damage to the property,70 increased 
insurance costs, and increased management costs; (2) to prevent 
nuisance-type harms to other tenants and neighbors from 
“overcrowding,” including noise and increased demands for 
parking;71 (3) to promote often paternalistic concerns about the 
habitability/quality of life of tenants, including the safety and 
appropriateness of facilities for children and purported psychological 
harm to tenants from living in “overcrowded” spaces;72 and (4) to 
                                                                                                                 
at 48, available at http://www.williams-edelstein.net/pdf/fair_housing_not_fair.pdf. 
 66. See MARANS ET AL., supra note 30, at 63–68. 
 67. See Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 318–19 (C.D. Cal. 
1994) (defendant argues that the occupancy restriction is designed “to keep the property in good repair 
and to reduce ongoing maintenance and eventual resale costs”). Landlords have had difficulty 
documenting these expenses as directly attributable to the occupancy standard except in extreme cases. 
 68. Some admit to higher profits that result from adults only rules. See, e.g., United States v. Tropic 
Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (D. Haw. 1995) (reciting Board resolution in which it is stated that 
reinstating a no children provision “would certainly increase and perhaps double the value of Tropic 
Seas Inc. apartments . . .”). 
 69. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 61 (“Other task force members disagreed due to concerns about the 
‘wear and tear that increases with population density’ and the management difficulties and tenant stress 
that increase with excessive population density.” (citing PUB. & ASSISTED HOUS. OCCUPANCY TASK 
FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 1-15 
to -16 (1994))). 
 70. In principle, security deposits and other lease provisions should take care of this. See, e.g., 
Snyder v. Barry Realty, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 217, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Barry . . . seeks . . . to avoid the 
risk of damage caused by large numbers of students”); United States v. Grisham, 818 F. Supp. 21 (D. 
Me. 1993) (finding familial status discrimination where owner refuses to rent to a family because of fear 
of damage to prized possessions that he keeps in the unit). 
 71. See The Fair Housing Act: Pro & Con, 67 CONG. DIG. 189, 191 (1988) (the testimony of Scott 
Slesinger on behalf of the National Apartment Association opposing adding “familial status” as a 
protected class in the FHAA: “The prohibition of discrimination against families with children would 
result in the overcrowding of apartment buildings”). 
 72. See, e.g., Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (landlords claim apartment 
“too small” for the family, but no objective evidence of actual size entered into evidence); United States 
v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (D. Haw. 1995) (child safety); Complaint at 4, Interfaith 
Hous. Ctr. of the N. Suburbs v. Giarelli, FHEO No. 05-07-0669-8 (HUD filed Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14471.pdf (alleging that while city’s 
Certificate of Compliance allowed for two person occupancy, landlords enforced a one-person-per-
bedroom occupancy policy because they thought that the apartment was too small for a mother and her 
child; alleging that landlords enforced a one-person-per-bedroom occupancy policy to exclude children 
18
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avoid overtaxing the carrying capacity of one or more systems of the 
housing unit (e.g., water or sewage).73 
Landlords’ views of what constitutes “overcrowding” are 
notoriously subjective. But, while often overstated, some landlord 
concerns may be legitimate in certain situations. Clearly, in some 
cases, landlords’ economic interests directly conflict with tenants’ 
preferences to reduce housing costs.74 More subtly, but perhaps more 
importantly, these economic conflicts often mask profound cultural, 
class, and racial/ethnic differences between landlords and tenants 
regarding family values and appropriate living arrangements. Critics 
argue that restrictive residential occupancy standards force citizens 
and especially new immigrants to assimilate to a particular vision of 
America by imposing certain views of family, individualism, privacy, 
and property rights on them under the guise of health and safety or 
other benign justifications.75 They prefer that America allow other 
                                                                                                                 
in order to maintain a quiet apartment building); Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America’s 
Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1265 (2005) (“Apartments and 
housing available to adults only were common, and justified by owners and landlords in the nature of 
peace and quiet, reduction of costs and damages, and for the prevention of harm to children.”). Such 
concerns are not a defense to FHAA familial status liability. See Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. at 1361 
(“Landlord who declined to rent to family, in part due to perception that the property was dangerous for 
children, had discriminated on the basis of family status in violation of the Fair Housing Act.” (citing 
United States v. Grishman, 818 F. Supp. 21, 23 (D. Maine 1993))). 
 73. See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 822–23 (D. Nev. 1994). 
 74. See The Fair Housing Act: Pro & Con, 67 CONG. DIG. 189 (1988) (Scott Slesinger testified on 
behalf of the National Apartment Association and opposed adding the additional “familial status” as a 
protected class: “With regard to the extension of protection to families with children, the legislation is 
attempting to address an economic issue through the Civil Rights Laws.”); see also Snyder, 953 F. Supp. 
at 221 (defending its occupancy standard because it “avoids the risk of having large groups of 
Northwestern students overpopulate units in an attempt to reduce their rental payments”); Kelly, supra 
note 18, at 60 (“Not surprisingly, owner groups oppose any relaxation of occupancy limits, which they 
perceive as likely to increase wear and tear on their properties, while tenant groups want more people to 
be able to occupy a given unit.”). Apartment owners and their associations study the relationships 
between “doubling up” and demand for apartments. See, e.g., Richard Levy, Doubling Up or Coupling 
Up?, MULTIFAMILY EXECUTIVE, July 2010, available at 
http://www.multifamilyexecutive.com/demographics/doubling-up-or-coupling-up.aspx. 
 75. Cultural differences include those regarding family, sexuality, child rearing practices, 
individualism and privacy. For example, who should decide if two children of different ages or sexes 
can share a room with each other or with their parents? See Kelly, supra note 18, at 61 (“These members 
believed that ‘occupancy standards that recognize the tenant family’s choice avoid imposing 
inappropriate cultural standards’ with respect to the appropriate size of the family’s housing unit.”) 
(citing PUB. & ASSISTED HOUS. OCCUPANCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 1-15 (1994)). At least one study questions the 
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cultures’ versions of these views to exist and, perhaps, modify the 
dominant “American” version. These concerns are particularly 
relevant now because important cultural and demographic shifts are 
occurring which impact our conceptions of “family.”76 Finally, 
residential occupancy standards also engage broader land use and 
environmental issues, including the efficiency of use of the existing 
housing supply and the extent of racial and economic residential 
segregation.77 
B.   Critiques of the justifications for the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard 
The issue here is not whether there is a need or value for some 
widely-recognized and accepted private residential occupancy 
standard that prevents actual “overcrowding” and its attendant 
problems. Rather, the issue is: What is the strength of the 
justifications for the two-person-per-bedroom standard as the 
appropriate standard? 
First, given its dubious origin explained in Part II infra, there is 
little reason to assume that the two-person-per-bedroom standard is 
the correct one. HUD’s justifications for incorporating two-person-
per-bedroom as the presumptively reasonable standard in its Keating 
Memo are weak. On HUD’s own account, it was neither the result of 
a study nor of a standard notice and comment process. 
Prior to Congress’s consideration of the FHAA, HUD 
commissioned an exhaustive national study to determine the nature 
                                                                                                                 
common assumption that doubling up is likely to be harmful to tenants’ health. Sherry Ahrentzen, 
Double Indemnity or Double Delight? The Health Consequences of Sharing Housing and “Doubling 
Up,” 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 547, 547–68 (2003). 
 76. For example, our country is currently embroiled in debates about same-sex marriage. The 
continued prevalence of divorce and remarriage together with adults having children in a household 
without ever getting married also challenge “traditional” views of family. 
 77. See generally GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30; MARANS ET AL., supra note 30. If most 
landlords are not willing to rent to large families and most of these are families of color, then they will 
cluster where landlords are willing to rent to them. They thus often cluster in larger and older housing 
stock in undesirable areas that have less restrictive residential occupancy standards. These buildings 
may be owned by landlords who are milking the property and not doing maintenance, so there are also 
numerous habitability problems. Further, the higher internal density mixes with physically sub-standard 
conditions and creates real health and safety concerns for residents, not just statistical overcrowding. 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 639 
 
and extent of familial discrimination and a second study to analyze 
the findings.78 HUD has performed both national statistical analyses 
of private residential occupancy standards (such as in Mountain Side 
v. HUD),79 as well as local statistics in cases (e.g., in Pfaff v. HUD) 
for its enforcement activity of the familial status obligation since 
1988.80 However, on HUD’s own account, the selection of the two-
person-per-bedroom standard as the basis for its internal enforcement 
guidance was not based upon any of these studies, nor of any other 
study of housing markets, incidences of “overcrowding” in 
apartments, or the discriminatory effect of various occupancy 
standards. There is no objective evidence that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard was calibrated in any way to be a standard which 
presumptively avoided discrimination. 
Rather, HUD’s selection of the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
as presumptively reasonable was based upon the internal policies and 
practices of HUD and the Department of Justice (DOJ).81 However, 
reliance on DOJ consent orders is circular reasoning and weak.82 
Since consent orders are negotiated with and agreed to by the 
defendant, reliance on them begs the question: On what basis did the 
DOJ use this standard? The second part of the justification for the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard in the Keating Memo invokes 
HUD’s own occupancy standards for public housing and HUD-
assisted housing as a basis for selecting two-person-per-bedroom as a 
presumptively reasonable standard for private housing.83 This 
justification directly contradicts what HUD had stated in the 
Preamble to the 1989 FHAA Regulations. The Preamble stated that 
                                                                                                                 
 78. GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30; MARANS ET AL., supra note 30. 
 79. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“Here, the Secretary relied on national statistics to establish a case of disparate effect.”). 
 80. Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996) (“HUD statistics demonstrated that households of five 
overwhelmingly comprise families with children in Whatcom County.”). 
 81. See Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,256. 
 82. In addition, relying on the DOJ’s consent decree positions may be self-limiting—if HUD and the 
DOJ did not charge cases in which the residential occupancy standard was two-person-per-bedroom, 
then it would not make sense for them to require defendants to adopt a residential occupancy standard 
more liberal than that. 
 83. Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,256–57 (citing HUD, NO. 7465.1 REV-2, PUBLIC HOUSING 
OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK ch. 5, at 5-1 (1991)). 
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the two-person-per-bedroom was not a safe harbor for private, non-
subsidized housing because, inter alia, rooms in private housing are 
often larger and floor plans are different than in public housing and 
HUD-assisted housing.84 The Keating Memo provided no 
explanation for this substantial change of position. 
Additionally, the well-documented housing industry pressure 
promoting the two-person-per-bedroom standard, discussed infra in 
Part II, raises the specter of regulatory capture. While two-person-
per-bedroom might be the best standard for the industry Congress 
intended to regulate, there is no evidence that it is the best standard 
for promoting the public interest and FHAA goals. 
Second, the two-person-per-bedroom standard predates the 1988 
FHAA,85 which was intended to be remedial legislation to address 
previous discriminatory practices against families.86 As explained 
infra, the National Apartment Association endorsed two-person-per-
bedroom as a maximum private occupancy standard as early as 
1976.87 A “Fair Housing Defense” blog entry entitled “Occupancy 
Standards—Why They Matter,” posted in 2009 begins: “When 
dealing with occupancy standards, it used to be easy. The traditional 
rule of ‘two heartbeats per bedroom’ was perceived as the way to 
go.”88 Another entry referred to the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard it as “the old general rule.”89 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Regarding occupancy guidelines for HUD-assisted housing programs, the Preamble stated: 
“[T]hese guidelines are designed to apply to the types and sizes of dwellings in HUD programs and they 
may not be reasonable for dwellings with more available space and other dwelling configurations than 
those found in HUD-assisted housing.” Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100). 
 85. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 86. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 87. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 88. Scott M. Badami, Occupancy Standards—Why They Matter, FAIR HOUSING DEFENSE BLOG 
(Sept. 3, 2009), http://fairhousing.foxrothschild.com/2009/09/articles/discrimination/occupancy-
standard-why-they-matter/. 
 89. “The old general rule, which reflected a two person per bedroom standard, is only a guide and 
does not end the analysis.” Scott M. Badami, Just What is Familial Status?, FAIR HOUSING DEFENSE 
BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010), http://fairhousing.foxrothschild.com/2010/10/articles/fha-basics/just-what-is-
familial-status/. A recent case appears to exemplify treating the two-person-per-bedroom standard as 
tradition. Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2011 WL 3489119 (D. 
Conn. June 23, 2011) (stating that the two-person–per-bedroom standard was included in the 
condominium occupancy policy but not offering any explanation or justification for this particular 
standard). 
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If two-person-per-bedroom was the “traditional” residential 
occupancy standard applicable before the 1988 amendments, and 
restrictive residential occupancy standards were one of the housing 
problems that Congress specifically targeted in the enactment of the 
1988 amendments to the FHA, then this standard is contrary to the 
remedial intent of the statute. Research examining the historical 
origins of the two-person-per-bedroom standard has found that it was 
neither scientific nor otherwise objectively grounded, but merely the 
product of classist and ethnocentric paternalism.90 
Third, the justifications for the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
as having legal force are weak. If the challenged residential 
occupancy standard is more restrictive than two-person-per-bedroom, 
the plaintiff/complainant might raise the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard as an argument against the more restrictive standard.91 Or if 
the challenged residential occupancy standard is two-person-per-
bedroom, the respondent/defendant might raise the two-person-per-
bedroom standard from the Keating Memo as a defense to a claim of 
discrimination or suggest that the standard does not violate the 
FHAA because it is a “reasonable occupancy standard.”92 The 
assumption underlying these arguments is that the Keating Memo—
or part of it—has established a liability rule for these cases. Indeed, 
several courts have referred to the Keating Memo (including that 
memo’s description of the two-person-per-bedroom standard as 
presumptively reasonable) or used the phrase “reasonable occupancy 
standard.”93 While there is confusion in the case law, no court has 
ever held that the two-person-per-bedroom standard is a “safe 
harbor” from FHAA liability.94 Rather, as Part III.A infra argues, the 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See supra notes 1, 72 and accompanying text; see also Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1211–13. 
 91. See, e.g., Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724–28 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (challenging a refusal 
to rent a two-bedroom apartment to a family of four); Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.N.Y. 
1995) (challenging a refusal to rent a three-bedroom house to a family of five). 
 92. See, e.g., Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing landlord’s limitation of two-
bedroom house to four persons). 
 93. See, e.g., CHRO ex rel Rowley v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374, at *5 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2001). For a discussion about the liability standards in residential occupancy cases 
including cases that cite the Keating Memo, see infra Part II.C.1. For a discussion of the legal status of 
the Keating Memo, see infra Part III.A. 
 94. See, e.g., Burnett, 903 F. Supp. at 304, 314 n.2 (refusing to rely on HUD’s “rule of thumb” 
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legal status of the Keating Memo has always only been as HUD’s 
internal enforcement guideline, and never as a liability rule. Finally, 
while Congress considered a two-person-per-bedroom national 
occupancy standard on several occasions, it never came close to 
passing one.95 
Further, even if the Keating Memo was a liability rule or if 
“reasonableness” was a defense based upon the Keating Memo, then 
courts would have to apply the whole Keating Memo with all of its 
factors, not just the two-person-per-bedroom standard standing alone. 
The Keating Memo itself states: “[T]he reasonableness of any 
occupancy policy is rebuttable, and neither [the first Keating 
Memorandum] nor this memorandum implies that the Department 
will determine compliance with the Fair Housing Act based solely on 
the number of people permitted in each bedroom.”96 Certainly, the 
fair housing defense bar uses the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
with the guise of legal authority from the Keating Memo in 
negotiations with plaintiffs.97 However, landlords’ lawyers and 
sophisticated advocates have always understood the two-person-per-
bedroom standard as only part of the Keating Memo in HUD’s intake 
and investigation process and that within that analysis the standard is 
rebuttable.98 Moreover, landlords, property management agencies, 
and the fair housing defense bar would probably not support courts 
treating the Keating Memo as having the force of law because of its 
                                                                                                                 
two-person-per-bedroom standard as presumptively reasonable because, inter alia, “the HUD regulations 
are not binding here, and the Court declines to institute such a conclusive mechanical test” (citing 
United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir.1992))); CHRO ex rel Rowley, 2001 WL 
951374, at *4–6 (“HUD has determined that an occupancy policy of two persons in a bedroom as a 
general rule, is reasonable but the whole purpose of the policy statement represented by the 1998 report 
was to indicate this [two-person–per-bedroom] suggestion was only a guideline; the reasonableness of 
any occupancy policy is rebuttable and HUD will not determine compliance with the Fair Housing Act 
based solely on the number of people permitted in each bedroom.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 95. See infra notes 251–52 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,257. 
 97. Scott M. Badami, Occupancy Standards—Why They Matter, FAIR HOUSING DEFENSE BLOG 
(Sept. 3, 2009), http://fairhousing.foxrothschild.com/2009/09/articles/discrimination/occupancy-
standards-why-they-matter/ (“Over the years, I successfully defended any number of cases based on the 
Keating Memorandum and the two person per bedroom guideline.”). 
 98. See Congress Directs HUD to Adopt Keating Memo for Occupancy Standards, FAIR HOUSING 
INSTITUTE, http://www.fairhouse.net/library/article.php?id=33 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
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uncertainty and because the application of its factors might often 
require landlords to allow more than two persons per bedroom.99 
Fourth, some might argue that, whatever its origins, landlords and 
property managers now have a reasonable and justifiable reliance 
interest in the two-person-per-bedroom standard because of the 
longevity of its use by HUD as an enforcement guideline. It is true 
that HUD has used the two-person-per-bedroom standard more or 
less consistently since 1998 except for a brief period in 1995. 
However, it did so (or was supposed to do so) as a part of its holistic 
analysis using the Keating factors as an intake guideline. The fact 
that housing providers first pushed for the inclusion of the two-
person-per-bedroom standard and intentionally stoked reliance upon 
it by their industry does not bolster their reliance and fairness 
argument. This self-serving reliance does not justify the two-person-
per-bedroom standard because the intended beneficiaries of the 
FHAA protections for familial status cannot be said to share in this 
reliance. 
Fifth, there is no evidence that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard per se is uniquely necessary to prevent the effects of 
“overcrowding” that concern landlords or to meet any other 
legitimate concern of landlords. Previous attempts to document 
negative overcrowding effects from occupancy standards have been 
weak and usually consist of projections based upon extreme 
assumptions without any actual empirical study or objective peer 
review.100 Even the extensive review of overcrowding literature 
authored by William C. Baer and commissioned by the National 
Multi Housing Council and the National Apartment Association 
failed to identify any objective studies supporting landlords’ concerns 
                                                                                                                 
 99. For a discussion of the Keating Memo factors, see infra Part III.A. Even if a court found that the 
Keating Memo has the force of law, the memo specifically limited its application “with respect to 
complaints of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act . . . on the basis of familial status which 
involve an occupancy standard established by a housing provider.” Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 
70,256 (emphasis supplied). Thus, by its clear terms, this provision would not apply to any cases where 
restrictive occupancy standards cause discriminatory effects on the basis of race or national origin rather 
than familial status. Therefore, those cases would still be litigated under a disparate impact theory of 
discrimination, presumably without any reference to the Keating Memo. 
 100. See Az. Multihousing Ass’n., Answers to Some Common Questions About “Occupancy 
Standards,” 10 (Nov. 1994) (unpublished report) (on file with author). 
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about most issues, including wear and tear costs.101 Moreover, 
landlords’ commitment to the two-person-per-bedroom standard as 
the necessary bulwark against the evils of overcrowding eases 
considerably when a profitable business model requires higher levels 
of internal density. Owners of vacation rental housing commonly 
allow residential occupancies of three to five persons per bedroom.102 
And, in at least one published case, such an owner argued that the 
city “incorrectly calculated occupancy by allowing only bedrooms to 
be used for sleeping.”103 
In conclusion, the two-person-per-bedroom standard lacks any 
substantial objective justification. While some residential occupancy 
standard may be needed, there is certainly some room—perhaps 
substantial room—to liberalize beyond the restrictive two-person-
per-bedroom standard.104 
                                                                                                                 
 101. WILLIAM C. BAER, RENTAL CROWDING AND OCCUPANCY STANDARDS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1996) (study commissioned by the National Multi Housing Council and 
National Apartment Association, among others). The study was commissioned to counter HUD General 
Counsel Nelson Diaz’s short-lived substitute for the Keating Memo. It indirectly attempts to “defend” 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard through a strained argument which relies on use of the 
“overcrowding” standard of one-person-per-bedroom, which is used as one factor in defining housing 
needs. Dr. Baer found only one Ph.D. thesis (submitted, but not clear if accepted and definitely not peer-
reviewed or published) finding “[d]epreciation rates increase noticeably with family size.” Id. at 49. Dr. 
Baer commented on this study: “The study by no means provides a definitive test of the matter—more 
study is clearly indicated—but it is the only one uncovered in the research.” Id. The following is Dr. 
Baer’s summary of his review of the crowding literature in the Executive Summary: 
Current findings from the literature suggest that objective crowding is only mildly linked 
to subjective perceptions or feelings of crowding. These subjective perceptions, however, 
often result in at least mild yet deleterious effects to many persons. But exactly who will 
be harmed and in what circumstances cannot be predicted before the event. It is cultural 
and contextual. Virtually no research has been done on the effects of crowding on the 
wear and tear and depreciation of housing. The only related study found that 
“depreciation rates increase noticeably with family size.” . . . Since subjective perceptions 
of crowding are more important than objective measures, there is a dilemma in 
establishing a standard for crowding. 
Id. at i (emphasis omitted). 
 102. See, e.g., United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 777 A.2d 950 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Now Booking Summer by the Sea in Cape Canaveral, 
VACATIONRENTALS.COM, http://www.vacationrentals.com/vacation-rentals/3732.html (last visited Jan. 
20, 2011) (advertisement for a one-bedroom vacation rental that sleeps four, equivalent to a four-person-
per-bedroom residential occupancy standard). 
 103. United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar, 777 A.2d at 951, 958 (finding, inter alia, that a local 
government ordinance provision “making it unlawful for number of adults in summer rental unit 
between 1:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. to exceed maximum permitted occupancy was an overbroad intrusion 
on tenants’ privacy rights and violated substantive due process”). 
 104. For example, California has long effectively had a two-person-per-bedroom plus one for the unit 
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C.   Empirical evidence demonstrates that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard constitutes a prima facie case of discrimination in 
many housing contexts 
Fair housing advocates and commentators believe that the 
antidiscrimination and pro-integration goals of the FHAA have been 
stymied in this area. FHAA advocates believe that restrictive 
residential occupancy standards, including the two-person-per-
bedroom standard, are likely to cause discriminatory impacts on 
members of protected classes in many situations. And, to the degree 
that restrictive residential occupancy standards limit the housing 
choices of people of color to housing in areas in which people of 
color are already concentrated, they believe restrictive residential 
occupancy standards constitute a separate FHAA violation because 
they perpetuate segregation.105 
Yet, even if the two-person-per-bedroom standard has dubious 
origins and is not strongly supported by objective evidence, this 
alone would not prove that it is the “wrong” standard or a bad 
standard. More is needed. Yet, to date only one published district 
court decision has found the two-person-per-bedroom standard to 
discriminate.106 And this case has not been cited by any other later 
                                                                                                                 
standard. The author was unable to find any reports finding that California has more overcrowding 
problems than other states due to this standard. Interestingly, the housing industry in California has 
attempted to procure legislation that would lock-in the more liberal “two persons per bedroom plus one” 
guideline as an enforcement standard by California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing. See 
State Assemb., 1703, 1993–1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1993). The California Apartment Association 
was the bill’s sponsor. 
 105. Fair housing advocates also believe that neutral residential occupancy standards are often used 
by landlords intentionally to restrict for race and national origin reasons. See, e.g., Asbury v. Brougham, 
866 F.2d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 1989) (in a case alleging racial discrimination against an African-
American family, defendants used neutral residential occupancy standards as their defense); Reeves v. 
Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (a race and family status case); Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. 
Supp. 304 (N.D. N.Y. 1995) (same). 
 106. United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding that a two-person-
per-bedroom residential occupancy standard applied to studio and one-bedroom apartments violated the 
FHAA). A recent case was won on summary judgment: Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2010 WL 2977143 (D. Conn. July 20, 2010). The author also has records of 
several cases challenging a two-person-per-bedroom standard which settled. e.g., Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication, Padilla v. 86 Pioneering 
Assocs., No. 26-19690 (Ca. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 2003) (two-person-per-bedroom standard used in a 
one-bedroom apartment); Minutes of Settlement Conference, Dominguez v. Holsclaw, CIV-S-02-1329 
WBS GGH (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12 2003) (two-person-per-bedroom standard applied in twelve unit 
27
Iglesias: Moving Beyond Two-Person-Per-Bedroom: Revitalizing Application of
Published by Reading Room, 2012
646 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:3 
 
case to challenge a two-person-per-bedroom residential occupancy 
standard. So, what is the basis for fair housing advocates’ concern?107 
Until now, there has not been a general demonstration of the 
discriminatory effect of the two-person-per-bedroom standard on 
households with children. 
This section reports the results of original empirical analyses that 
demonstrate that the imposition of a two-person-per-bedroom 
standard is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of familial status 
discrimination in housing markets nationwide. While courts have not 
coalesced around the particular standards that should be applied in 
disparate impact litigation challenging neutral private residential 
occupancy standards, they have affirmed that the disparate impact 
theory is appropriate to prove discrimination in this type of case.108 
And several courts have made findings that a plaintiff challenging a 
neutral residential occupancy standard has made a prima facie case of 
familial status discrimination.109 Because of the uncertainty in the 
law regarding the appropriate standards for defendants’ rebuttal, the 
analysis only extends to demonstration of prima facie cases of 
discrimination. Depending upon the standard for defendants’ burdens 
to justify their occupancy standards, the types of justifications that 
are deemed acceptable, and other issues in each case, violations could 
be found in some instances but not others. 
Richard Sander, a law professor and economist at U.C.L.A., has 
recently collaborated with the author on a set of statistical analyses 
                                                                                                                 
apartment complex). 
 107. It is possible that landlords and property management agencies have adopted strategies to settle 
any case challenging a two-person-per-bedroom standard in which there is distinct chance of a court 
finding liability in order to avoid bad precedent. Many of HUD’s “special circumstances” cases that 
challenged two-person-per-bedroom or less restrictive residential occupancy standards settled. See cases 
cited infra note 245. These cases were nationally identified as a threat to the stability of the two-person-
per-bedroom standard. See Occupancy Policies and the “Keating Memo” Resurface in a Chicago Case, 
FAIR HOUSING INSTITUTE, http://www.fairhouse.net/library/article.php?id=56 (last visited July 27, 
2010) [hereinafter Chicago Case]. 
 108. See Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. 
Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 109. See, e.g., Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347; Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayers, 
855 F. Supp. 315, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
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aimed at measuring how housing access for families with children 
has changed over the past forty years:110 
These analyses used a more sophisticated but conservative 
methodology than that typically employed by plaintiffs in disparate 
impact cases.111 Among other things, we examined how families with 
children in the rental market currently match up with units of various 
sizes. By comparing them with other rental households, we could 
examine how different types of households would be affected by an 
across-the-board application of a two-person-per-bedroom occupancy 
limit in rental housing. We could thus examine the disparate impact 
of such an occupancy limit on families with children, on children 
themselves, and on individual racial groups. 
First, consider national patterns of disparate impact upon families 
with children. The research found that if a two-person-per-bedroom 
had been applied uniformly to all one-, two-, and three-bedroom 
rental units in the United States between 2007 and 2009: 
 Roughly 94.5% of all units would be in compliance with 
the standard, but only 84% of all units occupied by families 
with children would be in compliance, compared to over 
99% of all non-family households. To put it differently, 
families with children would run afoul of the standard more 
than ten times as often as other households. Or to put it yet 
another way, more than one child in five living in rental 
housing between 2007 and 2009 was living in a unit that 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Richard Sander and Tim Iglesias are working on a paper for future publication which will 
present a demographic assessment of discrimination against children in the American rental market. The 
data collection and calculations behind the results presented in this article were made by Richard 
Sander. The findings were made by Tim Iglesias. Richard Sander & Tim Iglesias, Discrimination 
Against Children in the American Rental Market: A Demographic Assessment (UCLA Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. XX, 2011). 
 111. The analyses were sophisticated because of the data sets and methodology employed. 
The data in these tables come from the American Community Survey, which is conducted 
by the United States Census and which interviews about half a million households each 
year. Since these data are based on sampling methods that aim to produce a 
representative national sample, the raw numbers presented here give a fairly accurate 
picture of national housing patterns . . . . 
Id at 6. In contrast, many plaintiffs’ statistical evidence was derived from cross-tabulated data published 
by the U.S. Census. Tabulated census data is less flexible because it aggregates data on certain 
predetermined categories. 
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would have violated the two-person-per-bedroom 
occupancy limit. 
 These patterns vary, predictably, across units of different 
sizes. In general, as smaller units are considered, the 
absolute number of families drops (since relatively few 
families live in very small units) but the likelihood of those 
families being in violation of the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard increases. Thus, in the national data sample, less 
than 10% of families with children lived in one-bedroom 
units, but nearly three-quarters of those families exceeded 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard. Nearly half of 
families with children lived in two-bedroom units, of which 
nearly 15% violated the standard. About 40% of families 
with children lived in three-bedroom apartments, but only 
4.2% of those families exceeded the two-person-per-
bedroom standard. Yet across units of all sizes, the 
overwhelming proportion of households affected by the 
two-person-per-bedroom limit are families with children. 
Regardless of how one analyzes these numbers, the 
“displacement burden” of the occupancy limit falls very 
disproportionately on families with children.112 
Importantly, these findings likely underestimate the discrimination 
caused by imposition of the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
because the analyses were conservative in that they only used 
households actually living in one- and two-bedroom units as the 
sampling universe. This means that the results do not include the 
likely “demand” from family households of three persons (e.g., a 
couple and one child) who would want to live in a one-bedroom, but 
are not currently doing so. 
There is some conflict regarding the use of national statistics 
versus local statistics to prove housing discrimination. All of the 
cases in which a court has made a finding on the merits of prima 
facie discrimination have been found using local statistics. However, 
there are persuasive statistical reasons to expect that national 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. All findings are based upon the analyses of the data (on file with the author). 
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statistics accurately represent the discriminatory effects of the two-
person-per-bedroom standard with regard to familial status.113 Using 
local statistics makes great sense when talking about racial 
discrimination, because racial composition varies enormously across 
various parts of the country and even within metropolitan areas. 
However, the patterns discussed here—the relative distribution of 
families and other households across units of various sizes—hold 
with remarkable uniformity across the United States. Except in the 
most affluent sections of metropolitan areas, each of the disparities 
described here holds in the essential details, whether one considers 
the South, the Midwest, the suburbs, or the central cities.114 
The two-person-per-bedroom standard also has a strong disparate 
impact across racial lines. There are three broad reasons for this. 
First, non-Hispanic whites are far more likely to live alone when they 
are elderly or when they are young and unmarried; people of other 
races, especially Asians and Hispanics, are more likely to live with 
their families at these stages of the life cycle. Second, non-Hispanic 
whites have fewer children per household than other races do; the 
average is a bit higher for African-Americans, significantly higher for 
Asians, and highest for Hispanics. Third, Hispanics and 
African-Americans have higher poverty rates than the other groups, 
and this leads to a higher percentage of renters and smaller units.115 
Taken together, these patterns mean that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard has a disparate impact across racial lines, 
regardless of the type of unit to which it is applied. National statistics 
show that the proportion of African-Americans excluded by this 
occupancy standard is statistically significantly higher than for 
whites; the proportion of Asians excluded is higher than the 
proportion of blacks; and the proportion of Hispanics excluded is 
highest of all. Indeed, more than one-third of all Hispanic children 
living in one-, two-, or three-bedroom apartments in the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id.; see E.C. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (approving reliance on nationwide 
statistics in discrimination cases where there is “no reason to suppose” that regional statistics will differ 
markedly from national statistics). 
 114. See Sander & Iglesias, supra note 110. 
 115. Id. 
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in 2007-09 would have been displaced by rigorous application of the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard.116 
Hertz Consulting conducted a separate and independent analysis of 
U.S. Census housing data (specifically the 2007 American 
Community Survey) to compare the effect of a two-person-per-
bedroom standard on households that include children versus 
households that do not include children for each unit size on a state-
by-state basis.117 Using this data, the analysis determined the 
“qualification rate” for households with children—that is, the 
likelihood that such households would qualify for a unit (i.e., not be 
excluded by the occupancy standard). As a general rule of thumb, 
courts find that if the qualification rate for the protected class is less 
than 80% of the rate for non-class members, a prima facie case of 
discrimination is established.118 
The results of the study demonstrate that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard is discriminatory on the basis of familial status as 
applied to studio apartments in all but seven states. In Idaho, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Hampshire, West Virginia and Wisconsin, 
families with children had an equal chance of being excluded as 
families without children. And in Connecticut, families without 
children had a slightly better chance of being excluded by the 
occupancy standard.119 And the study found the two-person-per-
bedroom standard discriminatory on the basis of familial status as 
applied to one-bedroom units in every state of the United States 
except North Dakota, where which families with children had an 
equal chance of being excluded as families without children.120 The 
qualification rate for one-bedroom units ranged from a low of 11.3% 
in Idaho to a high of 49.2% in Kentucky, with an average of 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. 
 117. A separate and independent investigation conducted by Hertz Consulting analyzed Three-Year 
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) Census data for the years 2005–2007 to compare the effect of a 
two-person-per-bedroom standard on households which include children versus households that do not 
include children for each unit size on a state by state basis (on file with author). 
 118. This measure is the “four fifths rule” from employment discrimination cases. EEOC Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011). 
 119. Hertz Consulting, supra note 117. 
 120. Id. 
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25.6%.121 The qualification rates for two-bedroom units was more 
variable, with eight states hovering around or less than 80%,122 
suggesting a discriminatory effect, and an average of 85.5% for all 
states.123 
The Hertz analysis demonstrates that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard is discriminatory on the basis of familial status as applied to 
studios and/or one-bedroom units in 49 states.124 The analysis further 
shows that, even applying the conservative “four fifths rule,” the two-
person-per-bedroom standard is likely to be discriminatory as applied 
to two-bedroom units in eight states.125 Two of these states, 
California and Texas, have very large populations. 
What is the significance of the fact that the application of a two-
person-per-bedroom standard in studio, one- and two-bedroom units 
causes a prima facie case of discrimination in so many jurisdictions? 
First, because the vast majority of rental housing in the U.S. is 
comprised of studios, one-bedroom and two-bedroom units,126 this 
finding means that the effect is extensive and substantial across the 
rental housing industry. 13% of rental households with minor 
children have three persons.127 Twenty-eight percent of households 
with minor children have three to five persons, which represents 
more than ten million families.128 It is likely that a large proportion of 
these families seek housing in studios, one- and two-bedroom units. 
However, the studies demonstrate that when a two-person-per-
bedroom standard is applied, large percentages of families with 
children will be excluded from the majority of the rental units 
available in the U.S. 
One might argue that families, particularly larger families, should 
rent three- and four-bedroom units. However, three- and four-
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (AK (83.3%), AZ (79.9%), CA (73.6%), HI (80.1%), NM (83.1%), NV (80.5%), SD (83.6%), 
and TX (82%)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Hertz Consulting, supra note 117. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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bedroom rentals are relatively rare. Many of these larger units are 
owner-occupied. And, among those available for rent, there is some 
evidence that families have not been welcome as renters in these 
larger units.129 Larger families are not welcome in smaller units, but 
they may also have a hard time accessing these larger units. Second, 
while the quantitative effects of such discrimination—the extent and 
distribution of financial costs, etc., caused by the restriction of 
housing choice—would be difficult to measure, they are likely to be 
substantial. Third, qualitatively, a finding that the two-person-per-
bedroom standard is frequently and extensively discriminatory means 
that this standard is likely to cause the effects described in Part I, 
supra, including family disruption, stress, living in inferior housing 
and inferior neighborhoods, interference with deep cultural norms, 
and substantial financial consequences. 
In conclusion, while only one published case has found the two-
person-per-bedroom standard to discriminate, several empirical 
studies demonstrate that the application of this standard will regularly 
result in a prima facie case of discrimination in most jurisdictions. 
Considering the questionable origin of this standard and these 
empirical findings together, there is no good reason to treat the two-
person-per-bedroom standard as presumptively compliant with the 
FHAA. Rather, all of the evidence suggests just the opposite 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Baity v. Serio, FHEO Nos. 02-09-0659-8, 02-09-0660-8 (HUD filed 
May 18, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7523.pdf (where a landlord 
owns a four-bedroom but allegedly does not rent to families with children); Complaint at 3, Link v. 
Trucksess, FHEO Nos. 03-10-0065-8, 03-10-0068-8 (HUD filed Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7530.pdf (alleging that when viewing the 
apartment, the landlord stated that she had previously advertised the three-bedroom unit as a two-
bedroom unit so as to avoid inquiries from families with children); Complaint at 4, HUD v. During, 
FHEO No. 09-090598-8 (HUD filed Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7526.pdf (refusal to rent a four-bedroom 
house to family of seven persons); Complaint at 3, Colon v. Brill, FHEO No. 01-08-0312-8 (HUD filed 
July 8, 2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7504.pdf (refusal to rent a 
three-bedroom apartment to a family); Complaint at 2, Miles v. Golombek, FHEO No. 02-04-0666-8 
(HUD filed Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/enforcement/miles.pdf (landlord’s three-
bedroom was not available to families); Complaint at 2–3, Andrew v. Boettcher, FHEO Nos. 05-03-
0030-8, 05-03-0031-8 (HUD filed June 27, 2005), 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/enforcement/boettcher.pdf (refusal to rent a three-bedroom to a couple 
with three children). 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 653 
 
conclusion: the two-person-per-bedroom standard should be 
considered presumptively discriminatory.130 
This Part laid bare the weak defense for the two-person-per-
bedroom standard and demonstrated that it results in many families 
suffering discrimination without apparent recourse. The next Part 
explains how the two-person-per-bedroom standard has become the 
national dominant standard. 
II.   THE ORIGIN AND ENTRENCHMENT OF TWO-PERSON-PER-
BEDROOM AS OUR NATIONAL STANDARD: HOW WE GOT HERE AND 
HOW WE GOT STUCK HERE 
This Part argues that with some exceptions, the two-person-per-
bedroom standard has become a dominant national maximum 
residential occupancy standard applied by private landlords. Next, it 
tells the story of how this standard became dominant. It then explains 
why this standard has remained dominant. This Part concludes that 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard achieved and retains 
dominance because of confusion in the courts, dysfunctions in FHAA 
enforcement, and landlord advocacy. 
A.   Two-Person-Per-Bedroom: Our National Standard? 
With some notable exceptions, the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard has become a dominant national maximum residential 
occupancy standard applied by landlords. While no comprehensive 
database of landlords’ residential occupancy standards exists, 
numerous reliable sources combine to confirm this conclusion. 
First, national statistics: A 1994 study sponsored by the Arizona 
Multi Housing Association stated: “[M]ost states have adopted 
official or informal statewide occupancy standards, the majority of 
which use a standard equivalent to two-person-per-bedroom.”131 This 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Even the less restrictive “two-person-per-bedroom plus one” standard will sometimes be 
discriminatory. This position was expressed by HUD’s Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity, Roberta Achtenberg, in a March 24, 1994 letter to the Honorable Paul Newman. See Kelly, 
supra note 18, at 60 n.51. 
 131. Id. at 58 n.38 (citing Gary Witt, The Controversy Over Occupancy Standards for Rental Property 
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assertion appears to be based in large part on the effects of state fair 
housing enforcement guidelines agencies on the practices of private 
landlords.132 Arizona is one example of a state that has made an 
official adoption; its state code makes two-person-per-bedroom the 
maximum residential occupancy standard, ostensibly on health and 
safety grounds.133 
Second, since at least 1976, landlord and apartment/property 
management manuals, guides, and trainings, as well as the public 
positions of apartment owner representatives, commonly recommend 
two-person-per-bedroom as the appropriate maximum residential 
occupancy standard. In 1976, the National Apartment Association, a 
leading national association for apartment owners and managers, 
published THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APARTMENT MANAGEMENT. This 
work was written by Roland Freeman, the Chairman of the National 
Apartment Management Accreditation Board. The second paragraph 
of Chapter Twelve, entitled “Resident Selection” reads: “The first 
step is to determine your criteria . . . #2. How many adults are you 
going to allow in each type of unit? How many children? (If any!) 
It’s suggested you never allow more than 2 people per bedroom.”134 
Numerous contemporary websites for landlords repeat the same 
advice. For example, rental-housing.com states: “[T]he 2-person per 
bedroom standard is generally accepted as the most sensible 
throughout the industry and reflects standards which allow residential 
units to be properly operated and maintained.”135 The National Multi 
Housing Council’s analysis of occupancy standards states: “For many 
years, owners of public, assisted and conventional housing have 
relied on a two person per bedroom occupancy standard when 
                                                                                                                 
9 (Nov. 8, 1994) (unpublished report) (on file with author)). The author greatly appreciates the 
assistance of Mr. Kelly in procuring a copy of this unpublished study. 
 132. These state enforcement guidelines mimic or are derived from the Keating Memo. Keating 
Memo, supra note 16. 
 133. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 117 C (2010). 
 134. ROLAND D. FREEMAN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APARTMENT MANAGEMENT III-9 (1976). 
Different landlords may have distinct reasons for promoting the two-person-per-bedroom standard: 
some to actually impose this limit while fending off potential legal liability; others to create room for 
their exercise of discretion. 
 135. Occupancy, RENTAL HOUSING ON LINE, http://rhol.org/rental/occupancy.htm (last visited Jan. 
20, 2011). 
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adopting habitability policies for their units . . . . This standard has 
bec[o]me widely accepted . . . .”136 And an article in The Landlord 
Times states: “A standard industry . . . occupancy limit is two people 
per bedroom, regardless of the age or sex of the occupants.”137 Fox 
Rothschild, LLP, a national firm which represents many apartment 
owners and property management agencies, publishes a blog named 
“Fair Housing Defense.” Referring to the “two person per bedroom 
guideline” blog editor Scott Badami wrote: “Many professional 
apartment management companies, including those I represent, 
adopted that standard.”138 It is reasonable to assume that users of 
these guides implement the advice provided in them and clients 
follow the advice of their attorneys, especially owners or property 
managers of large numbers of units seeking to conform to the 
“norms” of professional property management.139 
While the two-person-per-bedroom standard is a dominant 
maximum private residential occupancy standard, there are four 
distinct situations where it is not employed: (1) a small minority of 
states, (2) a few rent control jurisdictions, (3) some vacation rentals, 
and (4) very low end housing. 
Some states and localities endorse a more liberal standard. In both 
California and Austin, Texas, two-person-per-bedroom-plus-one is 
the dominant standard.140 This has occurred through a similar process 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Occupancy Standards: Regulatory and Legislative History, NAT’L MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, 
(Dec. 1, 1997), 
https://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfm?IssueID=151&ContentItemID=1344&siteArea=Topi
cs. 
 137. Jo Becker, Occupancy Standards May Violate Fair Housing Laws, LANDLORD TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2008, http://www.thelandlordtimes.com/?q=story/all-regions/occupancy-standards-may-violate-fair-
housing-laws. 
 138. Badami, supra note 97. 
 139. See Charge of Discrimination at 3 n.2, Uludag v. Draper & Kramer, Inc., HUDALJ No. 06-047-
FH (HUD Sept. 21, 2006) (citing Draper and Kramer, Inc.’s “Residential Selection Criteria Guidelines 
for Draper and Kramer Managed Properties” (“guidelines”)); Occupancy, supra note 135. Additional 
anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion. While it is not currently common practice to include the 
residential occupancy standard in an advertisement, some ads do include it. With assistance from 
National Fair Housing Association, the author performed an informal national survey of fair housing 
advocates during November and December of 2009 in which many respondents reported that the two-
person-per-bedroom standard was the maximum residential occupancy standard applied in the 
jurisdictions in which they work. Tim Iglesias, Informal Survey of Fair Housing Advocates 
(unpublished study) (on file with author). 
 140. Austin, Texas, has “two plus one per bedroom” as their informal enforcement guidance 
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as the dominant two-person-per-bedroom standard—the agency 
charged with enforcement of fair housing has announced its 
enforcement guideline leading landlords, attorneys who advise them, 
and others to adopt and enforce it, even though it is not the actual 
liability standard.141 In addition, Hawaii’s own state fair housing act 
may also be somewhat more liberal than two-person-per-bedroom.142 
A few cities that have rent control ordinances in place (e.g., San 
Francisco, California, and Los Angeles, California) require that 
landlords of properties covered by their regulations rent to any family 
that would be allowed to live in the housing unit under a Uniform 
Housing Code (UHC) analysis.143 Generally, as applied, the UHC 
will allow more persons to occupy a dwelling than the two-person-
per-bedroom standard. 
Also, owners of property who offer vacation rentals frequently 
advertise a residential occupancy standard of three- and even four-
persons-per-bedroom.144 In fact, an association of landlords that rent 
housing for summer vacation use sued a city in part to protect its 
members’ right to allow occupancy levels higher than two-persons-
per-bedroom.145 Presumably, these landlords have calculated that a 
                                                                                                                 
according to Badami, supra note 97. While the origin of California’s informal standard is obscure, it 
may have been intended to allow a couple with a baby to occupy a one-bedroom apartment. Telephone 
interview with Chris Brancart, Partner, Brancart & Brancart (July 25, 2010) (notes on file with author). 
 141. California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing applies a disparate impact analysis to 
determine if a neutral private occupancy standard violates California’s fair housing act. The Department 
endorsed the disparate impact analysis for private occupancy standards cases in its precedential decision, 
Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Merribrook Apartments, No. FCR85-86 B3-0110 L-
38857 88-19, 1988 WL 242651, at *12 (Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n Nov. 9, 1988). This practice 
is confirmed in the recent article Ann M. Noel & Phyllis V. Cheng, Through Struggle to the Stars: A 
History of California’s Fair Housing Law, CAL. REAL PROP. J., Fall 2009, at 3, 5. Phyllis Cheng serves 
as Director of DFEH and Ann Noel as Executive and Legal Affairs Secretary. 
 142. See HAW. CODE R. §12-46-307 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing, in part: “Example: House rules 
(e.g. ‘two person limit to a bedroom’) which have the effect of discriminating (‘adverse impact’) against 
persons with children (because the overall square footage is large enough under housing code for three 
persons) are unlawful unless the rule can be justified by establishing a business necessity”). This statute 
was cited in United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1355 n.5 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 143. TERRY B. FRIEDMAN, DAVID A. GARCIA & MARK HAGARTY, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: 
LANDLORD-TENANT §§ 2:287.1, 2:592 (2010). 
 144. See, e.g., Now Booking Summer by the Sea in Cape Canaveral, supra note 102 (advertisement 
for a one-bedroom vacation rental that sleeps four, equivalent to a four-person-per-bedroom residential 
occupancy standard). 
 145. See, e.g., United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 777 A.2d 950 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
38
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 657 
 
more liberal residential occupancy standard fits their business model 
and maximizes their profits on these properties. 
Finally, landlords who rent low-quality properties at the bottom of 
the housing market are less likely to have a clear and consistent 
residential occupancy standard policy and are likely to allow more 
than two persons per bedroom. The business model of some of these 
landlords—sometimes called “slumlords”—has been described as 
“milking the property.”146 The availability of such housing directs 
many families to those units and those inferior neighborhoods, often 
resulting in high concentrations of low-income people of color in 
these neighborhoods. Therefore, the fact that it is these types of 
landlords who are not likely to enforce a two-person-per-bedroom 
occupancy standard is not a solution to the problem, but rather 
compounds it. 
Considered together, these exceptions only amount to a small 
proportion of the nation’s housing stock. Therefore, on current 
evidence available, it appears that the majority (or at least a 
substantial portion) of decent rental housing in the United States is 
governed by a maximum two-person-per-bedroom standard. 
B.   How the Two-Person-Per-Bedroom Became the Dominant 
National Occupancy Standard 
The two-person-per-bedroom standard became the national 
occupancy standard through a complex series of conflicts between 
Congress, HUD, lobbyists representing landlords and multifamily 
housing investors, state and local government lobbyists, and tenant 
advocates. The following is a brief history of the how the two-
person-per-bedroom standard became dominant.147 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: 
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 489 (1987). 
 147. This article makes no claim to apportioning responsibility or blame between HUD, Congress and 
housing industry advocates on the selection of two-person-per-bedroom standard or on the reaffirmation 
of it when HUD later attempted to move off of it. The purposes for presenting this history are: (1) to 
identify as objectively as possible the origin of two-person-per-bedroom standard in FHAA matters, and 
(2) to demonstrate its weak pedigree from the standpoint of appropriate law and policy making. 
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1.   Landlords’ Fear of Familial Status Liability 
In 1988, it became clear that Congress would adopt the FHAA, 
which included “familial status” as a new protected class. State and 
local government representatives as well as lobbyists representing 
landlords and multifamily housing investors were deeply concerned 
about potential legal liability under FHAA and tort law because of 
the effects of residential occupancy standards on families.148 Each 
group lobbied Congress for amendments to the bill. 
In response to this lobbying, Congress included a vague exemption 
from liability for “reasonable” governmental occupancy standards in 
the final bill.149 This revision did not completely address landlord and 
multifamily housing investors’ concerns because it did not directly 
state whether private owners could set their own occupancy 
standards, and, if so, how the FHAA would regulate them.150 
After the FHAA’s enactment, landlords’ pressure focused on HUD 
as it drafted regulations to implement the new provisions.151 HUD’s 
1989 regulations disappointed landlords. HUD found “no basis” for a 
national occupancy standard.152 While HUD opined in the Preamble 
to the regulations that it believed, in principle, private landlords could 
impose “reasonable” residential occupancy standards without 
incurring FHAA liability, it failed to adopt a regulation pertaining to 
private residential occupancy standards. And it failed to provide 
much guidance as to what standards would be acceptable.153 At the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1226 n.58. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006); see also City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 735 
(1995) (reviewing legislative history of the amendment). For an analysis of this exemption, see Iglesias, 
supra note 5. 
 150. Landlords were concerned that this exemption might be interpreted to mean that only 
governments could lawfully impose occupancy restrictions, and landlords could only do so in 
accordance with governmental restrictions. See Norville v. Dept. of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825, 827 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Petitioner reasons that [exemption for reasonable governmental occupancy 
restrictions] excludes a landlord’s right to regulate occupancy in the absence of a ‘local 
prescription . . . .’”). 
 151. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 
(Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 14, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 115, & 121) (HUD’s 
responses to public comments in the Preamble to the final rule on the FHAA in 1989). 
 152. Id. at 3237 (where HUD explained that it had “no basis to conclude that Congress intended that 
an owner or manager of dwellings would be unable in any way to restrict the number of occupants who 
could reside in a dwelling”). 
 153. Id. For example, the opinion referred to “sleeping areas” as well as “bedrooms.” Id. The specific 
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same time, the Preamble also frightened landlords with a warning. 
HUD stated: “In this regard, it must be noted that, in connection with 
a complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of familial status, the 
Department will carefully examine any such non-governmental 
restriction to determine whether it operates unreasonably to limit or 
exclude families with children.”154 
Taken as a whole, the Preamble explained why HUD did not take a 
position on either the meaning of the “reasonable” standard for 
governmental occupancy limits or the FHAA-compliant standard for 
privately-imposed residential occupancy standards. Not by intent, but 
in effect, the Preamble deepened the landlords’ predicament because 
it clearly provided some support for private landlords to set 
residential occupancy standards but because of its lack of clarity, 
simultaneously created regulatory uncertainty.155 
During 1989–1991,156 HUD, DOJ, and private litigants brought the 
first cases charging familial status violations based upon restrictive 
residential occupancy standards. Unexpected complications arose in 
the review of potentially discriminatory private occupancy standards 
in ownership situations, particularly with mobile home parks and 
condominium associations.157 No clear legal standard emerged from 
                                                                                                                 
origin of “reasonable” in this usage is unknown. It may reflect the exemption for governmental 
occupancy restrictions. And, of course, reasonableness is a legal standard throughout common law and 
in the FHAA, e.g. “reasonable accommodation” for persons with disabilities. 
 154. Id. (emphasis added). 
 155. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 59 (describing HUD as articulating “a standard hard to enunciate 
and harder to put in practice”). 
 156. See United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (the first published federal 
district court case); see also United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992) (the first published 
federal appellate case). 
 157. Many mobile home parks had been “adult only” before the FHAA, or had at least separated the 
“adult only” park from an adjacent “family park.” In addition, water and septic/sewage limitations, 
which purportedly justified restrictive occupancy standards, arose in the mobile home park situation 
more frequently than in the context of traditional rental apartments. To complicate matters further, HUD 
had set an occupancy standard for its own mobile homes in 1976 that was fairly restrictive, probably 
because of the relatively small size of HUD mobile homes. In California, the complexity of applying the 
FHAA to mobile homes was recognized immediately after the passage of the amendments. A resolution, 
Senate Joint Resolution Number One, was introduced in the California legislature in 1989 to urge 
Congress to clarify the application of the FHAA to mobile homes. S.J. Res. 1, 1989–1990 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Ca. 1989); see also Morales, Creating New Housing Opportunities for Families with Children, 
supra note 18, at 747–48 (noting that mobile home parks are covered dwellings and commenting on the 
ambiguity of exemptions from FHAA liability). In the condominium context, owners of units who 
wanted to sell, as well as their prospective purchasers, found themselves in conflict with condominium 
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this litigation. Most cases were resolved or settled without a 
published decision, offering no precedential authority to later courts. 
Yet, the law was being enforced, so landlords’ fear of liability 
persisted. 
2.   HUD’s Inclusion of the Two-Person-Per-Bedroom Standard in 
the Keating Memo 
On February 21, 1991, Frank Keating (HUD’s General Counsel 
under the first Bush administration) adopted internal guidance under 
HUD’s enforcement authority for its investigators and lawyers to 
determine which residential occupancy cases would be investigated. 
He was at least in part responding to the concerns of landlords and 
property managers.158 The initial version of this guidance, “Keating 
Memorandum I,” specified that only private residential occupancy 
standards more restrictive than “one person per bedroom plus one” 
would be investigated by HUD.159 According to the memo, this 
standard was derived based upon General Counsel Keating’s review 
of “a significant number of Fair Housing cases involving challenges 
to occupancy standards.”160 
Despite the fact that this memorandum was clearly specified as 
internal guidance for HUD’s use, not intended as a national 
occupancy standard, and not intended to affect the legal standard in 
suits by private parties, this restrictive standard provoked a furor 
among fair housing advocates against HUD. In response, on March 
20, 1991—only a month after he had distributed the initial memo—
General Counsel Keating issued “Keating Memorandum II”161 which 
                                                                                                                 
association rules limiting occupancy. There was no clear justification in the statutory language or 
legislative history to treat mobile homes or condominiums differently or, more generally, to apply 
different standards to different types of housing, forms of tenure, or locations (e.g. urban, small city, 
suburban, or rural). 
 158. See Memorandum from Frank Keating, General Counsel, HUD to all Regional Counsel 
regarding “Fair Housing Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Standards” (Feb. 21, 1991) (on file with 
author) (“There has been considerable concern on the part of landlords and managers about what 
occupancy standard they may impose without running afoul of the ban in the Fair Housing Act, as 
amended, of discrimination against families with children.”). 
 159. Id. at 1. 
 160. Id. Apparently at this time, General Counsel Keating was reviewing occupancy cases himself. 
 161. The March (1991) version of the memorandum is referenced throughout this Article as the 
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identified two-person-per-bedroom as presumptively reasonable.162 
According to the memorandum, the source of the two-person-per-
bedroom standard was twofold: (1) the DOJ had “incorporated it into 
consent decrees and proposed orders”; and (2) it was “consistent with 
the guidance provided to housing providers in the HUD [Occupancy] 
handbook.”163 The memorandum provided that the presumption was 
rebuttable. It also specified a list of factors HUD would consider 
before determining if any particular residential occupancy standard 
might violate the FHAA so that a further investigation should be 
conducted and, depending upon the results of the investigation, that a 
charge would be issued.164 
A few years later HUD appointed a special task force to analyze 
the problem of identifying a workable occupancy standard.165 
However, the task force was unable to agree on a specific policy.166 
On July, 12, 1995, Nelson Diaz (HUD’s General Counsel under 
the first Clinton Administration) issued a Memorandum from HUD 
withdrawing the Keating Memo and substituting guidance that only 
occupancy standards that were based on the model code published by 
the Building Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) would be 
guaranteed safe harbor.167 This memorandum was considerably more 
                                                                                                                 
“Keating Memo.” 
 162. Keating Memo, supra note 16. Although it was an “internal memo,” HUD gave copies of the 
Keating Memo freely to anyone who requested one. Congress Directs HUD to Adopt Keating Memo for 
Occupancy Standards, supra note 98 (“Since 1991, HUD has routinely distributed the Keating Memo to 
anyone who asked for a copy.”). 
 163. Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,257. While the memo does not provide a specific reference 
to the HUD Occupancy Handbook, General Counsel Keating was probably referring to HUD, NO. 
4350.3 REV-1, OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS 
(2009). 
 164. Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,257. The factors listed are: (1) size of bedrooms and unit 
(e.g. other living areas), (2) age of children, (3) configuration of unit (e.g. other possible sleeping 
spaces), (4) other physical limitations of housing (e.g. capacity of septic, sewer, or other building 
systems), (5) applicable residential occupancy standard from state and local law, and (6) other relevant 
factors (including discriminatory statements, discriminatory rules governing use of common facilities, 
taking steps to discourage families with children, and enforcing its occupancy standards only against 
families with children). Keating Memo I had only identified the following factors: “the number and size 
of bedrooms and the overall size of the dwelling unit.” 
 165. Kelly, supra note 18, at 60–61. 
 166. See PUB. & ASSISTED HOUS. OCCUPANCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS AND TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1994). 
 167. Memorandum from Nelson Diaz, General Counsel, HUD, to all Field Assistant General Counsel 
(July 12, 1995), available at 
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objective than previous guidance because, in principle, it would 
allow landlords and property managers to calculate the exact 
minimum occupancy standard required under the FHAA for each unit 
or house. It also specifically stated that it was offering “safe harbor” 
to housing providers who abided by it. This memo provoked a strong 
negative reaction from landlords and their advocates at least in part 
because “in certain situations [it] allow[ed] for nontraditional 
sleeping areas, such as living and dining rooms” to be included in the 
calculation for the minimum number of occupants required to be 
allowed under the FHAA.168 In response, a coalition of national 
housing organizations commissioned a countrywide study to 
challenge the proposal.169 In the end, the Diaz memo was short-lived. 
On September 25, 1995, Elizabeth K. Julian, HUD’s Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Policy and Initiatives, issued a memorandum 
to the Fair Housing Enforcement Directors and others that ordered 
them not to follow the Diaz Memorandum and reinstated the Keating 
Memo as operative guidance.170 
Under Henry Cisneros (the Secretary of HUD under the second 
Clinton administration), HUD prosecuted several alleged violations 
of FHAA in the area of restrictive residential occupancy standards, 
applying the disparate impact theory of discrimination. In some of 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_hudguid6. 
[hereinafter Diaz Memorandum]. 
 168. Occupancy, supra note 135; see also e.g., NMHC Comments on Fair Housing Initiative 
Program, NAT’L MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, 
http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfm?IssueID=149&ContentItemID=1336 (last visited Dec. 
30, 2011) (On December 19, 1997, The National Multi Housing Council submitted the comments on 
behalf of itself and seven other national organizations: “In 1995, Nelson Diaz, former General Counsel 
of HUD, issued a new memorandum rescinding the Keating Memorandum. However, after housing 
providers complained that the Diaz Memorandum’s requirements were too restrictive, the Keating 
Memorandum was soon reinstated.” In addition, the housing industry charged that the memorandum 
was confusing because it used an out-of-date version of the BOCA code.); Letter from Kenneth 
Schoonover, Vice President of Codes and Standards, Bldg. Officials & Code Adm’rs Int’l, Inc. (BOCA), 
to Clarine Nardi Riddle, Nat’l Multi Hous. Council (Aug. 2, 1995) (on file with author). 
 169. Baer, supra note 101. This study defends the two-person-per-bedroom standard as the status quo 
and argues that the HUD proposal would cause “overcrowding.” Id. 
 170. Memorandum from Elizabeth K. Julian, Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy & Initiatives, 
HUD, to Fair Housing Enforcement Directors, Investigation Divisions Directors, FHAP and FHIP 
Divisions (Sept. 25, 1995), available at 
http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=HUD_resources_hudguid8 
[hereinafter Julian Memorandum]. 
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these cases HUD argued that courts should apply the “compelling 
business necessity” standard as defendants’ rebuttal burden.171 
Landlords and their advocates pushed back.172 While courts accepted 
the use of disparate impact analysis in neutral private residential 
occupancy standards cases,173 two circuits have refused to adopt a 
“compelling business necessity” standard as defendants’ rebuttal 
burden.174 
In 1996, Congress enacted an appropriations bill requiring HUD to 
use the Keating Memo in enforcing the FHAA during the 1996 Fiscal 
Year.175 In 1998, Congress passed the Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act. This law included a provision directing HUD to 
use the Keating Memo as its policy for evaluating occupancy 
restrictions in familial status cases and to publish it in the Federal 
Register.176 HUD complied with the directive in late 1998 by issuing 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See, e.g., Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 743–47 (9th. Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates 
P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th. Cir. 1995). 
 172. See generally Steve Edelstein, What’s Really Wrong With Fair Housing, APARTMENT 
PROFESSIONAL, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 70–74, available at http://www.williams-
edelstein.net/pdf/apartment_professional_april_2005.pdf. 
 173. See, e.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d 739; Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243. 
 174. See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747; Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1254-55. See generally Reinhart v. Lincoln 
Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225 (10th. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming Mountain Side). 
 175. Sec. 224.  
None of the funds provided in this act ma[]y be used to take any enforcement action with 
respect to a complaint of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act on the basis of 
familial status and which involves an occupancy standard established by the housing 
provider except to the extent that it is found that there has been discrimination in 
contravention of the standards provided in the March 20, 1991 Memorandum from the 
General Counsel of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to All Regional 
Counsel or until such time that HUD issues a final rule in accordance with Section 553 of 
Title 5, United States Code. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-134, at 291 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (citation omitted) (only applies to federal 
government’s enforcement activities and only for that year’s appropriations). In the same year as this 
Act, Congress came close to enacting a statutory definition of a reasonable residential occupancy 
standard that would have adopted the Keating memo’s “two-persons-per bedroom” approach. See H.R. 
3385, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 2406, 104th Cong. (1996). H.R. 2406 passed in the House but failed in 
the Senate. 
 176. Sec. 589. TREATMENT OF OCCUPANCY STANDARDS. 
(a) Establishment of Policy.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall publish a notice in the 
Federal Register for effect that takes effect upon publication and provides that the 
specific and unmodified standards provided in the March 20, 1991, Memorandum from 
the General Counsel of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to All 
Regional Counsel shall be the policy of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development with respect to complaints of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act on 
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a “Policy Statement” adopting the Keating Memo as its enforcement 
policy for residential occupancy cases.177 Pursuant to Congress’s 
directive, this Policy Statement was published in the Federal Register 
to advise the public on how HUD would review compliance with the 
FHAA’s familial status provisions for residential occupancy cases.178 
Since 1998, neither Congress nor HUD has done anything to change 
this situation. 
During all of these periods, HUD’s use of the Keating Memo with 
its characterization of the two-person-per-bedroom standard as 
presumptively reasonable gave legitimacy, prominence, and 
significance to the standard no matter what HUD’s intent was and no 
matter what the actual liability standard was. 
3.   The Use of the Two-Person-Per-Bedroom Standard by HUD 
and FHAPs in Enforcement Activities 
A person who believes she has suffered housing discrimination has 
numerous institutional means for redress.179 One of the most common 
is filing an administrative complaint with HUD or a state or local fair 
housing enforcement agency for processing and prosecution. The 
governmental enforcement mechanisms for the FHAA include not 
only HUD and the Department of Justice, but also “Fair Housing 
Assistance Program” (FHAP) agencies which are administrative 
enforcement agencies in thirty-nine states and a substantial number 
of counties and cities that have federal fair housing “equivalency” 
status.180 Part of the regulations authorizing FHAPs requires them to 
                                                                                                                 
the basis of familial status which involve an occupancy standard established by a housing 
provider. 
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 589, 112 Stat. 2461, 
2651 (1998) (citation omitted). The Fair Housing Institute attributed Congress’s action to the rebuke by 
the Pfaff court. Congress Directs HUD to Adopt Keating Memo for Occupancy Standards, supra note 
98. 
 177. See Keating Memo, supra note 16 (HUD Statement of Policy Implementing the requirements of 
section 589 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998). See infra Part III.A for a 
discussion of the legal effect of this statute on the Keating Memo. 
 178. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the scope of HUD’s regulatory authority after this statute. 
 179. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
 180. Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) Agencies, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/partners/FHAP/agencies.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). The state and 
local fair housing enforcement agencies are called FHAPs, an acronym based on the name of the 
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enforce fair housing law that provides at least as many rights to 
protected classes as the FHAA provides.181 Apparently, following 
HUD, many FHAPs apply the Keating Memo as an intake guideline 
in residential occupancy cases.182 
Since 1989, dozens of claims have been filed with HUD and 
FHAPs alleging violation of the familial status provision through 
overly restrictive private residential occupancy standards. A 1991 
survey conducted by the Institute of Real Estate Management 
reported: 
Of survey respondents who reported problems resulting from the 
[Fair Housing] Act, 26 percent said they had received a claim of 
discriminatory occupancy policies or of discrimination on the 
basis of familial status. Familial status and discriminatory 
occupancy standards represent 56 percent of the threats of a 
claim made to survey respondents.183 
Once a complaint is filed, HUD has 100 days to complete an 
investigation and decide whether “reasonable cause exists to believe 
that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.”184 In some cases 
after applying the Keating Memo as an intake guideline, HUD 
decided to investigate a complaint and then, based upon the results of 
the investigation, file a charge. In the vast majority of the cases that 
were charged and litigated before an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
                                                                                                                 
program by which they are funded, the Fair Housing Assistance Program. 
 181. Id. Moreover, if HUD receives a complaint alleging a violation in one of these states, HUD is 
required by its own regulations to refer such claims to the FHAP in that state. 
 182. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Excluding California, the remaining thirty-eight 
states encompass 80.18% of the total U.S. population and jurisdiction over 78% of its total rental 
housing units. This article excludes California from this calculation because of its state fair housing 
enforcement guideline of “two-person-per-bedroom-plus-one.” See supra note 104 and accompanying 
text. These figures are the result of calculations made using PUMS data from the 2007 American 
Community Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. See also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
RECONSTRUCTING FAIR HOUSING 50–51 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2001/Nov62001. 
 183. Martha Schindler, How Many is too Many? The Need for Occupancy Guidelines, 
ALLBUSINESS.COM, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/business-regulations/329274-1.html (last 
visited July 11, 2011). 
 184. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006). 
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or in federal court, HUD articulated an FHAA violation under a 
disparate impact theory or a disparate treatment theory.185 But HUD 
was inconsistent. Sometimes in its administration of these claims, 
HUD blurred and apparently merged the “reasonable” designation for 
intake under the Keating Memo with a legal designation of 
“nondiscriminatory” under the FHAA in its adjudicatory work.186 
HUD sometimes referenced the Keating Memo in its residential 
occupancy case charges to ALJs, and sometimes (when briefs were 
required) in hearings before ALJs.187 Making “reasonable” under the 
Keating Memo functionally equivalent to “nondiscriminatory” under 
the FHAA supported the view that as “presumptively reasonable,” 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard was also presumptively 
compliant with the FHAA. Incorporating the “reasonable” language 
into its charges increased the likelihood that ALJs and courts would 
consider the Keating memo and its two-person-per-bedroom standard 
as a liability standard or (more usually) a defense. These mistakes 
helped provide a veneer of legal authority to the Keating Memo. 
4.   HUD’s and DOJ’s Incorporation of the Standard in Proposed 
Orders and Consent Decrees 
HUD also sometimes used the two-person-per-bedroom standard 
in consent decrees in its ALJ adjudications. And, according to the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See cases cited infra Part II.C.1; see also Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant 
Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, HUD, to All Regional Directors, Office of Fair Hous. and 
Equal Opportunity (Dec. 17, 1993), 
http://fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pageID=260. (stating “[c]ases which have 
been brought under the Fair Housing Act should now be analyzed using a disparate impact analysis, to 
the extent this theory is applicable to a particular case” and citing the Mountain Side case as an 
example). 
 186. See cases cited infra Part II.C.1. HUD also sometimes used the “reasonable” language in 
response to requests for guidance from individual housing providers. See United States v. Tropic Seas, 
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 n.3 (D. Haw. 1995) (reciting communications between HUD and VP of 
defendant Co-op board). 
 187. See, e.g., Guvenilir v. Riverbend Club Apartments, HUDALJ No. 04-89-0676-1, at 20 (HUD 
Oct. 15,1991), http://www.hud.gov/offices/oha/oalj/cases/fha/files/HUD%2004-89-0676-1.pdf (initial 
decision) (applying disparate impact and disparate treatment analyses but finding, as a conclusion of 
law, that the apartment complex’s occupancy policy operated unreasonably to limit or exclude families 
with children and that “[b]y enforcing an unreasonable occupancy standard, [Riverbend Club 
Apartments] have discriminated against families with children in the terms and conditions of rental of 
apartments in violation of the provisions of the Fair Housing Act”). 
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Keating Memo itself, one source of the two-person-per-bedroom 
presumptively reasonable standard for HUD’s enforcement activities 
was that the Department of Justice had “incorporated [it] in[to] 
consent decrees and proposed orders.”188 Both of these practices also 
supported the broader use of this standard by landlords and property 
management companies. 
During the period of 1989–2010, the practice in HUD ALJ 
adjudications has been inconsistent.189 Some orders only required the 
respondent to follow the law without additional direction or 
specificity,190 or to adopt “objective and nondiscriminatory 
standards.”191 Some orders directed the respondent to adopt an 
occupancy standard not more restrictive than two-person-per-
bedroom but without any reference to the Keating Memo.192 Some 
ordered the housing provider to adopt a residential occupancy 
standard consistent with the Keating Memo.193 Some directed the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,257. 
 189. The author was not able to collect every relevant case. 
 190. See, e.g., Beard v. Concord Apartments, HUDALJ No. 05-91-1345-1 (HUD Sept. 22, 1992), 
1992 WL 672901 (enjoining defendants from “enforcing any occupancy rules which prohibit any 
individual from occupying a unit based upon familial status”); Weigand v. Foxcroft Condo. Apartments, 
Inc., HUDALJ No. 04-93-0492-8 & HUDALJ No. 04-93-2091-8 (HUD April 17, 1996), at *3 (ordering 
respondent to “amend its occupancy policy to eliminate any adverse impact on families with children in 
the future”); Link v. Trucksess, FHEO Nos. 03-10-0065-8, 03-10-0068-8 (HUD Sept. 21, 2010), at *4 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=FHEOtrucksess.pdf (initial decision and consent 
order) (“[Owners] shall create a written rental policy of nondiscrimination to be approved by HUD.”); 
see also Press Release, Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila., Bucks County Landlords to pay $40,000 
for Illegally Evicting Mom and Adopted Son (Sept. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.fhco.org/pdfs/news/NEWS_PennLLsPay40KforEvictingMomAndAdoptedSon_09292010.p
df; Press Release, Shantae Goodloe, HUD, HUD Charges Philadelphia-Area Landlords with 
Discriminating Against Adoptive Mom (Apr. 15, 2010), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-
080. 
 191. See, e.g., Carson v. Bowen, HUDALJ No. 07-93-0867-8 (HUD July 25, 1995), 1995 WL 
454029, at *2 (enjoining defendant to “establish and uniformly apply objective and nondiscriminatory 
standards and occupancy requirements in determining whether to rent a dwelling”). 
 192. See, e.g., Guvenilir v. Riverbend Club Apartments, HUDALJ No. 04-89-0676-1, at 20 (HUD 
Oct. 15, 1991), http://www.hud.gov/offices/oha/oalj/cases/fha/files/HUD%2004-89-0676-1.pdf (initial 
decision) (instructing apartment owners to adopt and enforce an occupancy policy no more restrictive 
than two-persons-per-bedroom at all properties they own or control within the jurisdiction of the Atlanta 
HUD regional office). 
 193. See, e.g., Holman v. Melco Prop., HUDALJ No. 05-98-1047-8 (HUD Feb. 25, 2002), 2002 WL 
321955, at *2 (ordering respondents to “change their policies with regard to renting one bedroom units 
to people with a child so as to come into compliance with HUD’s regulations as reflected in the Keating 
memo, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A”). 
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respondent to adopt a reasonable policy.194 A few required the 
housing provider to adopt a residential occupancy standard not less 
restrictive than the local governmental occupancy standard.195 
To the degree defendants’ lawyers researched these orders or 
communicated among themselves, the practice of specifying “not 
more restrictive than two-person-per-bedroom” or an indirect or 
direct incorporation of the Keating Memo in consent orders 
supported continued use of the two-person-per-bedroom standard. 
Further, given the regulatory uncertainty and the role of the two-
person-per-bedroom standard as a focal point (discussed infra), 
arguably the more vague orders to “follow the law” also supported 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard. 
The terms of settlement agreements are reached by negotiation 
between the litigants. They may require more or less of the parties 
than a court would if the case went to trial. For these reasons, 
settlements and consent decrees do not become binding law for third 
parties, only for the parties to the settlement. Advocating for a two-
person-per-bedroom standard in consent decrees is consistent with 
the position of the fair housing defense bar. The fair housing defense 
bar pays attention to HUD’s and DOJ’s enforcement practices.196 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See, e.g., Bridges v. Ineichen, HUDALJ No. 05-93-0143-1 (HUD April 4, 1995), 1995 WL 
152740, at *9 (“Respondent and other housing providers . . . have a duty to ensure that their occupancy 
policies are reasonable.”). These cases could be understood to refer to the Keating Memo indirectly 
because of the reference to “reasonable.” 
 195. See, e.g., Martin v. Almeida, HUDALJ No. 01-93-0276-8 (HUD Apr. 26, 1994), 1994 WL 
680959 (“At a minimum, the standards for occupancy shall be no more restrictive than the standards set 
forth in section 45-24.3-11 of the Rhode Island . . . code.”); Suburban Md. Fair Hous., Inc. v. Krupp 
Realty, Inc., HUDALJ No. 03-90-0392-1 (HUD Nov. 8, 1993), 1993 WL 668339 (“Respondents may 
modify this policy in the future, but shall not adopt an occupancy policy for rental units in The Point 
Apartments more restrictive than the applicable local occupancy code.”); see also United States v. 
Candlelight Manor Condo. Ass’n, No. 1:03:-CV-248 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/candlesettle.php (providing in “Affirmative Relief” that 
defendant will revise master lease to provide “occupancy of any unit or any mobile home situated [on 
any Condominium site] shall not exceed the limitations that may be established from time to time by the 
City of Holland, the County of Allegan, or the State of Michigan . . . and [that defendant] further agrees 
that the occupancy standards as applied at the condominium development will not be more restrictive 
than the requirements of the City of Holland, the County of Allegan, or the State of Michigan” 
(emphasis added)). On my analysis, this would only be appropriate if the governmental standard were 
demonstrated to be “reasonable” under the FHAA statutory exemption. See infra notes 332–44 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., Badami, supra note 97 (“Over the years, I successfully defended any number of cases 
based on the Keating Memorandum and the two person per bedroom guideline.”); Lori Irish Bauman, 
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And so, while these HUD and DOJ practices did not give actual legal 
authority to the two-person-per-bedroom standard, they did support 
its use. 
5.   Mention of Two-Person-Per-Bedroom Standard from the 
Keating Memo by Some Courts 
Another reason the two-person-per-bedroom standard has gained 
national currency is that several published court decisions refer to it 
and some even appear to use it in their analyses.197 HUD is the 
federal agency charged with administration and enforcement of the 
FHAA. Because of this, HUD regulations and, in some instances, 
enforcement activity, are sometimes entitled to deference by courts. 
For this reason, courts’ discussion of HUD statements and policy are 
relevant. However, courts are not required to defer to every action or 
statement by federal agencies charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing federal statutes. And there are different levels of deference. 
While these references in published cases are arguably dicta or the 
product of poor legal reasoning,198 their presence both enables and 
encourages parties in future cases to treat the two-person-per-
bedroom standard as having a legal status that it does not have. 
Moreover, this view is likely to be transmitted to landlords or 
property management agencies who consult lawyers on the issue of 
what are “legal” private residential occupancy standards.199 
                                                                                                                 
Legal Update on Familial Status, J. PROP. MGMT., July-Aug. 1992, at 29 (summarizing recent cases); 
Chicago Case, supra note 107; see also Occupancy, supra note 135. 
 197. These cases are discussed infra Part II.C.1. 
 198. Certainly courts would be required to defer to the Keating Memo as HUD’s own internal 
enforcement guidance. In other words, a court could not order HUD to use some other standard as its 
internal enforcement guidance. However, no court has ever performed the appropriate legal analysis to 
determine if the law requires courts to defer to the Keating Memo as a liability rule. See discussion infra 
Part III.A. 
 199. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing 
and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 444 (1998) (citing Jaret 
Seiberg, A Trailer Park Case Worries Bank Lawyers, AM. BANKER, Mar. 29, 1995, at 4) (regarding the 
Mountain Side case). 
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6.   Promotion of Two-Person-Per-Bedroom By the Rental 
Housing Industry 
Throughout the entire period—from the time Congress considered 
adding familial status as a protected class to the FHAA to the present 
day—landlords and organizations representing landlords and 
property management agencies have actively and consistently 
promoted two-person-per-bedroom as the best and ought-to-be-legal 
standard.200 These groups sponsored two major studies used in 
lobbying for legislation at the state and federal levels to promote the 
standard.201 Moreover, two-person-per-bedroom was the standard 
that the landlord and multifamily housing investors’ lobby promoted 
to HUD.202 Indeed, the National Multi Housing Council (NMHC), 
one of the primary national organizations representing landlords to 
Congress, unabashedly claims credit for HUD’s adoption of the two-
person-per-bedroom standard in the Keating Memo. This claim is 
asserted on its website in a document entitled “An Overview of the 
activities that led to HUD’s 12/18/1998 occupancy standards 
guidance.” On the same website, the Keating Memo is posted with 
the following description: “Long-sought guidance confirming that a 
two persons per bedroom occupancy is ‘as a general rule’ reasonable 
for purposes of determining familial status discrimination under the 
Fair Housing Act.”203 The National Apartment Association and the 
NMHC appear to be the primary sources of the two-person-per-
bedroom standard in the apartment owner industry.204 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Referring to two-person-per-bedroom and the slightly more relaxed standard of two-persons-per-
bedroom-plus one, one report states: “These are the standards usually called for by the apartment 
owners.” Baer, supra note 101, at 32. Further, “the predil[e]ction of landlords everywhere [is] not to rent 
to more than 2 persons per bedroom.” Id. at 35. Referring to the Diaz Memorandum, supra note 167, the 
rental-housing.com website states: “Rental housing groups were disappointed and discouraged with 
HUD’s interim guidance since the 2-person per bedroom standard is generally accepted as the most 
sensible throughout the industry and reflects standards which allow residential units to be properly 
operated and maintained.” Occupancy, supra note 135. 
 201. Baer, supra note 101; see also Witt, supra note 131; Occupancy, supra note 135. 
 202. See Occupancy Standards: Regulatory and Legislative History, supra note 136. 
 203. Occupancy Standards, NAT’L MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, 
http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ContentList.cfm?NavID=238 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 204. Occupancy Standards: Regulatory and Legislative History, supra note 136. Under the subtitle 
“NAA/NMHC Position,” these two organizations explicitly endorse the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard as “presumptively reasonable.” Arguably, the other eleven groups comprising the “Industry 
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In November 1994, the Arizona Multihousing Association 
produced and distributed a document entitled Answers to Some 
Common Questions About “Occupancy Standards.” The final item in 
the document is entitled “What Actions Does the Multifamily 
Housing Industry Recommend?” The final sentence of this section 
reads: “The multihousing industry believes that HUD should reaffirm 
its presumptively reasonable minimum occupancy guideline of two 
persons per bedroom.”205 
Though the Keating Memorandum was only issued as internal 
guidance, it quickly became public and was of particular interest to 
landlords and the property management industry. Because HUD is 
the primary administrative agency charged with implementing the 
FHAA, it was expected to lead enforcement efforts.206 The pressure 
exercised by the housing industry, chronicled supra, in favor of this 
standard fairly raises the specter of its regulatory capture of HUD. 
After the Keating Memo was issued in 1991, these organizations 
often explicitly based this advocacy for the standard upon the 
Keating Memo, encouraging their audiences to treat the informal 
guidance as a “safe harbor” from FHAA liability.207 This advocacy 
sometimes articulated the standard without reference to the numerous 
special circumstances or factors that the Keating Memo itself 
identified as qualifiers on its reasonableness.208 And sometimes this 
                                                                                                                 
Coalition” (which included local governments, public housing agencies, the building industry, senior 
citizens advocacy groups, and affordable housing developers) have a different position. 
 205. Arizona Multihousing Association, supra note 100, at 10 (emphasis in original). In the context of 
the remainder of the document, it is clear that the adjective “minimum” really means maximum. 
 206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608, 3614(a) (2006). 
 207. Landlords also pointed to HUD’s own manuals for public housing and HUD subsidized housing 
as support for the two-person-per-bedroom standard because these manuals recommended a two-person-
per-bedroom residential occupancy standard. However, HUD stated in the Preamble to its FHAA 
regulations that residential occupancy standard appropriate for these kinds of housing might not be 
appropriate for private market housing because HUD assisted dwellings are often smaller and differently 
configured than private market units. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 
Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23, 1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 14, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 
115, & 121). 
 208. Some legal practice guides contribute to this misperception. To their credit, many lawyers 
representing landlords and property management agencies tried to educate their clients to keep the 
whole Keating Memo with its special circumstances factors in mind. See Badami, supra note 97; see 
also Cathy L. Lucrezi, The Fair Housing Corner— Two People per Bedroom?, EVICT.COM (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.evict.com/newsletters/newsletter_aug05.htm. 
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advocacy failed to convey that a two-person-per-bedroom standard 
could be found to violate the FHAA.209 
Notably, one HUD General Counsel and one HUD Secretary 
complained about the misuse of the Keating Memo by the apartment 
industry. HUD General Secretary Nelson Diaz complained about this 
misinterpretation of the Keating Memo: 
[The Keating Memo] has frequently been misinterpreted to set a 
‘bright line’ standard of two persons per bedroom, but in fact 
required consideration of a variety of factors in determining 
whether a maximum occupancy standard [discriminated] against 
families with children, including bedroom size and 
configuration, and the age and sex of children.210 
In an April 1994 letter to Arizona’s Governor Fife Symington, 
HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros complained that the Keating Memo 
had 
sometimes been misinterpreted to allow housing providers to set 
two person per bedroom occupancy standards in every situation, 
[when] it does not in fact authorize such action. There are a 
number of circumstances where the availability of particularly 
large bedrooms, use of space other than that denominated as 
‘bedrooms’ (such as dens or living rooms), or other factors could 
result in revision upward of a two person per bedroom 
guidance.211 
                                                                                                                 
 209. HUD has recommended a guideline of two persons per bedroom as a safe policy for 
providers. For policies which are more restrictive, HUD will take into account such 
factors as the size of the bedrooms and dwelling unit, capacity of sewer, septic and other 
building systems, and any city or state occupancy requirements governing the property to 
determine if discrimination against families with children is occurring. 
Occupancy, supra note 135 (emphasis added). 
 210. Diaz Memorandum, supra note 167. 
 211. Arizona Multihousing Association, supra note 100, at 3. 
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C.   Why We Have Been Stuck at the Two-Person-Per-Bedroom 
Standard 
1.   Lack of a Clear Liability Standard 
Since 1998, there have only been a handful of published cases on 
the merits regarding FHAA familial status claims against neutral 
residential occupancy standards. Sometimes a paucity of litigation 
can be attributed to clear and settled legal rules known to all relevant 
parties. However, the jurisprudence of residential occupancy 
standards has been anything but clear and settled. It is a testament to 
the importance, complexity and politically-charged nature of the 
issue that the courts’ jurisprudence is unclear. 
Twenty-two years after the FHAA was enacted, federal courts that 
have decided residential occupancy standard discrimination cases 
have failed to agree on the standard for legal liability.212 There is no 
U.S. Supreme Court decision directly on point.213 There are 
published appellate cases in only three federal circuits: the Eighth 
Circuit (United States v. Badgett),214 the Ninth Circuit (Pfaff v. 
HUD),215 and the Tenth Circuit (Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. 
HUD).216 Each circuit articulates a somewhat different liability 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See infra cases in notes 213–16. Of course, some published cases do not even reach the issues on 
the merits. See, e.g., DeBolt v. Espy, 47 F.3d 777, 777 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff lacked standing); 
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Hous. v. Arco Mgmt. Co., 168 F.R.D. 647, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 
(denying class certification). 
 213. See Edmunds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (interpreting the exemption from FHAA 
liability for “reasonable” governmental occupancy standards). 
 214. United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1179–80 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding one-person-per-
bedroom policy for a one-bedroom apartment with a living space of 636 square feet violated the 
FHAA). The Badgett opinion is the first published federal appellate case in which the plaintiff 
challenged a neutral occupancy standard with statistical evidence of discriminatory impact and 
presented some evidence of intent to discriminate. 
 215. Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding landlords’ refusal to rent two-bedroom 
house to family of five did not violate FHAA). 
 216. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1257 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(finding mobile home park occupancy policy of no more than three persons per mobile home did not 
violate the FHAA). The Mountain Side court applies a version of disparate impact burden-shifting test in 
which the defendant’s burden of proving a legitimate business justification was that “the defendant must 
demonstrate that the discriminatory practice has a manifest relationship to the housing in question.” Id. 
at 1254. It rejected a “compelling business necessity” requirement and found that a mobile home park 
occupancy policy of no more than three persons per mobile home did not violate the FHAA because the 
defendant park owner’s occupancy limits were justified by sewer system limitations and the owner’s 
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standard. As discussed infra, decisions by district courts and state 
courts are all over the map. 
HUD uses the Keating Memo to evaluate administrative 
complaints alleging that neutral private residential occupancy 
standards violate the FHAA, but it has employed a disparate impact 
or disparate treatment theory of liability when litigating these cases. 
This inconsistency or disjunction between the analysis used to decide 
whether to further investigate cases and the legal liability theory 
applied in cases that are actually brought has been the primary source 
of confusion in the cases. 
All three federal circuit courts have affirmed the application of 
disparate impact or disparate treatment analysis to such cases.217 And 
most courts do apply some version of disparate treatment or disparate 
impact using the traditional burden-shifting tests.218 However, several 
courts discuss “reasonableness” based upon either HUD’s Preamble 
to the FHAA regulations or the Keating Memo. And, while no case 
has treated the Keating Memo as a complete substitute for disparate 
treatment or disparate impact analysis, some courts appear to use 
“reasonableness” to modify the disparate treatment or disparate 
impact standards.219 
                                                                                                                 
concern over quality of life in the mobile home park. Id. at 1254–57. 
 217. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 739; Mountain Side Mobile Estates, 56 F.3d at 1243; Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1176. 
 218. See, e.g., Hous. Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc. v. Key Colony No. 4 Condo. Ass’n, 
Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (upholding both disparate impact and disparate treatment 
claims on motion to dismiss); Snyder v. Barry Realty, 953 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ill. 1996); United States 
v. Hover, No. C 93-20061 JW, 1995 WL 55379 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 1995); United States v. Weiss, 847 
F. Supp. 819 (D. Nev. 1994); Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994); CHRO ex rel Rowley v. J.E. Ackley, LLC, No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2001) (unpublished); Indiana Civil Rights Comm’n v. Cnty. Line Park, 738 N.E.2d 1044 
(Ind. 2000) (applying burden-shifting of Komorczy v. Sec’y of HUD, 53 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1995)); 
Human Rights Comm’n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 659 (Vt. 1995) (acknowledging but not addressing 
disparate impact claim because it upholds the trial court’s decision on disparate treatment). 
 219. Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747–49 (granting judgment for the defendant because of HUD’s conduct, but 
discussing the Keating Memo and “reasonableness” in dicta); Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1176 (applying the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, but discussing the Keating Memo and “reasonableness” in 
dicta); Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 727–28 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (applying disparate treatment 
burden-shifting analysis, but discussing “reasonableness” in dicta); Snyder, 953 F. Supp. at 222 
(applying a disparate impact analysis and misconstruing the Badgett court as establishing a 
“reasonableness” standard); Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying 
disparate treatment burden shifting analysis and misconstruing HUD’s Preamble to its FHAA 
regulations to have adopted “reasonableness” as defendant’s burden); United States v. Lepore, 816 F. 
Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (applying disparate treatment analysis and inappropriately considering the 
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Two of the appellate decisions exemplify this problem. The 
Badgett court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test (a 
disparate treatment analysis). However, while explicitly recognizing 
that the Keating Memo is only HUD’s “rule of thumb,” the court 
appears to evaluate the plaintiff’s prima facie case using the Keating 
Memo as a “totality of the circumstances” test.220 
The Pfaff court held that a neutral residential occupancy standard 
could be challenged under a disparate impact burden-shifting test, but 
found for the defendant because of HUD’s unacceptable conduct in 
the litigation.221 The Pfaff court rejected a HUD ALJ’s application of 
“compelling business necessity” as defendants’ burden in that case 
and declined to decide if it was the proper standard in general for 
disparate impact cases.222 The court stated its view that 
“reasonableness” was HUD’s original standard for defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
statutory exemption for reasonable governmental occupancy standards as a defense for private housing 
provider’s occupancy standard); Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 746 F. Supp. 301, 
309–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (opining in dicta that reasonable occupancy limitations have been held 
sufficient to rebut prima facie cases of discrimination). Similar minor references can be found in Sams 
v. HUD, No. 94-1695, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 449 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (per curiam); Milsap v. 
Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-60033-Civ-MARRA/SELTZER, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1147 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2005); United States v. Towers, No. 93-4260, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10012 
(E.D. La. July 15, 1994); Norville v. Dep’t of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 220. Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1178–80. 
 221. “We first consider the prima facie case and decline to reach the merits. We then turn to the 
rebuttal and find that the Pfaffs have met their burden to rebut any prima facie case against them. 
HUD’s reprehensible conduct in this case renders any other result unfair.” Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745. 
“Because HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously in bringing the present enforcement action against the 
Pfaffs under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), we reverse the order of the ALJ and direct that the Charge of 
Discrimination be dismissed.” Id. at 750. For example, the Northern District of Illinois interprets Pfaff 
as follows: 
In Pfaff v. Secretary of the Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., the Ninth Circuit abandoned 
the Mountain Side standard in favor of a “reasonableness” standard for purposes of 
determining whether defendant’s non-discriminatory reasons are legitimate. Rather than 
requiring defendants to use the least restrictive practices possible, the Ninth Circuit now 
requires that they use “reasonable” practices to achieve their non-discriminatory goals. 
Snyder, 953 F. Supp. at 222 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citation omitted). The Snyder court also misinterpreted the 
Badgett court as establishing a “reasonableness” standard. Id. 
 222. We hold that the ALJ erred in applying the Mountain Side test in this case. Even if the 
appropriate standard of rebuttal in disparate impact cases normally requires a compelling 
business necessity, the record in this case leads us to the conclusion that it would be 
fundamentally unfair to hold the Pfaffs to this standard given HUD’s truly appalling 
conduct in this matter.  
Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747 (footnote omitted). 
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rebuttal of a prima facie case and briefly applied this standard to the 
facts in the case.223 
Many courts’ references to “reasonableness” in these cases should 
be treated as mere dicta.224 Others can be criticized as inadequate 
legal analysis.225 However, these cases have been interpreted by 
some lower courts as grafting “reasonableness” from the Keating 
Memo into the disparate treatment and disparate impact burden-
shifting standards as either a plaintiff’s burden to prove a prima facie 
case or a defendant’s burden to defend an occupancy standard.226 
As demonstrated by the empirical studies presented in this article, 
enforcement of the “presumptively reasonable” two-person-per-
bedroom standard will often lead to at least a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Thus it is likely that application of the reasonableness 
analysis in the Keating Memorandum and a disparate impact or 
disparate treatment analysis will often come to different results. And, 
in any case, they require different types of legal analysis. The 
ambiguity caused by the occasional importing of “reasonableness” 
combined with the general lack of clarity in disparate treatment or 
disparate impact analysis jurisprudence causes uncertainty at every 
stage of the analysis in these cases, including what is required to 
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination,227 the 
standard for the defendant’s rebuttal burden,228 the kinds of reasons 
that are acceptable to justify a residential occupancy standard which 
has a disparate impact,229 the types of evidence that would be 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Id. at 748–49. 
 224. See cases cited supra note 219. 
 225. For example, a careful reading of the Pfaff case demonstrates these statements are dicta because 
the actual holding rests on the court’s frustration with HUD’s conduct. Further, the court’s interpretation 
of “reasonableness” as HUD’s original standard is flawed because it treats language in the Preamble to 
HUD’s FHAA regulations as if it were HUD’s authoritative interpretation of the statute establishing a 
liability rule with only a perfunctory analysis. 
 226. See cases cited supra note 219. 
 227. In several cases in which the adequacy of the plaintiff’s statistics were considered, the court 
avoided deciding this issue. See, e.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 739. 
 228. See U.S. v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. 
Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 229. Business-related problems with tenant applicants, including insufficient income, lying on 
applications, bad credit, weak references, or a history of disturbing other tenants or evictions, will 
always suffice. Most courts find that objective evidence of system carrying capacity can justify a 
relatively restrictive residential occupancy standard. E.g., United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819 (D. 
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required to ground those justifications,230 and what burden (or 
opportunity) plaintiffs might have to rebut a defendant’s defense. 
                                                                                                                 
Nev. 1994) (where each four-plex in defendant’s units was heated by one water heater that defendants 
claimed could only serve 11 residents, and the court relied on the water heater information to conclude 
that the defendants showed a compelling business necessity to justify limiting the number of occupants 
per unit, as it would cost $1.63 million to fix the problem); see also United States v. Lepore, 816 F. 
Supp. 1011 (M.D. Pa.1991) (systems issue defense, but not objective evidence); CHRO ex rel Rowley v. 
J.E. Ackley, LLC., No. CV99550633, 2001 WL 951374 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (systems issue defense 
but not objective evidence); Human Rights Comm’n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 659 (Vt. 1995) (where the 
plaintiffs had minor children, including a newborn, and when defendants argued that the septic system 
and water supply were insufficient for more residents, the court agreed with the lower court in finding 
that these arguments were not credible and were merely a pretext for discrimination against families 
with children). Further, landlord economic interests, such as management and other costs or profits, 
have also been set forth. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 
318–19 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (where defendant argued that the restriction was designed “to keep the 
property in good repair and to reduce ongoing maintenance and eventual resale costs,” the court held 
that the defendant’s rationale was not backed by evidence); see also Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 742 (describing a 
similar business model justification); Snyder v. Barry Realty, 953 F. Supp. 217, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(where defendant claimed that its residential occupancy standard was enforced “to avoid the risk of 
damage caused by large numbers of students living in its apartments,” the court found such reasoning to 
be insufficient, in part because it was applied inflexibly, as in the case of a married couple (one a 
student) with 3 minor children). Defendants often claim a governmental regulation defense, arguing that 
their residential occupancy standard does not violate the FHAA because it is consistent with and/or 
required by a state or local governmental residential occupancy standard. See Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis 
Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2010 WL 2977143 (D. Conn. July 20, 2010); Reeves v. 
Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724–28 (E.D. Mich. 2000); United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 
1347 (D. Haw. 1995); J.E. Ackley, L.L.C., 2001 WL 951374. For more, see discussion infra Part III.B. 
 230. For cases requiring objective evidence, see Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (defendant argued occupancy 
restriction was because there was a lack of parking at the apartment complex, but the court said that the 
standard was not a reasonable way to deal with the lack of parking because infants cannot drive, and 
thus it was pretext for discrimination); Gashi, 2010 WL 2977143 (defendants offered no objective 
justification for the two person per bedroom occupancy standard); Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347 
(defendants argued that the property was unsafe for children and that the child living there was young, 
but court was not persuaded by this subjective paternalism and indicated that a child safety argument, 
even if valid, does not preclude a finding of discrimination); United States v. Hover, No. C93-200061 
JW, 1995 WL 55379 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1995) (where defendant argued that it needed an occupancy 
standard because other mobile home park tenants would suffer if the density of the park population 
increased, but the court ruled that relying on the number of bedrooms, rather than their square footage, 
was not the least restrictive means of achieving the goal, as well as that the park had never actually 
reached maximum capacity and that it actually had a pending application to increase the number of 
mobile homes); Ayres, 855 F. Supp. at 318–19 (defendant argued that the restriction was designed “to 
keep the property in good repair and to reduce ongoing maintenance and eventual resale costs,” but 
court held that the defendant’s rationale was not backed by evidence and, even if it was, it is not the 
least restrictive means to achieve the goal); Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011 (defendant offered septic system 
limits but lacked sufficient evidence because there seemed to be no objective basis for these limits); J.E. 
Ackley, L.L.C., 2001 WL 951374 (defendants argued that the mobile park’s septic system required 
limiting occupancy, and that local ordinances required the restriction, but the court said that the 
defendants’ study of the septic system was insufficient to prove a business necessity and that the local 
ordinances did not apply). For cases not requiring objective evidence, see Carlson v. HUD, No. 95-
2980, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6381 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 1996) (defendant said apartment was “small”); 
Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-60033-CIV-MARRA/SELTZER, 2005 U.S. 
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Thus, in the majority of the circuits, plaintiffs cannot predict what 
precise legal standards a court will apply. 
The author believes the best interpretation is that the traditional 
disparate treatment and disparate impact burden-shifting standards 
apply. Further, courts’ references to “reasonableness” are the 
mistaken and unfortunate consequences of their failure to appreciate 
that HUD’s mention of reasonableness in the Preamble to the FHAA 
regulations did not represent its authoritative interpretation of the 
statute, and that the Keating Memo does not provide a liability rule 
but only an internal enforcement guideline.231 
HUD or the DOJ has brought most of the cases that were litigated 
to judgment and published.232 With few exceptions,233 the cases that 
are brought and litigated to a judgment are “easy cases” that 
challenge residential occupancy standards more restrictive than two-
person-per-bedroom.234 Several courts have held that a residential 
occupancy standard more restrictive than two-persons-per-bedroom 
                                                                                                                 
Dist. LEXIS 1147 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2005) (where one plaintiff had “two young boys” and the other 
lived with three children, the court relied only on the defendants’ stated occupancy restrictions); Burnett 
v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (landlords said that the unit was “too small” but had no 
objective evidence of actual size, so court noted it would have been better to have it); United States v. 
Towers, No. 93-4260, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10012 (E.D. La. July 15, 1994) (defendants argued that 
the building was in poor condition and not suitable for children, that the insulation was insufficient for 
children, and that the poor construction exacerbates noise from children). For mixed cases, see Pfaff, 88 
F.3d at 749 (defendants argued that “the house on Basin View Court was very small, as were its yard 
and its bedrooms for children,” and that they were concerned about property values and deterioration of 
property; defendants’ expert witness also testified to the “reasonableness” of the residential occupancy 
standard in light of local practices, and the court agreed that they were reasonable); Mountain Side, 56 
F.3d 1243 (defendants argued that the restriction was necessary because of the limited sewer capacity 
and low water pressure at the park, as well as to maintain the quality of life in the park; the court gave 
very little weight to the defendants’ census figures because they were national statistics rather than local, 
but still accepted the sewer and quality of life/overcrowding arguments in finding that the plaintiffs 
failed to establish a violation of the FHAA). 
 231. See infra Part III.A. However, as discussed infra Part III.B, the Keating Memo might provide a 
useful basis for a liability standard for these cases if it were more carefully and deliberately developed 
with such an end in mind. 
 232. This confirms Professor Schwemm’s expectation that HUD would be primary enforcer. Robert 
G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 745 (1993). Schwemm 
expected more litigation but also recognized it would be difficult and so expected that HUD and DOJ 
would take the lead. Id. 
 233. See HUD “special circumstances” cases, infra note 247. 
 234. These cases still exist. See Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., No. 05-60033-CIV, 2010 
WL 427436 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010) (challenging “one couple per bedroom” and “one heartbeat per 
bedroom” policies). 
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violates the FHAA.235 Most of these cases involve a plaintiff seeking 
to include one or a few more persons in her household than the 
landlord will accept. In the few published cases in which plaintiffs 
sought to include substantially larger numbers, plaintiffs have lost.236 
Regarding the two-person-per-bedroom standard, one district court 
found it discriminatory as applied to studio and one-bedroom 
apartments.237 No published appellate case has found this standard 
discriminatory. A few HUD cases have challenged two-person-per-
bedroom occupancy policies. These cases were brought based upon 
HUD’s application of the Keating Memo’s “special circumstances” 
or other factors to find that there was reasonable cause to charge 
defendants with discrimination.238 At least two governmental 
enforcement agencies239 and some private attorneys have brought a 
few cases challenging a two-person-per-bedroom standard with 
mixed results.240 Most of these cases settled. 
Neither plaintiffs, nor defendants, nor courts have clarity on the 
liability standard in this important area. Meanwhile landlord 
advocates promote the view that the Keating Memo—and especially 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See, e.g., Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176; Snyder v. Barry Realty, 953 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ill. 1996); 
Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315. 
 236. See, e.g., Norville v. Dep’t of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). One would 
expect that families who do find landlords willing to accept more than two-person-per-bedroom are not 
likely to sue on the basis of a restrictive occupancy standard, especially if they perceive two-person-per-
bedroom as the market norm. In these situations, tenant claims against landlords are more likely to be 
for inadequate and inhabitable conditions. Alternatively, these leasing situations are more likely to be 
disrupted by city enforcement of housing codes, sometimes in a discriminatory way. 
 237. United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995). Some courts and 
commentators mistakenly read Lepore as also finding a two-person-per-bedroom standard as violating 
the FHAA. However, in that disparate treatment case, plaintiffs who lived in a two-bedroom mobile 
home challenged a “two person per mobile home unit” occupancy restriction, which in their 
circumstances amounted to a one-person-per-bedroom limitation. United States v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 
1011 (M.D. Pa.1991). 
 238. See cases cited infra note 247. 
 239. See, e.g., Brief &Argument for Complainants-Appellees, Campbell v. Brown, No. 95-0288 (Ill. 
App. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1996) (brought by Chicago Commission on Human Relations). California’s 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing has also brought such cases, but importantly the informal 
standard in California is two-persons-per-bedroom-plus one. 
 240. See, e.g., Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-80280, 2010 WL 326035, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2010); Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-60033-Civ-
MARRA/SELTZER, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1147 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2005); Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis 
Prop. Mgmt. Servs., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2011 WL 3489119 (D. Conn. June 23, 2011) (finding liability); 
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication, Padilla v. 86 
Pioneering Assocs., No. 26-19690 (Ca. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2003) (settled). 
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its two-person-per-bedroom standard—provides a safe harbor from 
FHAA liability. In principle, more litigation could resolve the 
ambiguity in the legal standard, but the operation of two-person-per-
bedroom as a de facto standard inhibits such litigation. 
2.   The two-person-per-bedroom standard has become a focal 
point 
Over the years since the initial issuance of the Keating Memo, the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard has become a focal point for 
landlords and professional property management companies.241 The 
combination of the legal uncertainty left by HUD’s regulation, 
HUD’s role as primary enforcer of the FHAA, the failure of courts to 
agree upon a clear standard and analysis (discussed supra), landlords’ 
continuing demand for a “safe harbor,” the housing industry’s 
endorsement of the two-person-per-bedroom standard, and HUD’s 
seeming embrace of it in the Keating Memo, made two-person-per-
bedroom a national “focal point” for residential occupancy standards. 
In addition, to the degree two-person-per-bedroom was an actual 
traditional standard in the rental housing industry prior to the 
enactment of the FHAA, it should be expected that it would be hard 
to change a tradition firmly grounded in industrial social norms.242 
As described supra, the industry then created substantial reliance 
upon it.243 Even though the identification of the two-person-per-
                                                                                                                 
 241. See Andrew B. Whitford & Justin Tucker, Focal Points in Public Policy: Evidence from 
Voluntary Regulation, 29 REV. POL’Y RES. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=766145; see also Lior Jacob Stravilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the 
Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006) (discussing focal points regarding the FHAA, 
exclusionary vibes, and exclusionary amenities). 
 242. The standard also became a social norm among housing providers: 
We know from the recent scholarly exploration of social norms that norms and customs 
may be so widespread and so powerful that they have the practical force of law, or indeed 
may even override the formal law. When nudged along by judicial recognition, norms 
become law, in the formal as well as the informal sense. 
Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelly v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 218 (Gerald Korngold & 
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) (citing ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES, 52–62 (1991) and Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D.C. Mass. 1881)). 
 243. Housing industry lawyers knew that it was not the applicable legal standard. Fair Housing 
Institute articles written by lawyers regularly representing landlords demonstrate the understanding that 
the special circumstances factors always qualify the “reasonableness” of any private occupancy 
standard. See Congress Directs HUD to Adopt Keating Memo, supra note 98; Chicago Case, supra note 
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bedroom standard as “presumptively reasonable” was only intended 
by HUD as an internal enforcement guideline, it became widely 
used.244 With widespread practice comes broad expectations, a sense 
of legitimacy, a perception of normativity, and then a force of 
fairness behind the standard—a self-reinforcing process.245 This focal 
point in turn promotes what is experienced as justifiable reliance that 
is more self-reinforcing the longer it goes on. Now, landlords and 
professional property management companies reassure each other 
that, in the midst of uncertainty, this is a reliable legal safe harbor. 
The two-person-per-bedroom standard as a focal point likely has 
four effects: (1) cases brought challenging residential occupancy 
standards that are more restrictive than two-person-per-bedroom tend 
to settle and to be resolved at two-person-per-bedroom;246 (2) most 
cases in which a landlord enforces a two-person-per-bedroom 
standard are not charged by HUD and are not litigated by private 
parties;247 (3) most cases in which a landlord enforces a residential 
                                                                                                                 
107. 
 244. For one expression of the housing industry reliance on the two-person-per-bedroom standard and 
ongoing concern about this issue, see Chicago Case, supra note 107. In view of HUD’s enforcement of 
“special circumstances” cases, “properties that adopted a two per bedroom occupancy policy may not be 
as safe as they once thought.” Id. 
 245. An expert witness in Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996), testified to the 
“reasonableness” of defendant’s residential occupancy standard in light of local practices. But local 
practices might be overly restrictive and are arguably irrelevant to potential discriminatory effects on 
tenants. 
 246. See Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., No. 05-60033-CIV, 2010 WL 427436 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 1, 2010); see also Telephone Interview with Chris Brancart, Partner, Brancart & Brancart (Feb. 17, 
2011) and Telephone Interview with Anne Houghhtaling, Director of Enforcement, National Fair 
Housing Alliance (Aug. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 247. A recent HUD exception charging a landlord who denied a three-bedroom house to a family of 
seven with discrimination based upon familial status is Complaint at 2–4, Jones v. Mercker, FHEO No. 
04-07-0030-8 (HUD filed June 24, 2011), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=11HUDvMercker.pdf. Memorandum of Points & 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication, Padilla v. 86 Pioneering Assocs., No. 
26-19690 (Ca. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 2003) (which settled) and Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. 
Servs., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2011 WL 3489119 (D. Conn. June 23, 2011) (in which liability was found) 
are recent private party exceptions. It may also be true that landlord attorneys counseled settling the 
“special circumstances” cases to avoid making law that the two-person-per-bedroom standard could ever 
violate the FHAA. Since at least 2006, HUD has charged a few “special circumstances” cases against 
landlords with a two-person-per-bedroom residential occupancy standard (e.g., that extra room required 
two additional occupants). See Uludag v. Draper & Kramer, Inc., HUDALJ No. 06-047-FH, 2006 WL 
2848628 (HUD Sept. 21, 2006); Complaint at 4, HUD v. During, FHEO No. 09-090598-8 (HUD filed 
Dec. 10, 2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7526.pdf; Complaint at 2, 
Leather v. Florence Tollgate Condo. Ass’n, FHEO No. 02-06-0101-8 (HUD filed Feb. 11, 2009), 
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occupancy standard less restrictive than two-person-per-bedroom are 
unlikely to be brought at all, or, if they are, they also tend to settle at 
two-person-per-bedroom; and, (4) because of all of the above, few 
cases are litigated to judgment or appealed, and therefore few cases 
are published. As this analysis would predict, since 1998, the year 
when Congress required HUD to adopt and publish the Keating 
Memo, only a few FHAA cases challenging residential occupancy 
standards have been published.248 
The rental housing industry continues to monitor the application of 
the FHAA to private residential occupancy standards, fair housing 
trainings for property managers include residential occupancy 
standards as a topic,249 and national publications regularly report 
lawsuits and settlements of fair housing cases, including familial 
status cases.250 Now landlords resist any movement away from the 
two-person-per-bedroom standard, fearing that any move off of this 
focal point will lead to a proverbial slippery slope and open them up 
to FHAA liability unless they permit the maximum amount of 
persons allowed under comparatively liberal governmental residential 
occupancy standards. 
Finally, there have been no significant changes in Congress or at 
HUD on this issue since 1998. Indeed, Congress has been divided, 
ambivalent, or both. Some bills would strengthen state governments’ 
authority to set occupancy standards along “federalism” lines.251 Still 
others would establish a default national occupancy standard of two-
                                                                                                                 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14495.pdf; Complaint at 1–3, Michelbach 
v. Chavez, FHEO No.06-08-0968-8 (HUD filed Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14496.pdf. However, there are no 
published cases of this kind. 
 248. See, e.g., Norville v. Dep’t of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 249. The “Fair Housing and Beyond” (FHS-201) training offered by Institute of Real Estate 
Management (IREM) and the National Apartment Association Education Institute (NAAEI) for 
professional property managers includes a section on occupancy standards under the “Fair Housing and 
Property Operations” part of the training. See Course Descriptions, Fair Housing and Beyond, 
WWW.IREM.ORG (Select “Education,” click “Course Descriptions,” then select “FHS201 – Fair Housing 
and Beyond” in “Search by Topic” dropdown menu) (training information on file with author). 
 250. See, e.g., Chicago Case, supra note 107. 
 251. See, e.g., H.R. 2406, 104th Cong. § 508 (1996); S. 1397, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995). 
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persons-per-bedroom if states do not act to set their own.252 None of 
these bills have come close to being enacted as law. 
3.   The Lack of Litigation Challenging Landlords Employing the 
Two-Person-Per-Bedroom Residential Occupancy Standard 
Despite broad concern by fair housing advocates about restrictive 
residential occupancy standards, relatively few cases challenging 
them have been brought, and even fewer have been brought to 
challenge landlords who employ a two-person-per-bedroom or less 
restrictive residential occupancy standard. This lack of legal 
challenges contributes to the two-person-per-bedroom standard’s 
apparent stability and dominance. The lack of litigation stems in part 
from lack of clarity in the decided cases and other reasons, discussed 
supra, not from any particular merit of this standard itself. 
There may be many reasons for the relative dearth of private 
lawsuits in these cases. First, legal uncertainty and the apparent de 
facto legal status of the two-person-per-bedroom standard operate as 
a strong deterrent to bringing these cases. The paucity of published 
cases in each circuit fails to provide sufficient guidance for plaintiffs. 
Second, to an extent, under-enforcement regarding this fair housing 
problem is part of the larger problem of under-enforcement of the 
FHAA more generally.253 The numerous reasons why any potential 
fair housing violation is unlikely to be pursued are shared by these 
cases (e.g., tenants’ lack of knowledge of rights, lack of incentive to 
bring a case, etc.). Third, there are particular obstacles from the 
standpoint of a private attorney approached by a potential client, such 
as the expense of hiring an expert to perform statistical analysis.254 
                                                                                                                 
 252. See, e.g., H.R. 2, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3385, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996). 
 253. See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: 2010 FAIR HOUSING 
TRENDS REPORT 3 (2010). 
 254. One fair housing attorney with broad experience in this area, Chris Brancart, estimated that it 
would cost $10,000 to hire an expert to perform the statistical analysis necessary for a prima facie case 
and to submit an affidavit or testify. Telephone Interview with Chris Brancart, Partner, Brancart & 
Brancart (Feb. 17, 2011) (notes on file with author). Another possible reason for the dearth of cases 
challenging restrictive occupancy standards under a disparate impact theory is that some of these cases 
can be charged as violations of the FHAA prohibition against making discriminatory statements under 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006), which might be easier to prove. See, e.g., White v. HUD, 475 F.3d 898 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (reversing an ALJ’s finding that landlord’s statements did not indicate preference, limitation, 
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Finally, successes in cases challenging two-person-per-bedroom 
standards may not be well known, because when these cases settle 
there is no published judgment or opinion with precedential 
authority. 
This Part has argued that the two-person-per-bedroom standard has 
become and remained dominant for three principal reasons: HUD’s 
enforcement policy, lack of clarity in the courts, and landlord 
advocacy. And it has argued that none of these reasons reflects an 
analysis of its merits as the right standard. Consequently, apart from 
challenging residential occupancy standards more restrictive than 
two-person-per-bedroom, the promise of the FHAA to eliminate 
discrimination has become almost a dead letter in this area. 
III.   BEYOND THE TWO-PERSON-PER-BEDROOM STANDARD: OPTIONS 
FOR HUD, PLAINTIFFS, AND COURTS 
This Article has posed a serious and complex problem to HUD as 
the nation’s primary enforcer of the FHAA. The two-person-per-
bedroom standard regularly causes discriminatory impact, yet it is a 
dominant residential occupancy standard nationwide and enjoys a 
veneer of legal authority. After exploring the scope of HUD’s current 
regulatory authority in residential occupancy enforcement, this Part 
proposes several potential solutions that HUD could pursue.255 First, 
                                                                                                                 
or discrimination based on prospective tenant’s familial status); Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 
1995) (upholding ALJ’s finding that landlord’s advertisement and statements expressed tenant 
preference based on family status); Martin v. Palm Beach Atl. Ass’n, Inc., 696 So.2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1997) (upholding claim based upon publication of rules prohibiting occupancy by children under 
twelve years old); Complaint at 4, Interfaith Hous. Ctr. of the N. Suburbs v. Giarelli, FHEO No. 05-07-
0669-8 (HUD filed Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14471.pdf (charging that landlords’ 
expressions of one-person-per-bedroom residential occupancy standard were discriminatory statements 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)). 
 255. This article does not propose Congressional action as a solution, except as necessary to enable or 
facilitate appropriate action by HUD. On an institutional competency analysis, Congress is not well-
suited to resolve this problem. Rather, HUD, with its institutional expertise as the agency charged with 
administering and enforcing the FHAA, is best suited to do so. In addition to the options identified in 
this article, HUD should follow NFHA’s recommendation to bar funding for any grantee found to have 
violated the FHAA because of restrictive occupancy standards and recapture funds that were used to 
support any units that are not available on a non-discriminatory basis. See NAT’L FAIR HOUS. 
ALLIANCE, supra note 253, at 9. 
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assuming it has the necessary authority, HUD could adopt a 
regulation. Three variants on a regulation are proposed: (1) adopting 
a regulation defining the appropriate disparate impact analysis and 
standards; (2) adopting a regulation which employs the form of the 
Keating Memo analysis—a presumptively reasonable standard 
combined with a multi-factor test—together with an explicit “safe 
harbor” guarantee to landlords that use the standard; or (3) adopting a 
regulation which would generate locally-compliant residential 
occupancy standards. Second, short of adopting a regulation, HUD 
could issue additional internal guidance to improve its application of 
the Keating Memo enforcement guideline. At the very least, in the 
face of the evidence and argument presented by this Article, HUD 
ought to conduct studies to investigate, inter alia, whether the two-
person-per-bedroom standard contributes to discrimination. This Part 
explains each option in detail along with its likely costs and benefits. 
Recognizing that HUD has struggled with this issue and has been 
pulled in many different directions, it is only realistic to assume that 
HUD may not act.256 Therefore, this section also suggests options for 
private plaintiffs and courts in the absence of action by HUD. 
A.   The Scope of HUD’s Current Regulatory Authority 
Congress specifically granted HUD “[t]he authority and 
responsibility for administering” the FHAA.257 One possible solution 
to the problem posed by this Article would be that HUD could 
conduct a regular (or negotiated regulation) rule-making process with 
the goal of adopting a liability rule applicable to private residential 
occupancy policies. HUD representatives have promised to develop 
such a regulation at least three times.258 The Omnibus Consolidated 
                                                                                                                 
 256. There are numerous facts demonstrating that internal discussions within HUD about the 
residential occupancy standard issue were ongoing and difficult. See supra Part II. 
 257. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006). As the Ninth Circuit stated in Pfaff v. HUD: 
It is one of HUD’s functions to develop expertise on the problem of housing 
discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (duty to study and report), and, on the basis of this 
expertise, to exercise its broad powers of enforcement and regulation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
3608(a), (b) (HUD’s authority to administer the FHA); [§] 3614a (rulemaking authority). 
Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 258. See Diaz Memorandum, supra note 167 (“The Department will be issuing official guidance in 
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Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 explicitly held out this 
option for HUD.259 However, in light of the 1998 legislation, there is 
some uncertainty about the current scope of HUD’s regulatory 
authority regarding occupancy standards in familial status cases.260 
Essentially, the issue is: Does HUD currently have regulatory 
authority to establish a liability rule for occupancy standards in 
familial status cases? Or, stated differently, did the 1998 legislation 
establish the Keating Memo as the liability rule for occupancy 
standards in familial status cases? This Article argues that while 
HUD’s current authority is unclear, the better argument is that HUD 
continues to have such authority because the legal status of the 
Keating Memo has always only been an internal enforcement 
guideline and never a liability standard. 
The case for arguing that the Keating Memo does not provide the 
liability rule for occupancy standards in familial status cases is 
strong. The text of the Keating Memo itself clearly identifies it as an 
internal enforcement guideline. It is addressed to HUD’s Regional 
Counsel. 261 And, the second Keating Memo on its face states, in 
reference to the first Keating Memo: 
                                                                                                                 
the future on this subject.”); see also Julian Memorandum, supra note 170 (“The July 12 memorandum 
described a ‘safe harbor’ occupancy standard drawn from the BOCA Code and announced that rule-
making on this subject of occupancy standards would be forthcoming. Considerable confusion has 
arisen about the interpretation of the July 12 memorandum, and the rule-making process has been 
expedited.”); Letter from Henry Cisneros, HUD Secretary, to Rep. Lazio (May 17, 1996) (stating that 
HUD was considering negotiated regulation) (on file with author); Occupancy Standards: Regulatory 
and Legislative History, supra note 136. 
 259. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 224, 
121 Stat. 1321, 1321-291. The law required HUD to refrain from using appropriations under the Act to 
enforce a complaint of discrimination under the FHA “except to the extent that it is found that there has 
been discrimination in contravention of the standards provided in [the Keating Memo] or until such time 
that HUD issues a final rule in accordance with Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code.” § 224, 121 
Stat. 1321, 1321-291. 
 260. Because both the Keating Memo itself and the 1998 legislation only specifically refer to 
occupancy standards in “familial status” cases, there is no doubt that HUD continues to have regulatory 
authority to establish a liability standard for occupancy standards in race and national origin cases. 
Currently, the disparate treatment and disparate impact standards provide the liability rules in those 
cases, and the Keating Memo has no application. 
 261. The first Keating memorandum is addressed to “All Regional Counsel,” and the subject line 
reads: “Fair Housing Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Standards.” Memorandum from HUD General 
Counsel Frank Keating on Fair Housing Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Standards, supra note 158. 
The second Keating memorandum bears the same address and subject line. Keating Memo, supra note 
16. 
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The memorandum . . . was intended to constitute internal 
guidance to be used by Regional Counsel in reviewing cases 
involving occupancy restrictions. It was not intended to create a 
definitive test for whether a landlord or manager would be liable 
in a particular case, nor was it intended to establish occupancy 
policies or requirements for any particular type of housing.262 
HUD’s formal position has always been that the Keating Memo is 
an internal enforcement guideline and that it does not articulate a 
liability rule.263 Importantly, HUD has never adopted a regulation 
declaring that statements of policy published in the Federal Register 
would constitute a rule, regulation, or interpretation for purposes of 
FHAA’s application to residential occupancy standards.264 And, 
HUD’s own enforcement practice, which employs either a disparate 
treatment or disparate impact theory of liability or both when it 
brings residential occupancy cases, demonstrates that HUD does not 
consider the Keating Memo to provide a liability rule.265 
The primary argument that the Keating Memo should be 
interpreted as a liability rule is that Congress expressed this intention 
in its 1998 legislation. However, the most reasonable reading of the 
provisions of a 1998 Congressional statute does not support this 
argument.266 There are two relevant provisions in the statute. In the 
first provision, under the subsection title “Establishment of Policy,” 
Congress directs HUD to publish a notice in the Federal Register that 
provides that “the specified and unmodified standards” of the 
Keating Memo “shall be the policy of the Department of Housing 
                                                                                                                 
 262. Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 70,256 (emphasis added). The memorandum further states: “In 
order to assure that the Department’s position in the area of occupancy policies is fully understood, I 
believe that it is imperative to articulate more fully the Department’s position on reasonable occupancy 
policies and to describe the approach that the Department takes in its review of occupancy cases.” Id. 
 263. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 60 (“Since the issuance of the March Memorandum [Keating 
Memo], HUD has insisted that it should not be interpreted as establishing a national occupancy 
standard.”). 
255In contrast, see 24 C.F.R. § 3500.4(a)(1)(ii) (2011), a HUD regulation stating that a “statement of 
policy” published in the Federal Register constitutes “a rule, regulation or interpretation” for purposes of 
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 
 265. See supra notes 186–87 for some exceptions to this practice. 
 266. Quality Housing & Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 589, 112 Stat. 
2461. 
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and Urban Development with respect to complaints of discrimination 
under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) on the basis of 
familial status which involve an occupancy standard established by a 
housing provider.”267 On its face, by this statute Congress is only 
addressing this requirement to HUD and requiring HUD to publicize 
it to all concerned.268 In 1998, Congress was clearly aware that HUD, 
the DOJ, and private plaintiffs had been using disparate impact and 
disparate treatment theories in litigation since 1991. Therefore, if 
Congress had wanted to establish the Keating Memo as the liability 
rule for courts and for litigation brought by private parties, it would 
have used other language. Instead, the legal consequence of this 
provision was to lock in the Keating Memo as HUD’s internal 
enforcement guideline.269 
The actions of HUD, the DOJ, courts, and the fair housing bar 
since the passage of the law in 1998 support this understanding. As 
directed by Congress, HUD continues to employ the Keating Memo 
as an enforcement guideline. Yet, when HUD brings an 
administrative complaint, it continues to use disparate impact or 
disparate treatment theories of liability, or both, not one based in the 
Keating Memo’s “reasonableness” language.270 And, when the DOJ 
or a private party brings an action, they make similar claims.271 
While some courts have referred to the Keating Memo or used the 
term “reasonable” in sloppy ways,272 no court has ever adopted the 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Congress Directs HUD to Adopt Keating Memo for Occupancy Standards, supra note 98, 
for a slightly more ambiguous interpretation by a fair housing defense group. “Following years of vague 
and challenging policy announcements, HUD has now been ordered by Congress to adopt the so-called 
‘Keating Memo’ from 1991 as the basis for investigation and enforcement of fair housing complaints 
involving occupancy standards of private housing providers.” Id. 
 269. Interestingly, there have been similar attempts by the housing industry in California to procure 
legislation that would lock in the “two persons per bedroom plus one” guideline as an enforcement 
standard by California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing. See, e.g., A.B. 1703, 1993-1994 
Cal. State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993). These attempts have been unsuccessful. 
 270. See cases brought by HUD since 1998 cited supra in Part II.C.1. 
 271. See cases brought by DOJ since 1998 cited supra in Part II.C.1. 
 272. In Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996), the court was angry because it appeared HUD was 
using a different defendant burden (“compelling business necessity”) instead of its traditional 
“legitimate business purpose” in its disparate impact analysis. Id. at 747–49. The Pfaff court granted 
judgment for the defendant because of HUD’s conduct. However, in the opinion, the court discusses the 
Keating Memo and “reasonableness” in dicta. Id. In United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 
70
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 689 
 
Keating Memo in its entirety as a liability rule. To date, no court has 
cited to this statute for that proposition. Moreover, if the 1998 statute 
had raised this informal guidance to the level of a legally binding 
rule, the fair housing defense bar surely would have cited to the 
statute to this effect in order to steer courts away from applying a 
disparate impact analysis in these cases.273 There is no evidence in 
the cases of defendants having done so. At least some landlord 
advocates directly articulate this position. Referring to the Keating 
Memo after it had been published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
the 1998 statute, the landlord website “rental-housing.com” wrote: 
“This is a policy . . . . not a rule or law.”274 
The second provision of the 1998 statute is entitled “Prohibition of 
National Standard” and reads in its entirety: “The Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development shall not directly or indirectly 
establish a national occupancy standard.”275 The meaning of this 
provision and its effect on HUD’s regulatory authority is unclear. On 
its face, it appears to have changed nothing. HUD statements in the 
Preamble to FHAA regulations and the related memoranda 
consistently state HUD’s self-understanding that it does not have 
authority to “establish a national occupancy standard.”276 Congress 
can be understood here as reinforcing that the Keating Memo is only 
an enforcement guideline and that HUD’s use of it is not meant to 
                                                                                                                 
1992), the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, but appeared to use the 
Keating Memo as part of the prima facie case. In Reeves v. Rose, 108 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Mich. 
2000), the court referred to “reasonableness” of residential occupancy standards but applied disparate 
treatment burden-shifting analysis in a case denying summary judgment to defendants. The court in 
Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), purported to treat a “reasonable occupancy 
limitation” as fulfilling a defendant’s burden to establish a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory business 
reason” in a disparate treatment burden-shifting analysis, citing Glover v. Crestwoood Lake Section 1 
Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301, 309–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and the Preamble to HUD’s FHAA 
regulations. 
 273. See supra notes 198–209 and accompanying text. As noted, landlords, property management 
agencies and the fair housing defense bar would probably not support courts treating the Keating Memo 
as having the force of law because of its uncertainty, and because the application of its factors might 
often require more than two persons per bedroom. 
 274. Occupancy, supra note 135. 
 275. Quality Housing & Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 589(b), 112 Stat 
2461. 
 276. Id.; Memorandum from HUD General Counsel Frank Keating on Fair Housing Enforcement 
Policy: Occupancy Standards, supra note 158; Keating Memo, supra note 16, at 1. 
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directly or indirectly establish a national occupancy standard of two-
persons-per-bedroom because HUD has no authority to do so.277 
However, the provision presents a problem for assessing the scope of 
HUD’s current regulatory authority because it begs the question of 
whether establishing “a national occupancy standard” is different 
from adopting a liability rule for occupancy standards.278 
In the author’s view, developing a liability rule for deciding 
discrimination claims under the FHAA is not the same as setting a 
“national occupancy standard.” In this context, a “national occupancy 
standard” to best understood to refer to a specific standard, such as 
“two-persons-per-bedroom.” In contrast, a “liability rule” could take 
many forms, including, inter alia, specifying a range of acceptable 
residential occupancy standards or a set of factors that housing 
providers would be required to use to set an acceptable residential 
occupancy standard. In addition, Congress has expressed, and HUD 
has echoed, a concern for federalism in this context that supports the 
view that Congress did not want HUD to establish a specific national 
occupancy standard.279 In conclusion, while the 1998 legislation 
requires HUD to use the Keating Memo as its internal enforcement 
guideline, HUD continues to have regulatory authority to establish a 
liability rule for these cases, but not a specific national occupancy 
standard. 
B.   HUD’s Options 
1.   Clarifying Disparate Impact Analysis and Standards 
If HUD decided to promulgate a regulation, the regulatory process 
would likely be complex and contentious. Extensive studies would be 
needed to prepare for the effort. Of course, to be effective, this 
process must include substantial and appropriate participation by all 
the key stakeholders. And the process must be perceived as fair and 
                                                                                                                 
 277. This view is consistent with the argument, supra in Part I.B., that the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard is not the law. 
 278. Unfortunately, the provision has never been cited by or interpreted by any court. 
 279. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3237 (Jan. 23, 1989). 
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thorough. While landlords might fear that a revised standard would 
be too liberal, the revision may not need to be substantial to make a 
significant difference.280 
If HUD decided to promulgate a regulation, it would need to 
decide the form of the liability rule. There are two primary options: 
the disparate treatment and disparate impact shifting burdens analysis 
or the Keating Memo’s form of a presumptively reasonable standard 
combined with a factor test. 
All three federal circuits that have heard these cases have verified 
that disparate impact or disparate treatment analyses are appropriate 
liability theories in these cases.281 If HUD decided that a disparate 
impact standard is appropriate, it could select or modify the best one 
for this area based upon courts’ experience to date. HUD would need 
to clarify each part of the burden-shifting process: the requirements 
for a prima facie case, the defendant’s burden, and the plaintiff’s 
burden if defendant meets his burden.282 For example, if the 
regulation specified that the defendant must prove a “sufficient 
business necessity,” it should specify which kinds of justifications 
meet the standard, and what kind of evidence would be required to 
show that the standard was met.283 Such specifics are beyond the 
scope of this Article.284 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Most published cases do not reference very large households. Rather, the cases contain families 
that are larger than the average, such as five- or six-person households. An exception is Norville v. Dept. 
of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), where a household of eleven—a couple and 
their nine children—occupied a three-bedroom unit containing a 91-square foot bedroom, a 108-square 
foot bedroom, and a 144-square foot bedroom with a total size of 1,082 square feet. 
 281. See Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of 
HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995). While the Pfaff court adopted a disparate impact analysis, the 
basis for it decision was the finding that HUD acted arbitrarily and capriciously in pursuing a new 
standard for defendant’s burden, not the actual application of a burden-shifting standard. Pfaff, 88 F.3d 
at 750; see also United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying disparate impact 
analysis). Further, statements on the floor of Congress and HUD’s Preamble to the FHAA regulations 
also express concern over occupancy standards that “operate to discriminate.” 54 Fed. Reg. at 3237. 
 282. HUD, No. 8024.01, CHG-1, TITLE VIII COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION, AND 
CONCILIATION HANDBOOK ch. 2, at 2-27 (1998). In addition, HUD would need to clarify the relevant 
geographical unit and other issues. One such unresolved issue is whether national statistics are sufficient 
to ground a prima facie case. Some courts have questioned whether local statistics are required. See, 
e.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 745–46. 
 283. See United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 830–31 (D. Nev. 1994) (discussion of post-hoc 
evidence and subjective/objective evidence). 
 284. However, a recent paper concerning the application of disparate impact analysis in the FHAA 
73
Iglesias: Moving Beyond Two-Person-Per-Bedroom: Revitalizing Application of
Published by Reading Room, 2012
692 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:3 
 
The primary benefit of utilizing the disparate impact analysis form 
would be that it most directly serves the FHAA’s integration 
objective. The primary risk of utilizing the disparate impact analysis 
form would be that even a revised and clarified disparate impact 
analysis would fail to give notice or serve as a focal point to any 
party of what residential occupancy standard violates the FHAA.285 
In order to know what would make them liable, landlords would need 
to perform their own disparate impact analysis (which may be 
expensive and complex). Even with a clarified test, some degree of 
uncertainty would likely remain regarding which geographical unit 
the court would be using for comparison or what business 
justifications would be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of 
discrimination. 
While a disparate impact rule would probably supply notice 
sufficient to meet constitutional requirements (for example, in a due 
process case), better notice to landlords of what they are required to 
do may be necessary as a practical matter to resolve this contentious 
problem. As discussed supra, the Keating memo provides some, 
albeit imperfect, notice.286 Since the enactment of the FHAA, 
landlords have sought specific guidance on this issue.287 And, 
                                                                                                                 
context by Professor Robert Schwemm and Sara Pratt would be a useful starting point. See ROBERT G. 
SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH (2009), available at 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.
pdf. 
 285. The following is the Pfaff court’s complaint against HUD’s failure to clarify what the FHAA 
requires in this area: 
HUD should spare a thought for the law-abiding property owner, because the familial 
status amendment presents particularly difficult questions of compliance. Accepting 
arguendo that larger households tend disproportionately to include families with children, 
it would seem that any facially neutral, numerical occupancy restriction above a certain 
threshold number will exclude large families in significant degree. Where may landlords 
like the Pfaffs safely draw the line? 
Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 749. 
 286. The Diaz Memorandum, supra note 167, sought to give notice using a square footage measure. 
California’s informal enforcement guideline of two-person-per-bedroom plus one also serves this 
purpose. 
 287. A background paper issued by the California Apartment Association concludes: “The type of 
analysis necessary for an individual housing provider to identify a ‘safe’ or lawful ‘occupancy standard’ 
is not readily available within state law. The type of process and documentation necessary for most 
housing providers to defend an ‘occupancy standard’ by showing it to be ‘essential’ is often 
cumbersome and difficult. Therefore, until a ‘bright line’ is established, occupancy standards will be 
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Congress and some courts have acknowledged the importance of and 
need for notice in this arena.288 
As an experienced fair housing attorney wrote: 
[Disparate impact analysis] is most useful when assessing the 
discriminatory effects of neutral practices that do not lend 
themselves to standard-based assessments (e.g., a decision to 
demolish public housing or exclude multifamily housing or to 
convert subsidized housing). [Residential occupancy] restrictions 
are capable of justification and control through the use of 
objective, study-based health and safety standards. 289 
Because notice is very valuable to all parties in this arena, because 
residential occupancy standards are, in principle, amenable to 
objective standards, and because of the costs in bringing a case based 
upon disparate impact analysis, the author disfavors this option. 
2.   Transforming the Keating Memo into a Liability Standard 
HUD could propose a liability standard based upon the Keating 
Memo form. The Keating-type standard includes two parts: a 
presumptive but rebuttable standard, and the factors for rebuttal. This 
is a relatively uncommon form of legal rule because it explicitly 
combines a “bright line rule” dimension with factors allowing for 
flexibility. The Keating-type standard may be a superior form of 
legal liability rule for residential occupancy cases because it provides 
                                                                                                                 
challenged as discriminatory and will be the subject of increased litigation.” CAL. APARTMENT ASS’N, 
OCCUPANCY STANDARDS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL (2006), available at 
http://caa.atsol.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=688. 
 288. See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747–50; Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 
1243, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 1995). Similarly, some courts appear to have a concern for the “innocent law-
abiding landlord” in that they are reluctant to find liability under disparate impact analysis unless there 
is some evidence of discriminatory intent. For example, Kelly argues that the compelling business 
necessity burden may have been applied weakly in United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819 (D. Nev. 
1994), because there was no evidence of discriminatory intent. Kelly, supra note 18, at 64 n.27. This 
issue is part of a much broader conflict concerning the use of a disparate impact liability theory. 
 289. E-mail from Michael Rawson, Co-Director, Pub. Interest Law Project, to author (July 29, 2010, 
01:06 PST) (on file with author). The comment continues: “See Marina Point v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 
(1982), and other public accommodation cases finding that arbitrary admission standards can be justified 
by written, objective, research based on health and safety standards.” Id. 
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the desired notice and focal point while also incorporating flexibility 
by taking into account other objective relevant factors. The Keating-
type standard also makes sense in the residential occupancy standard 
context because of the complexity of the accompanying issues. A 
simple absolute bright line rule would not work well because it 
would not take into account variances in bedroom sizes nor allow use 
of other “habitable spaces” for sleeping purposes. A factor test alone 
would not work because it would not provide sufficient certainty or 
notice to landlords or to tenants and could lead to inconsistent results 
by courts. However, the combination makes sense because it 
provides both a focal point and some flexibility. Here, HUD deserves 
credit for fashioning an appropriate form of analysis in the initial 
design of the Keating Memo. 
As discussed supra, Congress has endorsed the Keating Memo to 
some extent, though short of giving it the force of law. Neither the 
courts nor HUD’s practice has developed the full potential of the 
Keating Memo form.290 The guidance is far from complete from the 
housing providers’ point of view.291 Therefore, in its current form as 
a rough enforcement guideline, it would need substantial refinement 
to serve as a liability rule. 
There are three primary tasks HUD would need to perform to 
transform the Keating Memo into a workable liability rule: (1) define 
a presumptively compliant standard; (2) define and operationalize the 
                                                                                                                 
 290. With some exceptions, HUD has not consistently applied the entire Keating Memo with all of its 
factors to cases. 
 291. Notably, landlords have groused at the lack of clarity of the Keating Memo: “HUD has never 
elaborated on any of these factors. Nor has the agency offered any objective guidance on specifically 
how these ambiguous factors should be applied in setting a ‘reasonable’ occupancy standard.” Arizona 
Multihousing Association, supra note 99, at 3. Housing providers and their advocates have complained 
that the Keating Memo is unclear and have requested more guidance from HUD. One post on 
Landlord.com reviews each factor and concludes that each is “a matter of judgment, that is, uncertain.” 
The Last Word on Occupancy Policies and HUD, LANDLORD.COM, 
http://www.landlord.com/last_word_occupancy.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). In reference to the 
Keating Memo when it was first issued, the landlord website Rental-housing.com states: “[HUD] 
acknowledged that its 1991 standards of occupancy of two persons per bedroom has been the source of a 
great deal of confusion and misinterpretation.” Occupancy, supra note 134. AllBusiness, a publication of 
the Institute of Real Estate Management, also criticized several aspects of the Keating Memo. Schindler, 
supra note 182. 
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relevant factors; and (3) provide guidance to courts on how to apply 
the test. 
Defining a presumptively compliant standard is the first task. This 
task would require two steps. First, HUD would need to determine if 
the presumptive compliant standard should be expressed in terms of 
the number of bedrooms in a housing unit or by the number of 
approved sleeping areas.292 The use of bedrooms as a measure helps 
provide a useful focal point and would appear to help compliance 
because of its familiarity. However, HUD would need to consider if 
these values are outweighed by the potential problems. From the 
beginning of HUD’s analysis of residential occupancy standards, it 
has always had both bedrooms and other sleeping areas in view 
because both types of rooms are relevant.293 The problem with a 
residential occupancy standard based only upon the number of 
bedrooms is that it gives landlords too much discretion in light of the 
FHAA’s demonstrated concern for familial discrimination because 
landlords and property management agencies can manipulate 
occupancy by which rooms it designates as “bedrooms.”294 An 
important consequence of Congress’s enactment of the original FHA 
is that when property owners decide to use their property as rental 
housing, they accept a reduced scope of some of the traditional rights 
associated with ownership.295 Several courts have demonstrated in 
residential occupancy standard cases a willingness to override 
landlords’ designations of bedrooms as the only allowable spaces for 
sleeping.296 In addition, the category of bedrooms does not fit well 
                                                                                                                 
 292. Note that the Diaz Memorandum, supra note 166, sought to use square footage as an objective 
alternative to bedrooms. 
 293. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989); see also Keating Memo, supra note 16. 
 294. See Complaint at 2, Leather v. Florence Tollgate Condo. Ass’n, FHEO No. 02-06-0101-8 (HUD 
filed Feb. 11, 2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14495.pdf (charging 
that Condominium Association characterized units as “Deluxe One Bedrooms” with two rooms in which 
one “bedroom” was the same size but additional room was designated as a “den”); see also Complaint at 
3, Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila. v. Trucksess, FHEO Nos. 03-10-0065-8, 03-10-0068-8 (HUD 
filed Apr. 9, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7530.pdf (where a 
landlord advertised a three-bedroom as a two-bedroom to avoid renting to families with children). 
 295. See United States v. Grisham, 818 F. Supp. 21 (D. Me. 1993) (finding familial status 
discrimination where owner refused to rent to family because of fear of damage to his prized 
possessions which he kept in the unit). 
 296. See, e.g., Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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with studio apartments. Also, many contemporary residential 
buildings, especially in urban areas, are configured as “lofts,” using 
floor plans without any identified “bedrooms.” Keying an occupancy 
standard to bedrooms fails to provide guidance in these contexts. 
Second, if HUD determines that “bedroom” is an appropriate 
measure to use in the standard, it should conduct a study to determine 
the right presumptively compliant standard. The empirical results of 
the study in this Article suggest that two-person-per-bedroom is not 
likely to be the right standard, at least not for all unit sizes and 
building types.297 Prior to issuing a proposed rule, HUD should 
perform a comprehensive study by which it would determine the 
appropriate presumptively compliant standard based upon relevant 
facts about the housing stock, household composition, and housing 
supply and demand.298 
HUD’s second task in transforming the Keating Memo—defining 
and operationalizing the relevant factors—would require several 
steps. First, HUD would need to review the factors identified in the 
Keating Memo and in the cases to determine which ones should be 
included. The factors identified in the Keating Memo are: (1) size of 
bedrooms and unit; (2) age of children; (3) configuration of unit; (4) 
other physical limitations of housing; (5) state and local law; and (6) 
other relevant factors.299 
                                                                                                                 
 297. If it is to be a “safe harbor,” it should be set to ensure a generous margin between it and what 
would otherwise violate the law. The two-person-per-bedroom standard is too restrictive. As an analogy, 
if the legal rule was that everyone must wear “professional attire,” you would not set the “safe harbor” 
at allowing anyone who has a shirt, a pair of pants, and shoes; you would set it at a suit and tie. 
 298. Given the diversity of housing stock, housing supply and demand, and family sizes, it is not clear 
whether a single national presumptively compliant standard could be identified. If HUD comes to this 
conclusion, this Article proposes an alternative, locally-compliant residential occupancy standard 
regulation, infra Appendix. 
 299. Keating Memo, supra note 16. The “other relevant factors” were defined in some detail: 
Other relevant factors supporting a reasonable cause recommendation based upon the 
conclusion that the occupancy policies are pretextual would include evidence that the 
housing provider has: (1) made discriminatory statements; (2) adopted discriminatory 
rules governing use of common facilities; (3) taken other steps to discourage families 
with children from living in its housing; or (4) enforced its occupancy standards only 
against families with children. 
Id. In addition to identifying the factors, the Keating Memo elaborated to some degree on what each 
entails by offering some examples. Id. 
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There is substantial overlap between the Keating Memo factors 
and the considerations courts have used as justifications for 
defendant rebuttal in disparate impact cases.300 In this sense, courts 
may be seen as having developed and further elaborated on the 
factors. These include governmental occupancy standards,301 
bedroom size,302 the availability of other sleeping areas,303 and other 
physical limitations of housing (e.g., capacity of septic, sewer, or 
other building systems).304 In some cases, courts appear to include 
other considerations for defendants’ rebuttal, such as landlords’ 
profits or business model305 or landlords’ perceptions of “quality of 
life” for tenants.306 HUD would need to decide if it should include 
these considerations as relevant factors. HUD should also consider 
whether the type of housing—such as mobile homes in mobile home 
parks or condominium units—would be a significant additional factor 
based upon the cases and their relevant differences.307 Finally, HUD 
should reconsider whether to continue to include the age and gender 
of children as a factor, and, if so, how.308 This issue is complex 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See cases discussed and cited supra Part II.C.1. 
 301. See, e.g., United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 302. Id.; see also Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 303. See, e.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d 739. 
 304. Id.; see also Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819 (D. Nev. 1994). 
 305. E.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d 739; Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819. 
 306. E.g., Pfaff, 88 F.3d 739. 
 307. Mobile homes located in parks have been a particular focus of litigation for three reasons: (1) the 
widespread practice of separating “family parks” from “adult parks” and exclusion of children from 
“adult parks” before 1988; (2) the distinct ownership relationship of a household owning their mobile 
home and renting a pad from the park owner; and (3) distinct sewage, water and utility issues arising in 
mobile home parks, especially those on septic systems. See Mountain Side, 56 F.3d 1243; United States 
v. Lepore, 816 F. Supp. 1011, 1017 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Human Rights Comm’n v. LaBrie, Inc., 668 A.2d 
659 (Vt. 1995). 
 308. Some existing and proposed residential occupancy standards include the age of children. 
“Arizona has a state occupancy standard of two persons per bedroom plus all children under the age of 
24 months, enacted in 1994. The provision regarding children under 24 months is scheduled to be 
removed from statute in July 1995.” Witt, supra note 130, at 8. “Phoenix, for example, uses an 
occupancy standard of ‘250 square feet for the first two occupants, and at least 150 square feet for every 
additional occupant, but children under 13 shall not be counted.’” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted). Some 
proposed federal bills also included such a factor. See, e.g., Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act 
of 1997, H.R. 2, 105th Cong. § 702(c) (1997) (“ABSENCE OF STATE STANDARD: If a State fails to 
establish an occupancy standard, an occupancy standard of 2 persons per bedroom plus infants that is 
established by a housing provider shall be presumed reasonable for the purpose of determining familial 
status discrimination in residential rental dwellings.”) (emphasis added). 
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because infants and young children typically need less room than 
older children. Yet, specifying ages and genders of children in the 
regulation could run afoul of the anti-discrimination norm animating 
the statute.309 
HUD would then need to operationalize each factor it selects. 
Ideally, HUD would sharpen the factors by providing objective 
standards. Each factor presents distinct challenges, but most are 
amenable to some further specification. 
a.   Governmental Occupancy Standards 
The Keating Memo explains the “State and local law” factor as 
follows: “If a dwelling is governed by State or local governmental 
occupancy requirements, and the housing provider’s occupancy 
standards reflect those requirements, HUD would consider the 
governmental requirements as a special circumstance tending to 
indicate that the housing provider’s occupancy policies are 
reasonable.”310 As discussed supra, Congress included an exemption 
from liability for familial status discrimination claims for “any 
reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the 
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.”311 
Clarifying the relationship between governmental residential 
occupancy standards exemption and the “State and local law” factor 
in the Keating Memo is critical. There are two distinct issues. First, 
what is the legal standard and analysis courts should use to determine 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See Morales, Creating New Housing Opportunities for Families with Children, supra note 18 
(arguing that inclusion of this factor is discriminatory). HUD General Counsel Nelson Diaz agrees: “I 
also believe that consideration by a housing provider of the sex of the children in establishing occupancy 
standards violates the provisions of the Fair Housing Act with respect to sex discrimination.” Diaz 
Memorandum, supra note 166. 
 310. Keating Memo, supra note 16. 
 311. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2006). In its 1989 regulations, HUD punted on the issue of identifying 
what constitutes a “reasonable” governmental restriction by merely repeating the statutory language in 
the regulation. Most states have adopted maximum residential occupancy standards based upon health 
and safety. Most of these are quite liberal. There are a few exceptions: Arizona’s two-persons-per-
bedroom standard, and standards in localities such as Richmond Heights, Illinois. The previous 
companion article focused on the application of the FHAA to governmental occupancy restrictions. It 
argued that HUD still has the regulatory authority to adopt a regulation defining a “reasonable” 
governmental occupancy restriction and should adopt one. At this time, such a regulation would still be 
valuable, but distinct from the option discussed in the text. Iglesias, supra note 5. 
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if the statutory exemption applies to a particular governmental policy 
or rule? Second, what is the relationship between a reasonable 
governmental standard and a claim that a private residential 
occupancy standard is discriminatory? 
A previous article attempted to clarify the application and scope of 
the governmental exemption. Briefly, the article argued that: (1) only 
governmental residential occupancy standards adopted for health and 
safety objectives could be eligible for the exemption,312 (2) only 
“reasonable” governmental residential occupancy standards are 
eligible, and (3) “reasonable” must mean something more than 
passing mere rational basis review. It further argued that if a private 
housing provider seeks to use a governmental residential occupancy 
standard as a defense against a claim of familial status 
discrimination, it must show that: (1) the governmental standard was 
adopted for health and safety objectives, (2) the governmental 
standard is “reasonable,”313 and (3) the housing provider is required 
by law to apply that standard to the housing unit at issue. 
The relationship between a reasonable governmental occupancy 
standard and a more restrictive private occupancy standard is 
controversial. Some argue that private housing providers do not have 
any legal authority to set residential occupancy standards more 
restrictive than the applicable reasonable governmental standards. On 
this view, if a landlord imposes such a residential occupancy standard 
with the effect that it excludes a family, all a plaintiff must do to 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1234–35; see also Sierra v. City of New York, 579 F. Supp. 2d 543 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding city housing maintenance code rule explicitly excluding children from SROs 
did not violate FHAA on familial status because of health and safety justifications). 
 313. The same article argued that in Fair Housing Advocates Association, the Sixth Circuit correctly 
held that the mere fact that an occupancy restriction is part of a municipal ordinance “does not remove 
[it] from the reasonableness inquiry,” and that the party claiming the exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 
3607(b)(1) bears the burden of proving that the occupancy restriction is reasonable. See Fair Hous. 
Advocates Ass’n v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 633–34, 636 (6th Cir. 2000). This view 
appears to be consistent with Mr. Kelly’s characterization of this factor as offering a “soft” safe harbor 
to owners. Kelly, supra note 18, at 66 n.48. Unfortunately, that court failed to articulate an appropriate 
and workable test to determine if a governmental standard is “reasonable.” My article proposed two 
alternative tests for “reasonable” standards. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 1250–59. At this time, the author 
believes a better solution would be “enhanced rational basis review,” requiring facts in evidence at time 
of passage that reasonably support the health and safety goals identified in the legislation. Such 
heightened rational basis scrutiny has been applied in other cases and proposed by other commentators 
for similar situations. 
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make an adequate prima facie case for discrimination would be to 
demonstrate this gap between the number of occupants that the 
applicable reasonable governmental standard would allow and the 
number of occupants allowed by the private landlord’s policy. HUD 
Secretary Nelson Diaz’s guidance on private residential occupancy 
standards,314 at least one DOJ consent decree,315 and some cases offer 
support for this view.316 
An alternative view is that even if the applicable governmental 
standard would allow more occupants in the subject unit, a plaintiff 
still bears the burden of making some additional showing that the 
residential occupancy standard discriminates. In practice, this means 
that the governmental standard would set a maximum number of 
occupants that could legally occupy a unit, the FHAA sets a required 
minimum number of persons that must be allowed to occupy a unit to 
avoid discriminating against families, and the FHAA could not 
require more occupants than the governmental standard unless the 
governmental standard failed the “reasonable” test. In other words, 
the governmental maximum is not the same as the FHAA-required 
minimum.317 On this view, the FHAA only requires that landlords not 
discriminate; it does not require landlords to allow occupants up to 
the health and safety limit. Therefore, under the FHAA, landlords 
must provide a legitimate business justification not for any residential 
                                                                                                                 
 314. The [Keating Memo], in my opinion, created more problems than it resolved. . . . [T]here 
have been situations where housing providers have applied a two person per bedroom 
standard which has disproportionately excluded families with children, and, in some 
cases, . . . application of the standard has allowed occupancy by fewer persons than 
would have been allowed under state or local occupancy standards. 
Diaz Memorandum, supra note 166. Indeed, the Diaz Memorandum guidance provided a governmental 
standard (BOCA) as the safe harbor. 
 315. United States v. Candlelight Manor Condo. Ass’n, No. 1:03:-CV-248 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 
2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/candlesettle.php (providing in “Affirmative 
Relief” that defendant will revise master lease to provide “occupancy of any unit or any mobile home 
situated [on any Condominium site] shall not exceed the limitations that may be established from time to 
time by the City of Holland, the County of Allegan, or the State of Michigan . . . and further agrees that 
the occupancy standards as applied at the condominium development will not be more restrictive than 
the requirements of the City of Holland, the County of Allegan, or the State of Michigan”). 
 316. Literally read, an “example” stated in Hawaii’s fair housing statute cited in Tropic Seas suggests 
this interpretation, but the court did not apply it in that way. United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. 
Supp. 1347, 1355 n.5 (D. Haw. 1995). 
 317. In principle, any difference between the governmental maximum and the FHAA-mandated 
minimum creates room for potential bargaining between a landlord and a tenant. 
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occupancy standard that is more restrictive than the governmental 
one, but only for a residential occupancy standard which 
discriminates. Initially, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to show 
that a landlord’s residential occupancy standard would discriminate. 
This understanding finds support in several cases, including Tropic 
Seas,318 and in the only U.S. Supreme Court decision to address the 
issue.319 
These issues regarding the application of the FHAA to 
governmental occupancy standards must be resolved for any solution 
regarding private residential occupancy standards to work; otherwise, 
any solution regarding private residential occupancy standards could 
be undermined by governmental residential occupancy standards and 
a court’s review of them. If HUD adopted a regulation regarding 
private residential occupancy standards without providing sufficient 
other guidance regarding governmental occupancy standards, 
representatives of apartment owners and property management 
companies could be expected to lobby all levels of government to 
adopt the two-person-per-bedroom standard (or one more restrictive) 
and rely on the statutory exemption from FHAA familial status 
liability for “reasonable” standards to defend them.320 
b.   Larger Bedrooms 
HUD’s Preamble, the first Keating Memorandum, and the second 
Keating Memorandum all identify the size of a bedroom as a factor 
that could justify an occupancy standard either more restrictive or 
less restrictive than the presumptively reasonable two-person-per-
bedroom standard.321 One example suggests that if an apartment had 
                                                                                                                 
 318. See Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 1347; see also Laurenti v. Water’s Edge Habitat, Inc., 837 F. 
Supp. 507, 509–11 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 319. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 735 (1995). 
 320. This suggestion has already been made. “Hediger [President of Hediger Enterprises, Inc.] says 
that the situation could be greatly improved if individual states or municipalities would adopt uniform 
standards.” Schindler, supra note 182. For more, see Morales, The Emergence of Fair Housing 
Protections Against Arbitrary Occupancy Standards, supra note 18, at 124–25. 
 321. The Preamble’s mention is incorporated into the Keating Memo. Keating Memo, supra note 16 
(“Thus, the Department believes that in appropriate circumstances, owners and managers may develop 
and implement reasonable occupancy standards based on factors such as the number and size of sleeping 
areas or bedrooms and the overall size of the dwelling unit.”). The first Keating Memorandum had also 
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“two large bedrooms and spacious living areas,” it might be a 
violation for the landlord to exclude a five-person family by 
enforcing a two-person-per-bedroom policy.322 A second example 
suggested that a housing provider could lawfully limit a two-
bedroom mobile home in which “one bedroom is extremely small” to 
two persons.323 HUD has issued charges in a few cases on this 
basis.324 Some courts have attended to this factor.325 
Logically, this Keating factor assumes some implicit “standard” 
bedroom size to be the basis of comparison, but the Keating Memo 
does not identify it. In order to operationalize this factor, HUD would 
need to identify the “standard” bedroom size (or a range) and set a 
standard for what counts as a legally relevant variation from that 
standard so that parties could agree whether or not any specific 
bedroom is a “standard” bedroom size. Building codes typically 
provide a minimum square footage size for a room to be considered a 
“bedroom.” These range from 100 square feet to 120 square feet.326 
Building codes also typically provide an objective measure of what 
additional square footage is necessary to increase occupancy for 
health and safety reasons, (e.g., an additional fifty to seventy square 
feet per additional occupant).327 HUD could use these numbers as a 
benchmark from which to articulate an objective standard for a 
bedroom that is substantially smaller or larger than the standard to 
justify a more or less restrictive occupancy standard. 
                                                                                                                 
identified “the number and size of bedrooms and the overall size of the dwelling unit” as relevant 
factors. One justification for inclusion of this factor is that landlords regularly charge higher rents for 
larger bedrooms. Memorandum from HUD General Counsel Frank Keating on Fair Housing 
Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Standards, supra note 157 
 322. Keating Memo, supra note 16. A justification for including this factor is that landlords regularly 
charge higher rents for units with additional living areas, such as dens, studies and “bonus rooms.” 
 323. Id. 
 324. E.g., Norville v. Dep’t of Human Rights, 792 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 325. See Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1996); Burnett v. Venturi, 903 F. Supp. 304, 306–
07 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 326. See Morales, The Emergence of Fair Housing Protections Against Arbitrary Occupancy 
Standards, supra note 18, at 107–08. Unfortunately, national statistics regarding average bedroom sizes 
are not available from the U.S. Census. 
 327. Id. 
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c.   Additional Sleeping Areas 
The Keating Memo identified the “configuration of unit” as a 
factor. The Keating Memo provided an illustration of this factor in 
which an occupancy standard applied to “a unit consisting of two 
bedrooms plus a den or study” might violate the FHAA if it excluded 
a family of five.328 The phrase “configuration of unit” has been 
understood by HUD to include the availability of additional areas not 
designated as “bedrooms” that would be appropriate for sleeping and 
therefore justify additional occupants.329 HUD has issued charges in 
few cases on this basis.330 Courts’ consideration of this factor is 
consistent with HUD practice. Courts that have attended to this factor 
did not defer to the landlord’s designation of a “bedroom” as the only 
legitimate “sleeping area” where application of an applicable 
governmental housing code would specifically allow this use.331 
In operationalizing this factor, the following issue arises: What 
space counts as a legitimate “other sleeping area”? The Keating 
Memo’s illustration identifies “a den or study” as possible additional 
sleeping areas, but is not exclusive. It is not clear whether other 
places such as basements, dining rooms, or living rooms could also 
qualify. One possible basis for resolving this issue is using “building 
codes” or “property maintenance codes.” Residential occupancy 
standards adopted by governments for health and safety purposes are 
generally part of more extensive building codes or property 
                                                                                                                 
 328. Keating Memo, supra note 16. Interestingly, this exactly describes the facts in the Pfaff case. 
 329. Indeed, HUD’s own 1986 regulations for its Section 8 program made this distinction. See 
Zakaria v. Lincoln Prop. Co. No. 415, 185 Cal. App. 3d 500, 506 n.4 (“Section 882.109(c)(2) provides 
in pertinent part: . . . ‘The dwelling unit shall contain at least one bedroom or living/sleeping room of 
appropriate size for each two persons.’”). 
 330. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Leather v. Florence Tollgate Condo. Ass’n, FHEO No. 02-06-0101-8 
(HUD filed Feb. 11, 2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_14495.pdf. 
 331. See, e.g., United States v. Tropic Seas, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1347 (D. Haw. 1995); see also United 
States v. Hover, No. C93-20061JW, 1995 WL 55379, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1995) (Mobile home 
contained three bedrooms; court ruled that relying on the number of bedrooms, rather than their square 
footage, was not the least restrictive means of achieving their goal); Laurenti v. Water’s Edge Habitat, 
Inc., 837 F. Supp. 507, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (plaintiffs argued the living and dining rooms could be 
considered sleeping rooms). Even the Pfaff court did not appear to defer to the landlords’ prerogative. In 
describing the subject housing unit, the court states: “By way of sleeping space, the house had a master 
bedroom, another 10’ x 10’ bedroom, and a ‘den’ opening directly into the main living area, which 
could also have been used as a bedroom.” Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 742 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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maintenance codes. These codes distinguish between “bedroom” and 
“other sleeping area” or “other habitable space.”332 They typically 
define allowable occupancy based upon a combination of number of 
persons per “bedroom” (using a technical definition)333 and number 
of persons per other “sleeping areas” or “habitable space” (again 
using technical definitions).334 From the standpoint of health and 
safety alone, both types of rooms or areas are appropriate for sleeping 
purposes. The codes clearly exclude kitchens, hallways, closets, and 
bathrooms from consideration as other sleeping areas.335 
Unfortunately, building code authors and publishers fail to provide 
completely operational definitions, useful explanations, or 
commentary on these issues. This lack of clarity leaves room for 
multiple interpretations and resulting conflicts.336 HUD would need 
to resolve this issue by providing an objective and practical definition 
for “other sleeping area” for the purposes of determining if more 
persons must be allowed to occupy a unit which has other rooms or 
habitable space not designated as a “bedroom.” The Appendix 
provides one means of combining the number and size of bedrooms 
and the availability of other sleeping areas into a user-friendly 
standard.337 
d.   Other Physical Limitations of Housing 
The Keating Memo identifies “limiting factors identified by 
housing providers, such as the capacity of septic, sewer, or other 
building systems” as issues to consider when determining whether 
any particular residential occupancy standard is FHAA-compliant.338 
                                                                                                                 
 332. See Morales, The Emergence of Fair Housing Protections Against Arbitrary Occupancy 
Standards, supra note 18, at 107–08. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. For example, landlords could argue that “other sleeping area” means that the space can be used 
like a “bedroom” for naps or overnight/weekend guests but not regularly/permanently. This 
interpretation seems weak because of the lack of temporal limiting language defining “other sleeping 
areas” in building codes, but the building codes do not include other language that would resolve the 
conflict. 
 337. See Appendix: Sample Keating-Form Liability Standard. 
 338. Keating Memo, supra note 16. 
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HUD and courts have struggled with the “carrying capacity” of 
various building systems in several cases, especially in the context of 
mobile home parks.339 This factor is, to some extent, amenable to 
determination by experts using engineering analyses applying 
industry standards. Of course, this raises the risk of the familiar 
“battle of the experts” problem. Courts are familiar with these types 
of conflicts. After appropriate studies, HUD may be able to improve 
the analysis by endorsing certain industry standards. 
e.   Clarifying How the Test Should Be Applied 
The third and final task for making the Keating Memo into a 
liability standard would be for HUD to clarify how the test should be 
applied. The Keating Memo provided some illustrative examples, but 
it does not provide sufficient direction for a court to apply it as a 
liability standard. The Badgett court correctly understood the Keating 
Memo as articulating a “totality of circumstances” test.340 Such a test 
necessarily invests the court with some discretion. However, some 
useful guidance may be provided, especially when the factors are 
operationalized and defined in as objective a manner as possible. 
Following are several initial suggestions. First, the regulation should 
emphasize that, based upon application of the factors, any residential 
occupancy standard that is presumptively compliant could potentially 
violate the FHAA. Second, the regulation could provide a “safe 
harbor” for a private landlord who applies a residential occupancy 
standard derived from applying the Keating factors.341 The regulation 
could state that courts should presume that such a residential 
occupancy standard is nondiscriminatory or at least give substantial 
deference to it. In contrast, if a private housing provider’s occupancy 
policy is more restrictive than that which would come from the 
analysis, it would be presumptively noncompliant. Third, the 
regulation should clarify the plaintiff’s burden to overcome the 
                                                                                                                 
 339. See, e.g., Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819 (D. Nev. 1994). 
 340. See United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 341. In a few jurisdictions, there is a clearly applicable governmental FHAA-compliant standard (e.g., 
Arizona’s two-person-per-bedroom) that landlords will also adopt. 
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presumption in situations where the challenged residential occupancy 
standard is equal to or more generous than the presumptively 
compliant one. Presumably, if the challenged residential occupancy 
standard is more restrictive than the presumptively compliant one, the 
plaintiff’s burden would be light. Fourth, the regulation should 
clarify the defendant’s burden if the plaintiff overcomes the 
presumption, providing a proper analysis and balancing of the 
relevant factors. HUD may decide that some factors are more 
important than others. For example, a defendant’s showing that the 
occupancy standard is one that is mandated by government, 
applicable to this unit, and “reasonable” could constitute a complete 
defense in a case where there is no other evidence of discrimination. 
A reformed Keating standard that emerged from the foregoing 
analysis would serve the FHAA’s anti-discrimination objective.342 
Such regulation fits HUD’s role, expertise, and authority. The 
Keating-type standard would take into account the housing unit 
itself—its space and configuration—and a number of other factors 
long-recognized as relevant by both HUD and courts. This standard 
provides clear and transparent reasoning, which gives better guidance 
to landlords, tenants, and courts. This approach meets landlords’ need 
for notice, certainty, and a legal safe harbor. Just as HUD’s use of the 
two-person-per-bedroom as its enforcement guideline in the Keating 
Memo fostered widespread “compliance” with that standard, HUD’s 
articulation and publication of the new FHAA-compliant standard 
together with the regulation promising a safe harbor would promote 
low-cost and widespread compliance.343 This approach would end the 
disjunction between HUD’s enforcement guidance and the liability 
                                                                                                                 
 342. In addition, serving the anti-discrimination objective would contribute to reducing residential 
segregation in the aggregate. Advocates concerned with the FHAA’s integration goal should use other 
means to serve it, such as applying the FHAA in land use and zoning, including the duty to affirmatively 
further fair housing. 
 343. Initially this approach reduces the costs of litigation to both plaintiffs and defendants compared 
to a disparate impact standard because they would not need to commission statistical studies. By itself, 
this cost reduction would tend to increase litigation. However, with proper promulgation, the approach 
will increase compliance because it provides a new focal point with objective criteria and thus would 
tend to reduce litigation. 
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theories (disparate treatment and disparate impact) that it and the 
DOJ employ in their residential occupancy cases.344 
Some landlords might argue that this approach is too indeterminate 
and gives courts too much discretion in applying the factors. 
However, under any of its formulations, the burden-shifting 
framework gives substantial discretion to courts, albeit not explicitly. 
In contrast, the Keating-type standard arguably gives explicit 
discretion, but allows for more specific direction on how courts 
should exercise such discretion regarding the appropriate factors to 
consider and how to consider them. 
Landlords might complain that this revised Keating-type standard 
is too complex to administer or too costly.345 However, it would 
actually be relatively easy to administer once the initial 
determinations and measurements for a unit were made.346 Notably, 
many landlords already provide square-foot measurements and floor 
plans to prospective tenants.347 Furthermore, HUD could create and 
provide guidance materials, which would make this measurement 
standardized and not burdensome. Absent substantial rehabilitation of 
units, each unit would only need to be measured once. Tenant 
advocates would point out the potential for landlords to “manipulate” 
occupancy by changing sizes or shapes of rooms to avoid the 
specified size requirements. However, this is a risk of all “black 
letter” type rules and would be mitigated by clear standards for the 
other available sleeping areas. 
                                                                                                                 
 344. This approach is consistent with the HUD-appointed Public and Assisted Housing Occupancy 
Task Force recommendation that HUD establish some sort of maximum occupancy standard, based on 
the square footage of the apartment or its sleeping area, or devise some other “safe harbor” mechanism 
to protect landlords from litigation. PUB. & ASSISTED HOUS. OCCUPANCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS AND TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 1-14, 1-15, 1-16 (1994). 
 345. There may be practical implementation problems with needing whole numbers (e.g. three-
person-per-bedroom) instead of fractions (e.g. 2.5 person-per-bedroom). The regulation would have to 
provide a rule for rounding up or down, such as the traditional rule of “if less than half, round down, and 
if equal to or more than half, round up.” 
 346. For an admirably clear (if legally incorrect) explanation of how to apply the Keating Memo 
factors, see How to Abide by the Federal Occupancy Standard, EHOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/how_2170464_abide-federal-occupancy-standard.html (last visited May 16, 
2011) (on file with author). 
 347. See, e.g., APARTMENTS.COM, http://www.apartments.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (featuring 
advertised units on a national rental website). 
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f.   Safe Harbor Requires Transparency 
Most people are familiar with signs in elevators, public meeting 
rooms, and swimming pools that state the allowable number of 
persons who may occupy that space for its designated purpose. HUD 
could combine the new liability standard with a “safe harbor” 
provision, offering landlords who comply with the new liability 
standard a safe harbor from FHAA enforcement. Safe harbors serve 
the useful goal of encouraging compliance at low enforcement cost. 
If HUD were to create such a safe harbor as a complementary 
provision, it should require in the regulation that in order to take 
advantage of the safe harbor, landlords must publicly post the 
residential occupancy standard that they apply to a specific unit, 
include this information in their marketing efforts, and disclose 
square footage and floor plan information upon request.348 In 
combination with other measures described in this section, these 
requirements would increase compliance and decrease litigation by 
reducing tenants’ and tenant advocates’ information costs and by 
facilitating consideration of the space-related factors in the Keating-
type test. 
Such disclosure would not be overly burdensome. At least one 
national organization serving landlords has arrived at the same 
conclusion—that it would be in landlords’ interest to make their 
occupancy standard policy publicly available. Landlord.com 
recommends that landlords perform necessary research to formulate a 
legally defensible residential occupancy standard, write it down, 
incorporate it into the general rental standards policy, and make it 
“available to anyone who has a reason to see it.”349 The national 
rental housing marketing website Apartments.com already includes 
floor plans and square footage in the information provided for 
apartments for rent.350 Advertisements for vacation homes often 
                                                                                                                 
 348. It would need to be a violation of the FHAA to post and subsequently not use the residential 
occupancy standard or to post false standards. 
 349. See The Last Word on Occupancy Policies and HUD, supra note 290. 
 350. See APARTMENTS.COM, supra note 346. 
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include residential occupancy limits. In addition, there is precedent 
for such disclosure in FHAA familial status litigation.351 
3.   Creating Locally Compliant Residential Occupancy Standards 
Any national liability rule will necessarily fail to account for any 
significant differences among and within states of housing stock, 
household composition, and housing supply and demand.352 Based 
upon its studies, HUD may decide that due to substantial variation in 
regional or local factors, it would not be feasible or wise to establish 
one national, presumptively compliant, residential occupancy 
standard. This section offers an alternative to address these potential 
problems. It might be possible to calibrate the Keating-type standard 
to the relevant housing markets.353 
HUD could develop a methodology using the relevant 
geographical unit’s household composition, housing stock, and 
housing supply and demand to identify “local FHAA-compliant 
                                                                                                                 
 351. See, e.g., United States v. Hover, No. C 93-20061 JW, 1995 WL 53379, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 
1995) (part of an order requiring the defendant publish its residential occupancy standard in a 
newspaper); Guvenilir v. Riverbend Club Apartments, HUDALJ No. 04-89-0676-1, at 20 (HUD Oct. 
15,1991), http://www.hud.gov/offices/oha/oalj/cases/fha/files/HUD%2004-89-0676-1.pdf (initial 
decision) (same). There may also be an apartment analogy to HUD certifications for manufactured 
housing here. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Harry J. Kelly, III, another commentator on 
occupancy standards, agrees: “An occupancy standard should be made available to prospective 
tenants. . . .” Kelly, supra note 18, at 62. 
 352. At least one major landlord representative views the Keating Memo as inappropriate because of 
its national scope: 
In 1991, HUD’s chief counsel wrote a memorandum for the guidance of the bureaucrats 
charged with enforcement of the Fair Housing Law, setting out what he thought would be 
reasonable standards for occupancy from Orono, ME, to San Diego, CA, and Vancouver, 
WA, to Miami, FL. This inevitably crass, one-size-fits-all memo was incorporated 
formally into a HUD policy in 1999. 
The Last Word on Occupancy Policies and HUD, supra note 290. 
 353. An experienced fair housing attorney, Chris Brancart of Brancart & Brancart has identified 
another version of locally compliant standards. HUD could require jurisdictions that receive Community 
Development Block Grants or similar funds to include an analysis of private residential occupancy 
standards in the Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing section of their Consolidated Plan. Such 
jurisdictions are required to take measures to reduce or eliminate identified impediments. Alternatively, 
HUD funding for the Fair Housing Assistance Program could require program recipients to review 
private residential occupancy standards in relationship to the Keating Memo and develop locally 
appropriate enforcement standards. In both cases, HUD would specify that the Keating Memo would be 
the minimum amount of protection provided for the fair housing rights of protected classes. Telephone 
Interview with Chris Brancart, Partner, Brancart & Brancart (Feb. 17, 2011). 
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residential occupancy standards” for local jurisdictions.354 For 
example, based upon an analysis of the relevant factors, the FHAA-
compliant residential occupancy standard for City A might be two-
persons-per-bedroom plus one person per additional sleeping area of 
a specified size, while the FHAA-compliant residential occupancy 
standard for City B might be two-persons-per-bedroom plus two 
persons per specified size sleeping area. 
HUD would publicize and distribute to all jurisdictions a set of 
numbers for the locally compliant residential occupancy standards 
which landlords, tenants and tenant advocates could understand and 
follow. The standard could be expressed in the three-digit sample 
form (described in the Appendix). As in the previously proposed 
solution, landlords using these standards would enjoy safe harbor 
from familial status discrimination challenges. 
Even if HUD determined that it did not have the regulatory 
authority to replace the Keating Memo with a liability rule for its 
own use, HUD could use the Consolidated Plan guidelines or FHAP 
grant requirements to enable FHAPs to study and to adopt locally 
appropriate residential occupancy standard enforcement guidelines 
while maintaining the Keating Memo as the mandatory floor. Several 
FHAPs already employ an enforcement guideline that is less 
restrictive than the Keating Memo.355 
This idea is realistic because HUD has substantial experience in 
applying a federal law that takes into account regional and local 
housing conditions, for example computing the annual Section 8 Fair 
Market Rents using American Housing Survey data.356 Due to the 
dynamism of housing supply and demand, this analysis may need to 
                                                                                                                 
 354. The methodology would define how the “relevant housing market” would be delineated. Under 
the methodology, the target could be to set residential occupancy standards to give households with 
children in the relevant housing market an 80% “qualification rate” relative to households without 
children for the existing and expected housing stock. 
 355. See Badami, supra note 96. 
 356. The Fair Market Rents are used in the Housing Choice Voucher, the Moderate Rehabilitation, 
the project-based voucher, and other programs that require location-specific economic data. OFFICE OF 
POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FAIR MARKET RENTS FOR THE 
SECTION 8 HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS PROGRAM 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html. 
92
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/11
2012] PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARDS 711 
 
be redone with some frequency (such as every five years or ten 
years), possibly resulting in changed standards. 
This approach shares most of the same benefits, costs, and risks as 
the Keating strategy. However, if studies revealed that one national 
presumptively compliant occupancy standard would be inappropriate, 
this alternative would help establish better standards. While the legal 
standard would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it would be fair 
because there would be proper and adequate notice. If HUD does 
this, it could do so with the knowledge that each “local FHAA-
compliant residential occupancy standard” would likely become the 
actual standard in each jurisdiction by the same process as the two-
person-per-bedroom standard became established. 
4.   Supplementing the Keating Memo with Additional Guidance 
HUD may determine that under the 1998 statute it does not have 
the regulatory authority to adopt a regulation. Even under such an 
interpretation, HUD’s current authority regarding the Keating Memo 
would arguably include providing gap-filling guidance to improve 
upon how the Keating Memo is applied. Short of adopting a 
regulation, HUD could supplement its enforcement guidance (for 
example, the Keating Memo) with an eye towards making it function 
as a liability standard and then publish the supplementary guidance in 
the Federal Register.357 
Clearly, under this alternative, HUD would not have authority to 
change the two-person-per-bedroom standard as the presumptively 
reasonable residential occupancy standard or to change the factors 
considered under the Keating Memo analysis. 
However, assuming that HUD has authority to issue 
supplementary guidance, ideally, such additional guidance would 
clarify each of the elements of the Keating Memo and its application 
as discussed supra. HUD could conduct some studies to ground the 
                                                                                                                 
 357. If HUD were to pursue this option, it would be useful for it to negotiate a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the DOJ to coordinate their enforcement activities. There is precedent for this. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JOINT STATEMENT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT (May 14, 2004). 
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supplemental guidance. The supplemental guidance could include 
information such as the bedroom size that HUD would consider to be 
the “average” and the minimum size of a room before it would be 
considered an additional sleeping area. 
This approach would provide for better enforcement while giving 
more complete notice to potential defendants about which residential 
occupancy standards HUD is likely to spend resources investigating. 
The difference would be that, unlike the regulation approaches 
discussed supra, the supplemented enforcement guideline would not 
have the force of law. However, if HUD did this, it could do so in the 
knowledge that its new standard would likely become the new 
dominant standard by the same process as before, even if no courts 
adopt it as the actual liability rule. At bare minimum, it would be 
widely known that HUD could and would regularly apply all of the 
Keating factors to determine the “reasonableness” of any residential 
occupancy standard, including a two-person-per-bedroom standard. 
Such an understanding would likely encourage people to file 
administrative complaints with HUD and FHAPs in cases where 
landlords were applying two-person-per-bedroom occupancy policies 
and other factors (such as large bedrooms) were present. 
5.   Conducting Studies 
Two national studies preceded the 1988 amendment to add 
“familial status” as a protected class to the Fair Housing Act.358 At a 
minimum, HUD’s Policy Development and Research division should 
conduct new studies to update and extend the analysis of those 
studies either as a precursor to other recommended actions or to 
inform a decision about which action(s) to take. Important research 
questions include: (1) What range of residential occupancy standards 
do governments apply, and with what justifications?; (2) What range 
of residential occupancy standards do private housing providers 
apply, and with what justifications? In particular, what is the extent 
of the application of the two-person-per-bedroom standard?; and (3) 
                                                                                                                 
 358. GREENE & BLAKE, supra note 30; MARANS ET AL., supra note 30. 
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To what degree and in what typical demographic situations and 
housing markets is the application of particular private residential 
occupancy standards (for example, two-person-per-bedroom) likely 
to discriminate based upon familial status, race, or national origin? 
C.   Plaintiffs’ Options in the Face of HUD Inaction 
Given the political and legal mess so far in the area of residential 
occupancy standards, even if any of the options described above 
could advance the FHAA and be workable in principle, there is still a 
substantial possibility that HUD will not act. While Congress has 
directed HUD to employ the Keating Memo as its enforcement 
policy, HUD has not always applied the entire Keating Memo with 
all of its factors.359 In this case, the opportunity for action moves to 
the fair housing plaintiff’s bar—including the enforcement divisions 
of FHAPs. This section briefly suggests some options. 
Most of the enforcement in this area occurs through the HUD and 
FHAP administrative complaint process, which typically employs the 
Keating Memo. In cases in which complainants are being excluded 
by two-person-per-bedroom residential occupancy standard policies, 
fair housing advocates and attorneys could ensure that complaints 
include sufficient facts, or at least allegations, to trigger the “special 
circumstances” factors of the Keating Memo (and appropriate fact 
investigations) that are likely to merit a complete investigation. This 
would increase the possibility that HUD would make a reasonable 
cause finding and charge the defendant with an FHAA violation. 
Private attorneys, in conjunction with fair housing agencies, could 
bring more cases challenging two-person-per-bedroom residential 
occupancy standard policies using disparate impact theory. They 
should allege facts in complaints and conduct discovery likely to 
support such claims. They could continue to share information about 
what statistical analysis provides a persuasive prima facie case and 
how to challenge subjective and inappropriate attempted 
justifications.360 
                                                                                                                 
 359. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 360. Fair housing attorneys may need training in working with statistical evidence. 
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If defendants refer to the Keating Memo for purposes of defending 
a two-person-per-bedroom residential occupancy standard policy, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys could challenge the legal authority of the Keating 
Memo and especially the two-person-per-bedroom policy standing 
alone as discussed supra. Moreover, if a court were inclined to 
incorporate the Keating Memo into its analysis, plaintiffs could 
ensure that the court considers all of the factors and does not 
privilege the “presumptively reasonable” two-person-per-bedroom 
standard as if it were an actual liability standard.361 If a trial court 
relied on the Keating Memo to allow a defendant to use the two-
person-per-bedroom standard as a defense without thorough 
consideration of the other factors, plaintiffs should consider 
appealing the issue. 
It also might be possible for fair housing lawyers to collaborate on 
one or more large national cases that would erode the dominance of 
the two-person-per-bedroom standard. For example, they might bring 
one or several cases against large, interstate, multi-family housing 
management companies that employ a two-person-per-bedroom 
standard in all of their units of various sizes across several 
jurisdictions.362 They could use local statistics to demonstrate that the 
two-person-per-bedroom practice violated the FHAA in numerous 
states and localities and that its use constitutes systemic 
discrimination. If successful, such a case would become a model for 
litigation by others all over the nation, and might pressure HUD to 
initiate a regulatory process to create a new focal point to reduce 
landlords’ uncertainty. Finally, in some states, there may be other 
state law provisions that fair housing advocates can use to challenge 
private residential occupancy standards.363 
                                                                                                                 
 361. Representatives of the defense bar were noticeably concerned when HUD charged a few special 
circumstances cases. 
 362. This option is modeled upon the litigation in Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. A.G. Spanos Constr., 
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2008). This case settled on favorable terms for the plaintiffs. A 
recent case challenging a two-person-per-bedroom standard against a well-known property management 
company, Grubb & Ellis, was successful on summary judgment in part because Grubb & Ellis did “not 
have any information regarding the occupancy policy, including why it was adopted.” Gashi v. Grubb & 
Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1037, 2011 WL 3489119, at *2 (D. Conn. June 23, 2011). 
 363. E.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2006); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235 
(McKinney 2006); state constitutional protections for privacy; other anti-discrimination laws. 
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D.   Courts’ Options in the Face of HUD Inaction 
If HUD fails to act, courts could address the problem in several 
ways. First, they could converge on a clarified disparate impact 
standard. Any court in which a residential occupancy standard case is 
filed could take the opportunity to clarify and help promote 
convergence around one disparate impact standard. Of course, district 
courts in the circuits that have adopted a version of the disparate 
impact standard would be bound by their circuit’s rule. Nevertheless, 
they could suggest how to improve the disparate impact standard 
applicable to FHAA residential occupancy standard cases, including 
by clarifying which types of justifications are legitimate and what 
evidence is required to prove them.364 
Given courts’ failure to coalesce around a clear disparate impact 
standard in fair housing law generally over the last twenty-two years, 
this option is very unlikely. A more likely potential role for courts 
would be to clarify the legal status of the Keating Memo and, in 
particular, the two-person-per-bedroom standard. As discussed supra, 
while several courts have referred to and arguably used the Keating 
Memo, none has performed the appropriate analysis to clearly specify 
its legal status as merely a HUD intake guideline. 
If courts nonetheless found that the Keating Memo was useful, 
they should work with it to improve it in a common law fashion. 
Assuming arguendo that a court could not change the two-person-
per-bedroom presumptively reasonable standard incorporated into the 
Keating Memo, these improvements would be, as discussed supra, to 
clarify the factors and how they should be applied. This would 
include defining a “bedroom,” making clear that courts need not 
defer to a landlord’s designation of a “bedroom,” and defining other 
“sleeping areas” where a state’s housing code would specifically 
allow this use. 
                                                                                                                 
 364. The proposal by Professor Robert Schwemm and Sara Pratt would be useful guidance if courts 
were inclined toward this effort. See Schwemm & Pratt, supra note 283. 
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CONCLUSION 
Challenging the two-person-per-bedroom standard is necessary to 
increase housing choices for families as the FHAA promises. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the common and dominant 
two-person-per-bedroom standard is frequently discriminatory in 
many jurisdictions across the United States. Additionally, landlords 
who do not enforce restrictive residential occupancy standards often 
do not provide the best housing in good neighborhoods. HUD’s 
Keating Memo impliedly endorses the two-person-per-bedroom 
standard as “presumptively” compliant with the FHAA, contributing 
to the current stalemate at a restrictive and frequently discriminatory 
residential occupancy standard. HUD should disassociate itself from 
this discriminatory standard. 
Any proposed solution should be better than the status quo. As 
argued in this article, the status quo is a two-person-per-bedroom 
dominant residential occupancy standard combined with an uncertain 
liability standard, and the Keating Memo is generally not fully 
applied. Together, these last two elements function as an unintended 
support for the two-person-per-bedroom standard’s veneer of legal 
authority. “Better” means serving the FHAA’s anti-discrimination 
and pro-integration goals with high compliance rates and fairness to 
landlords, property management agencies, and tenants. 
The solutions proposed in this Article seek to serve the FHAA’s 
objectives while recognizing the mutual need for a focal point (which 
aids fairness and compliance), respecting legitimate property rights, 
and offering practical solutions. There is a mutual interest in some 
certainty. On the part of landlords, there will be a continuing need for 
certainty and the strong demand for a focal point which is a legal safe 
harbor. Prosecutors and fair housing advocates also have a strong 
interest in some measure of certainty in this arena because of the high 
costs and uncertainty of litigation. In addition, landlords and tenants 
generally agree that a residential occupancy standard should depend 
to some extent on actual dimensions and the spatial configuration of 
a specific building. Furthermore, they generally agree that any limits 
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should have a legitimate basis, but they disagree on what should 
count as a legitimate reason and what evidence should be required to 
demonstrate whether a justification is legitimate. 
Any solution must consider the stakes of key stakeholders: 
Congress, HUD, the DOJ, the housing industry (especially the 
National Apartment Association and National Multi Housing 
Council), fair housing/civil rights advocates, and the tenants whom 
those advocates represent. Any solution must also take into account 
the diversity of housing supply and demand, composition of housing 
stock, and size and composition of families. The array of options 
presented in this article is intended to be responsive to current legal 
authority and to considerations about proper institutional choice. Of 
course, each alternative has its benefits, costs, and risks. 
It is possible that only relatively small changes in expanding the 
standard residential occupancy standard beyond two-person-per-
bedroom would make a significant difference in increasing housing 
choice for members of protected classes.365 Yet, moving away from it 
requires a complex and delicate balancing of the rights and interests 
of landlords and tenants. This article suggests several ways that HUD 
could move from the overly restrictive two-person-per-bedroom 
standard to a new, less restrictive standard that makes it sufficiently 
certain that high rates of compliance would be achieved. 
Implementation of these proposals would substantially increase 
decent housing and good neighborhoods available to families. 
                                                                                                                 
 365. California’s two-person-per-bedroom-plus-one standard opens up one-bedroom apartments to 
families of three persons and two-bedroom apartments to families of five persons. It is worth noting that 
the two-person-per-bedroom-plus-one standard is only marginally less restrictive than the dominant 
two-person-per-bedroom standard. However, it can have a significant effect on families’ housing 
choices. 
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APPENDIX: A SAMPLE KEATING-FORM LIABILITY STANDARD: THE 
THREE-DIGIT RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY STANDARD 
This version of a Keating-type occupancy standard incorporates 
two of the most important factors: the potential for increased 
numbers of persons permitted per bedroom based upon the size of the 
bedroom, and additional persons based upon the availability of 
appropriately sized other sleeping areas. Instead of the familiar 
single-digit residential occupancy standard, two-person-per-bedroom, 
or the less common two-digit form, two-person-per-bedroom-plus-
one,366 this form of a revised Keating-type standard would consist of 
three digits. The first digit would express the number of persons 
allowed to occupy each room designated as a regular-size “bedroom” 
under the regulation; the second digit would express the number of 
additional persons who would be required to be permitted in rooms 
designated as “bedrooms” which are substantially larger than 
traditional size under the regulation’s definition of “substantial;” and 
the third digit would express the number of additional persons who 
would be permitted in rooms which met the regulation’s definition of 
“other available sleeping areas” (for example, minimum additional 
square footage). The occupancy number established by adding the 
three digits as applied to a particular unit would be the 
“presumptively FHAA-compliant” residential occupancy standard for 
that unit. 
For example, suppose the regulation provided for two-person-per-
bedroom in standard bedrooms of 100 to 120 square feet, one 
additional person per additional 75 square feet in a room designated 
as a “bedroom,” and two persons per other additional “sleeping area” 
measuring at least 100 square feet. Suppose an apartment contains 
two bedrooms (one measuring 100 square feet and the other 
measuring 175 square feet) and a den which meets the regulation’s 
definition of an additional sleeping area and measures 100 square 
                                                                                                                 
 366. The California and Austin, Texas, informal standards are two digits: two-person-per-bedroom-
plus-one. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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feet. The presumptively FHAA-compliant residential occupancy 
standard for this apartment would be 4+1+2 = 7, meaning that the 
landlord would need to allow a family of seven persons to occupy the 
unit. (Four would be allowed because it’s a two-bedroom unit, an 
additional occupant would be allowed because one of the bedrooms 
is substantially larger than normal, and two additional occupants 
would be allowed because the den meets the requirement for an 
additional sleeping area.) Pursuant to the regulation, this presumptive 
standard could be rebutted either by the landlord (as too high for a 
particular unit) or by a tenant (as too low for a particular unit) 
applying the other specified factors. 
The numbers of persons required under the second and third digits 
could be open-ended or, in other words, merely a function of the 
additional size of the bedrooms and the number and size of additional 
sleeping areas. Alternatively, the second and third digits could be 
capped at a specified number (for example, not exceeding a total of 
four), no matter how much larger the bedrooms are and no matter 
how many and how large the additional “sleeping areas” are beyond 
the specified minimum size. Of course, any resulting residential 
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